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Abstract 
Access to finance is a necessity for the start-up, growth, innovation and survival of 
any organisation. As a result, access to finance has become an important theme in 
small business research. Although there is overwhelming research evidence on access 
to finance, there are still research gaps in the knowledge base of different forms of 
access to finance, especially in times of uncertainty and economic distress. 
Specifically, more research is needed on the identification of relevant theories of 
access to finance, the role of venture capital and crowdfunding, the effect of financial 
education and self-confidence on access to micro finance and the role of institutions 
in small firms financial liquidity. The thesis aims to fill these gaps and provide 
comprehensive reviews and new empirical evidence related to the above issues. 
Reviewing the academic literature, this research supports the view that venture 
capital and crowdfunding are both relevant in access to funding for firms as they 
represent worthy alternatives for different types of firms. Venture capital firms (VCF) 
have targeted their investment on later-stage, management buy-out and buy-in to limit 
their risks and increase returns. Although VCF traditionally have huge appetite for 
high risk and high returns, research show that they concentrate their funding on older 
innovative firms. In their risk aversion, VCF have become more stringent in their 
entrepreneurial project selection and monitoring with reduced funding of seed and 
early stage of projects. 
Turning to empirical parts of the thesis, a series of interesting and new findings 
have emerged. First, this thesis supports the view that financial self-confidence of the 
owner manager contributes to successful access to finance for UK firms whereas 
financial education is found to have weak explanatory power. However, financial 
education is found to increase financial self-confidence, and thus can be used as a 
means of improving access to micro-finance for SMEs. Self-confidence is also found 
to be affected by past poor performance of the owners’ credit outcomes stressing the 
importance of building a successful credit history and experience with the financial 
sector. Finally, at international level this thesis stresses the importance of regulation 
and institutions in Baltic States and South Caucasus countries in SME access to 
finance. The analysis points also towards some gender differences which add to the 
existing debate on differences between males and females. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction: SMEs and Access to Finance 
1.1 Introduction 
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) need finance for their start-up, 
innovation, growth and survival (Saridakis et al., 2008, 2013; Jackson et al., 2012). 
There are many ways businesses access finance including personal savings, friends 
and family support, debt finance, equity finance, hire purchase, trade credit and 
invoice discounting (McGuinness and Hogan, 2016; Fraser, 2008). Although these 
methods of accessing finance have some similarities, each of the ways of accessing 
finance has a level of uniqueness. 
 The volume of research on SMEs and access to finance has expanded as SMEs 
have become worldwide phenomena. Indeed, SMEs create jobs and improve the 
economic wellbeing of nations (World Bank, 2015; OECD, 2006). 
 The literature review chapters on bank finance (chapter 2), VC finance 
(chapter 3) and crowdfunding (chapter 4) provides a general and conceptual 
knowledge base about access to finance for SMEs. The empirical chapters (5, 6 and 7) 
provide an in-depth investigation of access to bank finance. The empirical chapters 
investigate access to bank finance (overdraft and loan) as the most important source 
of funding for SMEs. 
 This chapter briefly sets out the objectives and content of the thesis. At the 
outset, it is important to define the phenomena under study. 
1.2 Definition of SMEs 
The definition of SMEs varies across the world. International organisations such as 
the World Bank and the European Commission have given their own definitions of 
SMEs. Whilst SMEs may be defined in terms of the size of their workforce, there are 
other definitions relying on business turnover or the total financial value of the 
business as contained in the balance sheet. 
 
The EU recommended definition for SMEs is as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“1. The category of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) is made up of enterprises 
which employ fewer than 250 persons and which have an annual turnover not exceeding EUR 50 
million, and/or an annual balance sheet total not exceeding EUR 43 million. 
2. Within the SME category, a small enterprise is defined as an enterprise which employs fewer 
than 50 persons and whose annual turnover and/or annual balance sheet total does not exceed 
EUR 10 million. 
3. Within the SME category, a microenterprise is defined as an enterprise which employs fewer 
than 10 persons and whose annual turnover and/or annual balance sheet total does not exceed 
EUR 2 million.” (EU Recommendation, 2003). 
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In the UK, Companies Act 1985 section 248 provided legal definition for small and 
medium-sized businesses as follows: 
 
“248 (1) A company qualifies as small in a financial year if for that year two or more of 
the following conditions are satisfied: (a) the amount of its turnover for the year is not more 
than £1.4 million; (b) its balance sheet total is not more than £700,000; (c) the average 
number of persons employed by the company in the year (determined on a weekly basis) does 
not exceed 50.  
(2) A company qualifies as medium-sized in a financial year if for that year two or 
more of the following conditions are satisfied: (a) the amount of its turnover for the year is not 
more than £5.75 million; (b) its balance sheet total is not more than £2.8 million; (c) the 
average number of persons employed by the company in the year (determined on a weekly 
basis) does not exceed 250.” (Companies Act 1985 section 248(1-2)). 
 
 
Moreover in the UK, the following describes the most recent legal definition 
of small and medium-sized enterprises. These descriptions are contained within the 
legal framework of Companies Act 2006 section 382(3) and 465(3): 
 
“The qualifying conditions are met by a company in a year in which it satisfies two or more of 
the following requirements— 
1. Turnover not more than £5.6 million 
2. Balance sheet total not more than £2.8 million 
3. Number of employees not more than 50” 
(Companies Act 2006 section 382(3)). 
 
“The qualifying conditions are met by a company in a year in which it satisfies two or more of 
the following requirements— 
1. Turnover not more than £22.8 million 
2. Balance sheet total not more than £11.4 million 
3. Number of employees not more than 250” 
 (Companies Act 2006 section 465(3)). 
 
 
This research will adopt the European Commission definition of SMEs as 
described in EU Recommendation (2003) because the research discussions draw 
numerous instances and examples from within European countries. Also, the data 
used for investigation originate from the UK (SME finance survey data) and Central 
and Eastern Europe (BEEPS data). 
1.3 The Research Project 
This thesis is divided into different sections and each section has a level of uniqueness 
to it. Each of the sections is presented in individual chapters as a research output 
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worthy of publication or as a whole to expand knowledge. Hence, each chapter 
reports on a unique concept in access to finance. 
 The motivation for this research is my background as a property entrepreneur. 
I interact with other entrepreneurs from time to time and a common narrative is the 
issue of access to finance. Although access to finance is a common theme among 
many entrepreneurs, there are different entrepreneurial experiences in sourcing 
finance for business projects. As a way to discuss the research gaps, it is necessary to 
identify the main objectives of this research. Therefore, each research topic will be 
determined from the main objectives and discussed in detail within each chapter. 
The main objectives of this research are: 
 To provide a relevant and reliable knowledge base on access to finance to 
support research students, researchers, entrepreneurs, owner managers and 
their businesses. 
 To examine the determinants of access to finance for entrepreneurs and raise 
awareness among researchers and businesses. 
 To investigate the gender dimension in access to finance for business ventures. 
 To explore the relevance of the financial crisis of 2007 and its aftermath in 
creating financial constraints in SME access to finance. 
 To examine the relevance of the court system in supporting access to finance 
transactions between funders and borrower businesses in a globalised domain. 
 To explore the relevance of creativity and innovation in entrepreneurial access 
to finance. 
 
The UK government, research organisations and international organisations 
such as the World Bank and the OECD support the sharing of data for research 
purposes. Indeed, the sharing of statistical data to provide research based solutions to 
different societal issues is very important for mankind and continuous civilisation. 
First, this thesis utilised data from the UK Data Archive accessible via the University 
of Essex. The data acquired was made up of two cross-sectional datasets including the 
2004 and 2008 surveys of 2500 SMEs in the UK. Thus, the datasets covered the 
period before the financial crisis of 2007 and afterwards. Second, another dataset was 
collected from the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey 
(BEEPS) of 2009 on SMEs in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) countries. The 
BEEPS dataset was sponsored by the World Bank and the European Bank for 
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Resettlement and Development (EBRD) as a way to promote development in the 
business environment across the CEE countries. 
1.4 Methodology 
The research approach for this thesis adopts a quantitative paradigm. However, it is to 
set out the important theoretical frameworks and concepts behind the approach 
adopted. Data was acquired externally from two sources, the UK Data Archive and 
The World Bank/European Bank of Settlement. While the UK Data Archive provided 
data for the financial self-confidence and financial education researches, the World 
Bank/European Bank of Settlement provided the BEEPS dataset for exploring access 
to finance in the Baltic States and South Caucasus countries as part of the CEE 
countries. It was also necessary to make references to reports from Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor and World Justice Project. 
The approach adopted for this thesis is positivist (Robson, 2011). To this end, 
the positivist tradition attempts to provide opportunities for explaining empirical 
correlations using predictions to explain events that reflect the natural environment. 
There are arguments for and against quantitative and qualitative methods of 
research. Bryman (2008) introduced mixed methods as a solution to merge the 
benefits contained in each of the quantitative and qualitative research methods. The 
terms deductive and inductive in social science research also provide links to 
positivist and interpretivist paradigm respectively. 
The research approach adopted for this research is the quantitative method and 
this is contrasted with qualitative method in Leedy and Ormrod (2005) as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Apart from the presence of the mixed method approach to research (Bryman, 2005), 
researchers may adopt either quantitative method or qualitative method. As specified 
in the quote attributed to Leedy and Ormrod (2005), quantitative research approach 
explains, predicts and controls the behaviour of variables. On the other hand, 
“In general, quantitative research is used to answer questions about relationships among 
measured variables with the purpose of explaining, predicting, and controlling phenomena. 
This approach is sometimes called the traditional, experimental, or positivist approach. 
     In contrast, qualitative research is typically used to answer questions about the complex 
nature of phenomena, often with the purpose of describing and understanding the phenomena 
from the participants’ point of view. The qualitative approach is also referred to as the 
interpretative, constructivist or postpositivist approach.” (Leedy and Ormrod, 2005, p. 94). 
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qualitative research approach describes phenomenon on the basis of the point of view 
of research participant. 
1.5 Structure and overview of this thesis 
This thesis has eight substantial chapters and each chapter provides an analysis of 
different aspects of funding for SMEs. 
1.5.1 Chapter 1 
This chapter introduces the thesis as a single unified document containing the 
definition of SMEs, research project overview with objectives, methodology and 
structural definition. The methodology section discussed the methodological approach 
used for this research as well as a general philosophical and epistemological 
foundation, quantitative and qualitative concepts. 
1.5.2 Chapter 2 
This chapter discusses access to bank finance. SMEs play a significant role in both the 
national and international economy and social life related to employability and 
promoting urbanisation. Small firms, however, have traditionally encountered 
problems with both raising and approaching providers of finance, and the link 
between SMEs and external finance has been widely researched in small business 
literature. Hence, this chapter will review the related literature developed by both 
economists and management experts, discusses theories of SME financing and 
critically reviews these studies. The chapter will add to the understanding of access to 
finance for small firms in the UK with particular emphasis after the credit crunch, 
highlights the most important issues and concepts that affect the SMEs’ finance today 
and provides useful information to academic, practitioners and policy makers. 
Particularly, the chapter will cover key issues related to information asymmetry, the 
financial crisis, government intervention and personal characteristics such as ethnic 
minority and female entrepreneurs, and discusses the challenges faced during the 
financial crisis providing an objective assessment of various points of view. 
 This chapter fills the knowledge gap and makes a contribution of providing a 
concise knowledge base of access to bank finance as the most common source of 
funding for SMEs. Bank finance is a source of debt finance made up of overdrafts and 
loans. We focus on bank finance because overdrafts and commercial loans are the 
most common credit facilities available to small firms. We empirically examine the 
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effect of financial education (Chapter 5) and financial self-confidence (Chapter 6) on 
bank finance rejection outcomes. 
1.5.3 Chapter 3 
This chapter discusses formal venture capital (VC) as an alternative or substitute form 
of access to finance as it involves equity finance or equity-linked investment in 
potentially high growth unquoted companies. Venture capital is an alternative means 
of access to finance for innovative SMEs to sustain their innovation, growth and 
survival. Although VC firms are well established in the UK and USA, it is not well-
known worldwide and many SMEs are unaware of their potentials. This chapter will 
review research literature on VC, its conceptualisation and synthesis over four 
decades. VC is gaining increased and varied significance worldwide as a way for 
innovative SMEs to access fund. Globalisation has provided entrepreneurs the 
opportunity to seek VC globally as reputable VC firms are able to fund innovative 
projects across countries and continents. As the legal and regulatory regimes improve 
around the world, VC finance opportunities increase with impact on the demand and 
supply of VC. Innovative SMEs are encouraged to take advantage of globalisation 
and competition among VC firms in their search for VC. Recently, VC firms have 
become more risk averse regardless of their traditional competence in screening and 
monitoring. 
 This chapter also fills the knowledge gap and makes a contribution of 
providing a concise knowledge base of formal VC finance as an alternative source of 
funding for SMEs, albeit equity based finance. However, VC finance was not 
empirically examined in this thesis. 
1.5.4 Chapter 4 
This chapter discusses crowdfunding
1
. This chapter analyses research and policy 
literatures in the spheres of crowdfunding. It identifies reward-based, donation-based, 
equity-based and credit-based crowdfunding with a view to collate relevant 
information to support crowdfunding knowledge base and further research. 
Crowdfunding is a relatively new concept, increasing in popularity in social media, 
business and research communities. Academic research in crowdfunding is limited 
                                                          
1
 This chapter was recently published as a book chapter (ISBN 978-1-4666-9604-4) - Imarhiagbe, B. O. 
(2016) Exploring the spheres of crowdfunding. In D. Assadi (Ed.), Strategic Approaches to Successful 
Crowdfunding (pp. 190-209). Hershey, PA: Business Science Reference. doi:10.4018/978-1-4666-
9604-4.ch009 
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and the subject is still evolving as a way of access to finance for seed capital, 
entrepreneurial projects and other early stage projects. European and North American 
organisations have recognised the relevance of crowdfunding for project fundraising. 
However, the World Bank confirmed that developing countries are at different stages 
of recognition of crowdfunding in their policy framework. Although the UK financial 
regulator, the Financial Conduct Authority, produced a policy statement for 
crowdfunding and approved some service providers such as crowdfunding platforms, 
it is still interacting with stakeholders and providing guidance to potential 
entrepreneurs on the operational models. Crowdfunding is an innovative way of 
raising small amounts of money from different contributors over the internet for 
different types of projects. There are huge management implications in the spheres of 
crowdfunding. 
 This chapter fills the knowledge gap and makes contribution of providing a 
concise knowledge base of crowdfunding as a systematic review of the different 
spheres of crowdfunding literature and describes relevant theories. However, 
crowdfunding was not empirically examined in this thesis. Although crowdfunding 
has been recognised as a source of entrepreneurial business finance, it is an 
innovative, new and technology savvy concept requiring exploration. Accordingly, 
crowdfunding is said to be increasing in popularity all over the world using the 
internet platform as a medium linking the electronic crowd contributors and 
entrepreneurs seeking project fund. 
1.5.5 Chapter 5 
This chapter presents an empirical study of the human capital of the owner manager 
of a business. It discusses the relevance of human capital (such as experience, 
financial education and academic qualifications) in access to bank finance for 
businesses. This chapter empirically examine the association between financial 
education and bank finance rejection of owner managers in their access to bank 
finance for their business. This chapter use data from 2004 and 2008 surveys of 2500 
UK small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Although there is limited research 
evidence, the relationship between financial education and bank finance outcome is 
interesting and important from academic and policy perspective. This chapter use 
micro-econometrics techniques to measure and assess the effect of SME owner 
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manager’s financial education on bank finance rejection rates. It was found that the 
financial education of owner managers have no significant effect on bank finance 
rejection rate. However, there is a significant effect that the financial self-confidence 
of owner managers lowers their bank finance rejection rates. It follows that financial 
self-confidence is an important predictor for bank finance rejection. Hence, it is 
argued that financial self-confidence determines financial behaviour and performance 
and should be integral part of educational programmes related to financial capabilities 
and knowledge. 
 This chapter examines the role of financial education on bank finance 
outcomes for small firms. We focus on bank finance because overdrafts and 
commercial loans are the most common credit facilities available to small firms. This 
chapter contribute to our understanding of the relevance of financial education as a 
form of human capital as well as the dimension of business age and gender aspects in 
the course of seeking bank finance. Following the importance of bank finance and 
credit rejection outcomes, we present empirical investigation on Chapter 5, Chapter 6 
and Chapter 7. 
1.5.6 Chapter 6 
This chapter
2
 presents an empirical study of the self-confidence in finance among 
owner managers. It describes how self-confidence in finance among owner managers 
can contribute to improved access to finance. This chapter will empirically examine 
the determinants of owner manager self-confidence in finance using the data from 
2004 and 2008 surveys of 2500 UK small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The 
analysis finds evidence that outright bank credit rejection reduces financial self-
confidence among owner managers whereas partial bank credit rejection is found to 
help boost confidence prior to the financial crisis. Furthermore, financial self-
confidence is partly gender dependent. In particular bank credit rejection is found to 
reduce self-confidence among men entrepreneurs after the crisis whereas the 
association is found to be weak for women. There is also strong evidence that 
financial education increases financial self-confidence. 
 This chapter empirically examines the role of financial self-confidence on 
bank finance outcomes for small firms. We focus on bank finance because overdrafts 
                                                          
2
 This chapter was recently invited for major revisions in the International Journal of Entrepreneurial 
Behavior & Research. 
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and commercial loans are the most common credit facilities available to small firms. 
This chapter contribute to our understanding of the relevance of financial self-
confidence and bank finance outcomes. Following the importance of bank finance and 
rejection outcomes, we present empirical investigation in Chapter 5, Chapter 6 and 
Chapter 7. This chapter makes a contribution in empirically examining the 
determinants of financial self-confidence of small firm owner managers, pre and 
during the recent financial crisis. In particular, the chapter provides the effect of bank 
credit rejection on the financial self-confidence of business owners in times of booms 
(pre financial crisis) and busts (during financial crisis). 
1.5.7 Chapter 7 
This chapter examines access to finance for SMEs in the Baltic States and South 
Caucasus countries immediately after the financial crisis of 2007. Specifically, we use 
the cross-sectional dataset from the Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Survey (BEEPS) for 2009 to empirically examine access to finance for 
SMEs and the court system in the Baltic States and South Caucasus countries. We 
find variations from one Baltic State and South Caucasus country to another about the 
fairness, speed of justice and court decision enforcement. We suggest that if access to 
finance is no obstacle to business operations and the court system is fair, impartial and 
uncorrupted, it determines the likelihood of strength in entrepreneurship. 
Additionally, we find that businesses that face obstacles in accessing finance are more 
likely to have a female as their top manager in the Baltic States. However, for the 
South Caucasus region we find no gender differences. 
 This chapter investigates the Baltic States and South Caucasus countries 
immediately after the financial crisis of 2007 to differentiate between the EU and non-
EU countries. The rationale for this choice was the contrasting development paths of 
the countries involved with emphasis on the pace of institutional change and 
geography. As well as investigating access to finance for entrepreneurs in these post 
socialist countries, this chapter also examine the effectiveness of the court system 
which can be a major constraint if there are significant institutional deficiencies. 
Therefore, this chapter provides a comparative study between the Baltic States and 
South Caucasus countries as part of a study on the EU and non-EU. 
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1.5.8 Chapter 8 
This chapter provides a general conclusion for this research. It discusses the 
importance of access to finance for SMEs and described the research gaps. This 
chapter also describes the summary of the research findings and their importance as 
well as the limitations of this research work. 
1.6 Conclusion 
This thesis presents a multi-analysis of access to finance for SMEs. These various 
aspects are contained in individual chapters in this thesis. This conclusion captures a 
summary of each of the research chapter and an overall assessment of the position of 
access to finance for SMEs. 
 The research creates an awareness of the theories of access to finance and 
improves the research based knowledge base to support businesses, researchers, 
students and other business practitioners. Gender related research in access to finance 
should consider and exploit other factors including collateral, credit history, banking 
relationship, use of financial intermediary and human capital. 
 Venture capital firms (VCF) have targeted their investment on later-stage, 
management buy-out and buy-in to limit their risks and increase returns. In their risk 
aversion, VCF have become more stringent in their entrepreneurial project selection 
and monitoring with reduced funding of seed and early stage of projects. As UK VC 
funders are influential in global VC finance, their risk aversion has spread abroad. UK 
VCF invests more in the UK than other countries and this may reflect a localisation 
bias. Moreover, the VCF in the USA have localisation bias in their investment as 
there are concentrations in some localities such as San Francisco, New York and 
Boston. VCF have become more risk averse even in a globalised business 
environment amidst their financial risk management, screening and monitoring 
capabilities. This is not compatible with their previous appetite for high risk and high 
returns. Therefore, this is an area requiring further research. 
 Crowdfunding is a new, innovative, alternative and additional method of 
access to finance for seed, start-up and other early stage project fundraising from 
many small contributors via the internet. The existing economic and management 
theories (e.g. pecking order, signalling, stakeholder, social capital and agency cost) of 
SMEs are also applicable to crowdfunding. Globalisation and web technology has 
provided the driving force for a quicker expansion of crowdfunding all over the 
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world. Crowdfunding is increasing in popularity amongst SMEs as demonstrated in 
social media, business and research environments. It is very important that researchers 
explore crowdfunding widely with a view to broaden the knowledge of project 
initiators (such as entrepreneurs, business owners and managers). The necessity for 
further research is centred on the need for better information sharing and knowledge 
exchange to support new and existing entrepreneurs all over the world. 
 The analysis shows that the financial education of owner managers has no 
significant effect on bank finance rejection rate. However, there is a significant effect 
that the financial self-confidence of owner managers lowers their bank finance 
rejection rates. We suggest that financially self-confident owner managers can 
provide a potential signalling effect on bank lenders in their access to bank finance. 
Although there were high bank credit rejection rates in 2008, financially self-
confident owner managers had better access to bank finance in comparison to their 
non-financially self-confident counterparts. It is recommended that further research 
explores the role of financial education and financial self-confidence among owner 
managers in limited liability businesses, charities and social enterprises to support 
their strong growth. Start-up firms face greater challenges in accessing finance for 
their project and established firms are found to be less likely to be rejected or had 
reduced funding by banks. It is argued that the government may provide direct 
support through start-up training and start-up finance in the form of micro credit. The 
government may target financial support and counselling to the start-up entrepreneur 
on the basis of business potential and viability. 
 Outright bank credit rejection is negatively associated with financial self-
confidence whereas partial bank credit rejection may boost self-confidence. 
Moreover, the results show that financial education has a strong and positive effect on 
self-confidence in finance providing support for increasing entrepreneurial and 
financial education in higher education.    
Further research is recommended to evaluate and assess the self-confidence in 
finance of owner managers in limited companies, social enterprise and charities to 
determine their credit rejection rate and their gender aspect. This knowledge will 
allow owner managers to resolve their deficiencies in financial education as a way to 
increase their self-confidence in finance and determine their readiness for 
entrepreneurship. 
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 The study of the Baltic States and South Caucasus region finds that the court 
system is a good legal regulatory system measured by their level of fairness, 
impartiality and uncorrupted. There are remarkable differences in access to finance 
and court systems between these countries but there are also similarities. In both the 
Baltic States and South Caucasus region, firms that report fairness, impartiality and 
uncorrupted court system have a reduced likelihood of access to finance obstacle. 
Although access to finance is identified as an obstacle to business operations in each 
of the Baltic States and South Caucasus countries, it is not the biggest obstacle in all 
of the countries. The biggest obstacle to business operations is access to finance in 
Azerbaijan. The practice of competitors in the informal sector is the biggest obstacle 
to business operations in Armenia. Inadequately educated workforce is the biggest 
obstacle to business operations in Estonia. Political instability is the biggest obstacle 
to business operations in Georgia. Tax rate is the biggest obstacle to business 
operations in Latvia and Lithuania. 
 Overall, these chapters contribute to our understanding of SME finance. The 
specific issues discussed and analysed within each of the chapters provide the 
contexts but collectively add to the wealth of analysis of the challenges that SMEs 
face in accessing finance for their entrepreneurial endeavours. 
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Chapter 2 SME Access to Bank Finance 
2.1 Introduction 
The funding of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) is an important part of the 
smooth functioning of the UK economy seeking to promote entrepreneurship, 
innovation in both production and management that leads to performance, 
productivity and thus, to profits and economic growth after the financial crisis 
(Cornett et al., 2011; Saridakis et al., 2013).  SMEs are a vital part of the economy as 
they constitute more than 95 per cent of enterprises in OECD countries and are 
responsible for 60-70 per cent of new job creation (OECD, 2006, 2013a). The World 
Bank also acknowledged the role of SMEs in the economic growth of nations 
(Hallberg, 2000) and, hence, good financial sector development can support SMEs 
and reduce poverty (Lin and Li, 2001). Given that SMEs contribute to better 
economic development, the UK government over many decades echoed the need for 
SME funding through reports such as the Macmillan Report (Stamp, 1931), Bolton 
Report (Bolton, 1971) and the Cruikshank Report (Cruickshank, 2000). Although the 
UK government introduced different SME funding schemes, some SMEs are still 
financially constrained following the credit crunch (Kay et al., 2014; BIS, 2013a, 
2013b). Our review concentrates on the UK, the effect and aftermath of the financial 
crisis of 2007. 
Nevertheless, SMEs face significant constraints to access finance from the 
banking system and some of them fail as a result (see, for example, Kay et al., 2014; 
Saridakis et al., 2013, 2008). Nowadays, finance is even limited accentuating the 
already dismal economic climate since individuals are discouraged in setting up new 
businesses and a substantial part of the existing businesses fail to meet their financial 
obligations and seek alternative solutions. Indeed, overdrafts and bank loan rejection 
rates were significantly higher since the start of the financial crisis suggesting 
potential credit supply constraints (Kay et al., 2014; Fraser, 2008; Popov and Udell, 
2012). In the midst of financial constraints from overdraft and loans in the aftermath 
of the crisis, some vulnerable SMEs explored trade credit (McGuinness and Hogan, 
2016). As far as we are aware, however, there is no single and concise review 
containing information and analysis relevant for major aspects of UK SMEs and their 
access to funding as well as the effect of the recent financial crisis. 
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Our contribution is a broad knowledge base as the subject of access to finance 
in small firms in the UK has assumed a different dimension in the credit crunch 
induced by the recent financial crisis of 2007. Therefore, this chapter contributes to 
the small business research literatures as an authoritative knowledge base as follows. 
First, it provides a review of the key theories for SME financing cut across multiple 
disciplines including economics and management. The understanding of these key 
theories will provide adequate knowledge of owner-manager behaviour in accessing 
finance for their business venture. Second, it provides the critical review of the 
economics and management research literatures related to debt financing and equity 
funding, focusing particularly in the UK small firms sector in the aftermath of the 
2007 credit crunch, provides an accumulation of knowledge for access to finance 
derived mainly from research sources. Third, this knowledge base is also relevant and 
provides a rich source of information for small businesses, entrepreneurs, 
practitioners, policymakers and researchers of SME financing in the UK and beyond. 
Fourth, it provides a review of the global financial crisis of 2007 and its impact on 
countries. Although the crisis originated in the USA, it impacted other countries in 
varied measure. Hence, businesses across international boundaries were impacted 
dependent on the country-level severity. A notable example is the UK and New 
Zealand research of Smallbone et al. (2012). Fifth, the discussion also includes a 
critical account of debates (such as collateral, gender and ethnicity) in small firms 
with suggestions of potential avenues and directions for further academic research. 
To achieve our aim, we use EBSCO, Econlit, Emerald, Google Scholar and 
ScienceDirect electronic databases in our search for academic journal papers using 
keyword search method and manual search of leading academic journals. We also 
used reports published by government bodies and international organisations. In 
section 2, we discuss the problem of information asymmetry and focus on the 
importance of collateral, the relationship between lenders and borrowers, credit 
scoring, market intermediation and law and regulations. Section 3 reviews key 
theories of SME financing. Section 4 discusses the financial crisis and its role in SME 
financing. Section 5 discusses the ambiguous link between personal characteristics 
(such as ethnicity and gender) and external finance. Section 6 presents UK 
government interventions to support SMEs. Finally, in section 7, the chapter presents 
a conclusion with suggestions for further research and directions. 
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2.2 The problems of information asymmetry 
Holmes et al. (2003, p. 97) defined information asymmetry (IA) as ‘a situation in 
which agents have information on the financial circumstances and prospects of the 
enterprise that is not known to principals’. IA is a major problem in SME funding 
because lenders and borrowers do not agree on the level of information perfection – 
one often claims superiority over the other. The level of information perfection 
impacts credit decision making. In the previous discussion we highlighted that IA 
may impact SME access to finance in diverse ways (Bester, 1987; De Meza and 
Webb, 2000; Leland and Pyle, 1977; Mattesini, 1990) and it appears the phenomenon 
tends to exhibit a variety of meaning from lenders to borrowers. Indeed, the concept 
of perfection in credit market information is somewhat a fallacy as perfect 
information varies between borrowers and lenders.  Certainly, IA is a major link in the 
credit decision making process with many parameters (e.g. credit scoring, availability 
of collateral, banking relationship, human capital and legal/regulation) from one 
lender to another towards rejection or acceptance of credit application. These 
parameters have the capacity to impact one another in the credit decision making 
process. In the analogy of Hodgson and Drummond (2009), IA could be synonymous 
with uncertainty and, consequently, any credit decision based on uncertain parameters 
run the risk of failure. Although Holmes et al. (2003) discussed IA in relation to 
management and SME research in general, the phenomenon assumed a different 
dimension in the financial crisis. 
 Following various research findings and conclusions (Berger and Udell, 2002; 
Stiglitz, 2002; Mattesini, 1990; Jensen and Meckling, 1976), it is necessary to define 
some key relevant concepts including information asymmetry, adverse selection and 
moral hazard. Information asymmetry is a situation where one party to an economic 
transaction has better information than the other. Adverse selection refers to a 
situation where borrowers have information that lenders do not, or vice versa, about 
accessing finance. A moral hazard may occur where the actions of one party may 
change to the detriment of another after a financial transaction has taken place. 
Researches (Berger and Udell, 2002; Stiglitz, 2002; Mattesini, 1990) show that 
information asymmetry simply means imperfect information. Thus, adverse selection 
and moral hazard are the result of information asymmetry. 
There is benefit in the separation of ownership and control of entrepreneurial 
ventures as a way to improve IA (Acemoglu, 1998). However, the owner of the firm 
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still holds the power of the business because he remains the employer. Hence, the 
reduction of IA through transfer of business control may not be a sustainable 
argument. Venture capitalists provide funding for start-up and technology firms 
regardless of the high IA and the associated high risk (Greene et al., 2001). In a more 
recent paper, Cowling et al. (2012) showed that IA may not cause reduced investment 
as there are increasing numbers of finance providers who are still willing to lend to 
less risky firms. Thus, it can be argued that the issue of IA are being resolved as some 
lenders (e.g. venture capitalists and business angels) have devised ways to mitigate 
the risks. In mitigating the risk factor associated with IA, Lean and Tucker (2001) and 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) discussed the concept of agency cost made up of 
monitoring cost, screening cost and residual loss. 
The problem of IA, however, stresses particularly the importance of collateral, 
the relationship between lenders and borrowers, credit scoring, market intermediation, 
and law and regulation in which we now turn our discussion. This review will discuss 
each problem of IA in turn. 
2.2.1 Collateral 
Collateral is important in a lender-borrower relationship to eliminate or reduce IA 
because it can act as a signal to lenders of potential borrower performance. Collateral 
is an asset pledged by a borrower to secure credit. The presence or absence of 
collateral in a lender-borrower relationship can impact the credit market positively or 
negatively (Bester, 1987; Besanko and Thakor, 1987; Mattesini, 1990). According to 
Fraser (2008, p. 7), ‘overdraft rejections due to the firm having no security/collateral 
have more than doubled in 2005-2008 (accounting for 9.5% of overdraft rejections; 
up from 4.1% in 2001-4)’. Whilst the absence of collateral can impact negatively on 
the borrower, it can also impact negatively on the lender as every unsuitable borrower 
reduces the potential customer base of the lender.  Likewise, the presence of collateral 
can impact positively on both lender and borrower in a lender-borrower relationship. 
For their lack of or inadequate collateral, start-up firms experience greater problems 
accessing finance (OECD, 2006). According to Bester (1987, p. 887), there are 
‘different riskiness’ associated with different borrowers. Fraser (2004, 2008) 
confirmed that firms with greater collateral tend to experience fewer credit rejections. 
This agrees with Cowling et al. (2012) in that lenders prefer to lend to larger and older 
businesses as they are able to show more collateral, especially during the period of 
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economic uncertainty. Therefore, although collateral provides security for credit and 
act as a measure of assurance against potential repayment default of the borrower, 
credit risk can become riskier in the time of economic volatility. 
Mattesini (1990, p. 1) disclosed that ‘there are serious limits to the use of 
collateral as a screening device.’ Although Bester (1987) and Besanko and Thakor 
(1987) supported the use of collateral to determine lending, Mattesini (1990, p. 2) 
found that the extent to which lenders can use collateral to determine lending is 
dependent ‘on the proportion of high- and low-risk firms in the market.’  It is possible 
that moral hazard and adverse selection (Berger and Udell, 2002; Mattesini, 1990) 
may hamper collateralisation and credit rationing. Although there is a limit to the use 
of collateral for credit rationing, adverse selection can still lead to collateralisation 
(Mattesini, 1990). However, the availability of collateral does not rule out credit 
rationing (Coco, 1999). Thus, the availability or no availability of collateral in a credit 
transaction is only a single measure amidst a plethora of criteria and lender decision 
facilities.  Coco (1999) suggested that the availability of collateral may not signal any 
potential project risk. Therefore, it is not possible for lenders to weigh project risk 
based on available collateral alone. Indeed, the credit crunch posed a major project 
risk for businesses. 
Saridakis and Storey (2009) suggested that banks may incur significant cost of 
valuing collaterals to enable lending decision.  Hence, the cost of valuing assets and 
risks of using property as collateral in a market characterised by falling prices can be 
a discouragement for lending. This is particularly relevant during the period of the 
financial crisis, as Fraser (2008) revealed that negative equity sets in when the current 
asset value falls.  Cornett et al. (2011) interpreted the financial crisis induced 
volatility as managed liquidity which can lead to credit rationing or outright credit 
rejections. Borrowers who possess large collateral may have access to high value 
loans for their business but may not require it (Wang, 2010). Therefore, the existence 
of a high value loan which is greater than the entrepreneurial project requirement may 
signify risk of ‘inefficient resource allocation and over-borrowing’ (Wang, 2010, p. 
220). Hanley and Girma (2006) identified the dilemma of a large and indivisible asset 
which could allow for borrowing but the collateral value is greater than the credit 
requirement. Hence, the lender could still be at risk if the borrower has inadequate 
human capital (e.g. qualification and experience) to make full use of the credit facility 
provided. 
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2.2.2 Relationship lending  
Relationship lending is important in a lender-borrower relationship because it allows 
the lender to have adequate information about the potential borrower to support 
lending decision. Money lending through an established banking relationship could be 
an alternative funding provision for potential SME borrowers who fail collateral 
requirement of their lender (Voordeckers and Steijvers, 2006). This can only work in 
favour of the borrower where there is a good and established relationship with the 
lender (Cotugno et al., 2012; Saridakis and Storey, 2009). While trust in bank 
relationships with SMEs result in more credit facilities and reduced credit constraints, 
agency cost and transaction cost are also reduced (Moro and Fink, 2013). On the other 
hand, a good and established relationship can only be formed over a reasonable period 
of time (Saridakis and Storey, 2009). Hussain et al. (2006) found that 85.7% of SMEs 
based in the UK have either good or excellent relationship with their banks and Fraser 
(2004) showed that 61 per cent of UK SMEs were satisfied with their bank charges. 
Fraser (2008) also confirmed the usefulness of good banking relationship in SME 
funding. In the 1st quarter of 2013, 77% overdraft and 69% loan applications 
succeeded for repeat SME borrowers (BDRC, 2013). However, they show that first 
time applicants had 38% overdraft and 41% loan success. Thus, where good or 
excellent relationship exists between lender and borrower, it can lead to favourable 
borrowing terms as IA problem would have been resolved. However, Cenni et al. 
(2015) confirm that credit rationing and relationship lending are not the same for 
different firm size. 
 According to Berger and Udell (2002), lenders who form a relationship with 
borrowers improves their lending commitment over time. Cotugno et al. (2012) 
investigated the relevance of relationship lending during the period of financial crisis 
and found that a consolidated relationship can diminish credit rejections. However, it 
can be argued that relationship lending can be a type of risk misperception (Rötheli, 
2010) because relationships between banks and their customers are different, varied 
and has the potential to be complex. Interestingly, Fraser (2008) found that bank 
switching rates were higher over the credit crisis suggesting that SMEs were forced to 
seek alternative financial providers. 
In emphasising the significance of relationship lending, Voordeckers and 
Steijvers (2006, p. 3067) asserted that ‘the collateral requirement decreases in the 
length of the bank-borrower relationship.’ Saridakis and Storey (2009, p. 91) also 
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disclosed the significance of ‘good and longer financial relationships’ in SME 
funding. Credit lenders are able to reduce their cost of borrower assessment and 
monitoring as the information at their disposal is relatively adequate to make lending 
decisions (Saridakis and Storey, 2009). According to Voordeckers and Steijvers 
(2006) and Saridakis and Storey (2009), the length of time of the lender-borrower 
relationship is very significant because IA may not be resolved in a short time towards 
making a good lending decision. 
2.2.3 Credit scoring 
Credit scoring is important in a lender-borrower relationship because it informs the 
lender about the credit performance of the potential borrower. UK credit reference 
agencies have been engaged in checking the credit score and credit history of 
individuals to help lenders determine the propensity of individuals (e.g. owner-
managers, entrepreneurs) to pay back loans without repayment default on credit 
agreements (Banasik et al., 2003). Credit reference agencies keep records which are 
made up of previous individual credit information, electoral roll data, court judgments 
and existing credit defaults (Saridakis and Storey, 2009). The decision to establish a 
bank branch can depend on the ready availability of efficient credit bureaus and 
quality credit reporting facilities (Tsai et al., 2011). Therefore, the availability of 
credit bureaus is a signal of stability in the financial environment to support credit 
transactions. It was found that credit bureaus assist to reduce the information costs to 
the lender in the process of making credit lending decision (Tsai et al., 2011). Beck 
and Demirguc-Kunt (2006) identified the sharing of credit information as a way of 
facilitating SME funding. The number of SMEs defaulting on their credit liability 
increased during the recession (Bruche and González-Aguado, 2010). Accordingly, 
the financial crisis of 2007 caused an increase in the credit default rate which can lead 
to lesser creditworthiness and Fraser (2008) confirmed that the increase in the rate of 
bank credit rejections was a strategy used to reduce high risk. 
In the process of determining SME funding, lenders perform credit scoring 
which involves a consideration of the ‘owner’s wealth and firm assets…business and 
owner characteristics…financial ratios…financial delinquency’ (Fraser, 2008, p. 109). 
The credit scoring of the small firm extend to the owner-manager of the firm as a way 
to get a clearer understanding of the business history and performance (Berger and 
Udell, 2006). Credit scoring models have varying levels of bias and the credit scores 
are predicted values derived from the probability of repayment (Banasik et al., 2003). 
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Different lenders tend to keep their credit scoring approach a secret to gain 
competitive advantage and lenders whose credit scoring technique is too strict may 
become uncompetitive in the financial market as borrowers may approach lenders 
with reduced strictness in their credit scoring system (Blöchlinger and Leippold, 
2006). The level of strictness of a particular credit scoring model does not determine 
its quality (Banasik et al., 2003). According to Blöchlinger and Leippold (2006), 
when there is an increase in the use of credit scoring, it could increase the 
discriminatory power of one bank. They suggests that the bank which discriminates 
against low quality borrowers through credit scoring could affect its profits and 
systematically improve the market share of competitive lenders, and lenders who 
adopt a better credit scoring model will enjoy higher loan portfolio with less risk of 
borrower default. 
2.2.4 Market intermediation  
Market intermediation is important in a lender-borrower relationship because it acts as 
an intermediary between a lender and borrower. Market intermediation defines the 
activities of market intermediaries who are middlemen in lender-borrower 
relationship. As development in the financial market increases, tools like 
intermediation for improving market processes also increase (Aggarwal and Goodell, 
2009; Meon and Weill, 2009). The emergence of intermediaries in market 
transactions supports both buyer and seller in their seemingly indirect relationship 
(Spulber, 1996). Market intermediation may improve IA but in an earlier paper 
Leland and Pyle (1977) suggested that the authentication of the true circumstances of 
the borrower by intermediaries may be costly or impossible.  There is costly 
monitoring in the course of seeking better information to enable lenders in making 
better lending decision (Williamson, 1987b). The intermediation function of 
supplying information to the lender makes the intermediary provide the 
‘microstructure’ of the financial and credit market (Spulber, 1996, p. 135). The 
market for information has become very important and this has originated a big 
business for market intermediaries (Allen, 1990).  Leland and Pyle (1977) argued that 
the existence of intermediaries is dependent on the presence of IA and market 
intermediation can be viewed as a natural response to IA in the credit market. 
Financial intermediation is more developed in countries where the law and 
regulation are efficient and effective (Levine, 1999) and hence impacts funding for 
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small firms. Aggarwal and Goodell (2009) and Williamson (1987a) reiterate the 
significance of financial intermediation and show the tendency of the financial market 
to grow with effective intermediation connected to quality regulatory environment. 
The efficiency of the legal and regulatory framework will determine the strength of 
financial intermediaries and the extent of lender-borrower relationship formed 
through intermediation (Levine, 1999). As the relationship between a lender and 
borrower can be strengthened using a legal contract (Qian and Strahan, 2007), it is 
also possible to use a legal contract to strengthen intermediary relationship with the 
lender and borrower. However, Meon and Weill (2009, p. 296) discovered that 
‘financial intermediary development influences macroeconomic technical efficiency’. 
Thus, the weakness of the economic development of a country can negatively impact 
the financial intermediary processes and significance. Aggarwal and Goodell (2009) 
suggested that the increase in globalisation has improved the relevance of financial 
intermediation. The financial market preferences increases with a stable political 
environment and decreases with a low quality regulatory system and ambiguous 
regime (Aggarwal and Goodell, 2009). 
2.2.5 Law and regulations  
Law and regulations are important in a lender-borrower relationship because it 
provides justice and fairness between lenders and borrowers. The relationship 
between a borrower and lender can be sealed within a legal contract (Qian and 
Strahan, 2007). Law and regulation may also reduce IA in registered small firms 
(Klapper et al., 2006). Williamson (1987b) expressed support for the use of loan 
contracts to ensure better performance as it reduces the cost of monitoring on the 
lender.  Investors favour a quality legal system to support financial contracts and the 
investors are more inclined to provide additional support to the business to attain 
success (Bottazzi et al., 2009). Thus, the legal contract will serve as a performance 
monitor for the lender and borrower. However, the jurisdiction of the legal framework 
can determine whether the lender will have regard for any contractual engagement, 
especially in emerging economies with weaker regulatory regime (Qian and Strahan, 
2007). Goodhart (2008) exposed the regulatory failures (e.g. inefficient money market 
operations, unreliable bank insolvency regimes and inadequate crisis management) 
that contributed to the financial crisis with particular reference to the UK. The 
weaknesses of the Basel Accords are other regulatory failures identified (Blundell-
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Wignall and Atkinson, 2010). Hence, although a weaker regulatory regime is a 
characteristic of emerging economies, developed economies may experience 
occasional weakness in their regulatory provision with dire consequences (e.g. the 
financial crisis of 2007). 
According to Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), the higher the 
indicative measure on the Law and Order numeric indicator, the better the legal 
framework to support credit contracts. ‘Law and Order Indicator is scored 0-6. It 
reflects the degree to which the citizens of a country are able to use the existing legal 
system to mediate disputes and enforce contracts. Higher scores indicate sound 
political institutions and a strong court system. Lower scores indicate a tradition of 
depending on physical force or illegal means to settle claims’ (Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic, 1998, p. 33). They stated that countries with better legal framework 
have better loan regulations leading to longer-term loan finance for businesses and 
better financial system development. They further argue that there is access to finance 
limitation in countries where the legal framework is inadequate and structurally weak. 
A good legal framework is one of the institutional development measures for an 
effective banking market structure and economic growth (Beck et al., 2004). Qian and 
Strahan (2007) and Williamson (1987b) identified the usefulness of laws and 
regulation in the inception of loans. These researches show that lending and 
borrowing can be successful if both parties commit to an authentic contractual 
engagement within a legal and regulated environment. Thus, good financial sector 
development can depend on the excellence of the legal and regulatory framework 
which can improve the finance gap and increase access to finance in small firms. 
La Porta et al. (1998) and Pistor et al. (2000) reiterate the findings of Demirgüç-
Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) and Qian and Strahan (2007) in that legal and 
regulatory regimes in less effective economies have negative effect on SME funding. 
Therefore, there is a link between SME access to finance and effective legal and 
regulatory system to support associated financial transactions such as finance 
contracts. In particular, La Porta et al. (1998) showed that effective legal regime can 
provide protection for creditors in the process of credit lending. Stable government, 
good governance and less corruption improves entrepreneurial venture formation and 
a notable example is Peru where positive political changes in governance caused 
improvement in entrepreneurial venture formation (Klapper et al., 2009). Developing 
economies are characterised by high agency cost of monitoring associated with IA, 
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difficulty in contract enforcement and weak regulatory regime (Dutz et al., 2000). On 
the basis of testable hypotheses, Cook and Nixson (2000) disclosed that common law 
legal systems are better than civil law in providing better protection for investors. 
Therefore, the quality of the legal framework documented in the national law books 
should be adequately implemented to make it relevant in financial transactions for the 
protection of creditors and debtors alike. 
2.3 Key theories for SME financing 
This part of the investigation discusses the relevant key theories for SME financing. It 
is often difficult to identify the relevant theories that impact SME access to finance in 
management and SME finance research. These include agency cost, signalling, credit 
rationing, pecking order and discouraged borrower theories. Economists and 
management scholars developed these theories to explain small business financing 
behaviour and financial institution lending to SMEs. An economic theory considered 
in relation to SME financing is the agency cost theory (Ross, 1973). This theory is 
derived from the theory of agency and embraces the concepts of information 
asymmetry, moral hazard and adverse selection (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Previously, economic models of decision-making processes were largely based on the 
assumption of perfect information (Stiglitz, 2002) or when minor information 
imperfections are present in markets, the market would still behave similarly to 
markets with perfect information (Stiglitz, 2000). The information asymmetry (IA) 
research, however, suggests that the borrower may have more superior information 
over the lender about their business (Saridakis et al., 2008). Lenders are risk averse 
and more so in the period of the financial crisis (Saridakis et al., 2013). As a result, 
they engage in protective and preventive measures to limit their risk. These measures 
are not without cost implications and agency cost is the sum of monitoring costs, 
bonding costs and residual loss (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Thus, as lenders 
engaged in financial risk management after the credit crunch, they incurred agency 
costs and this is regardless of the success or failure of the transaction.  
Moreover, in signalling theory, lenders are able to make an assessment of 
potential borrower information to determine the potential borrower behaviour to 
inform lending decision. Thus, the potential borrower information reduces IA between 
the two parties (Spence, 1973). For example, in signalling research, the human capital 
of owner-managers of the business can act as a positive indication of potentially good 
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performance (Colombo and Grilli, 2005; Saridakis et al., 2008). Whilst Weiss (1995) 
also discussed the relevance of human capital as a signalling effect in labour 
economics, Ross (1977) revealed the role of incentive-signalling in the determination 
of corporate financial structure. There are limited but growing researches in the 
human capital area indicating that the experience (Gruber et al., 2012) and education 
(Saridakis et al., 2008, 2013b) of the owner-manager can have a positive signalling 
effect on lenders in SME access to finance and business lifespan. A notable example 
is the human capital signalling effect of owner-managers on venture capital funding 
(Hsu, 2007). Moreover, business registration with limited liability status can improve 
IA (Klapper et al., 2006). Thus, limited liability status acts as signal of improved IA 
and encourage lenders to lend. A good legal system can act as signal of improved 
financially developed environment (La Porta et al., 1998; Levine, 1999). 
Economists have also argued that uncertainty and IA may lead to credit 
rationing (Saridakis and Storey, 2009). Simply we can say that there is a critical level 
of interest rate where any further increase in interest rate reduces loan supply. This is 
due to moral hazard and adverse selection problems discussed in Saridakis and Storey 
(2009). It can be argued, for example, that using high interest rate to determine 
lending can be counter-productive because on the one hand if the borrower is ill-
informed, it may opt for the high interest loan with no regard for high premium 
interest rate and on the other hand, it may discourage low-risk businesses (Kay et al., 
2014; Besanko and Thakor, 1987; De Meza and Webb, 2000; Mattesini, 1990). The 
concept of credit rationing was introduced by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) who showed 
that borrowers who are willing to pay high interest rate may exhibit the propensity for 
high risk as they may not be able to honour the repayment of the loan. Credit 
rationing reduces the credit finance available for SMEs and it can be affected by 
uncertainties in the business environment (such as the financial crisis) and the non-
availability of collateral. Earlier review by Storey (1994), however, suggests that 
credit rationing does not exist on a major scale in the UK and a more recent work by 
Kremp and Sevestre (2013) shows that French SMEs have not been significantly 
affected by credit rationing since the recent economic/financial crisis. Moreover, 
Cowling et al. (2012) used the UK longitudinal dataset spanning the crisis period to 
show that credit rationed firms in the UK peaked in 2009 as 10% of small businesses 
were refused. 
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Another theory that emerges as a result of the presence of IA problems, such 
as moral hazard and adverse selection in financial markets, is the pecking order theory 
(Frank and Goyal, 2003). Myers (1984) suggests that pecking order theory is the 
hierarchy of financing pursuit of SMEs where owner-managers prefer debt finance 
over equity. The pecking order theory allows owner-managers to determine their 
financing option and keep full control of their business (Holmes and Kent, 1991) as 
well as reduce transaction cost (Lopez-Gracia and Sogorb-Mira, 2008). According to 
the pecking order theory, owner-managers of small firms consider internal sources of 
business financing before external sources. Lopez-Gracia and Sogorb-Mira (2008) 
considering a large sample of Spanish SMEs over a 10-year period found that SMEs 
follow a funding source hierarchy. Therefore, this can be likened to the UK SMEs as 
the UK and Spain are in the European Union with somewhat related business 
environment. 
Finally, in condition of imperfect information and positive application costs, 
creditworthy borrowers who fear credit rejection may not apply for any credit and 
according to Fraser (2008) and Kon and Storey (2003) this group of borrowers is 
described as discouraged. This brings the recently developed theory of discouraged 
borrowers to the forefront in SME research. It has been estimated that 4.2% and 4% 
of US and UK businesses respectively are discouraged borrowers at any one time 
(Fraser, 2004; Levenson and Willard, 2000). Han et al. (2008) using US data found 
that riskier borrowers have higher probabilities of discouragement, low risk borrowers 
are less likely to be discouraged in concentrated markets than in competitive markets. 
Also, Han et al. (2009) argued that good borrowers may not apply for a loan fearing 
rejection. Hence, this identifies another dimension in the theory of discouraged 
borrowers. It has been revealed that good and bad borrowers can be discouraged 
thereby creating a self-rationing credit device (Kon and Storey, 2003). Interestingly, 
the number of owners not applying for a loan increased over the economic crisis 
(Fraser, 2008). Discouragement may point to discrimination in the market for SME 
finance (Blanchflower et al., 1998; Cavalluzzo et al., 2002). However, Cowling et al. 
(2012) does not believe that discrimination is relevant, especially in the period of the 
financial crisis. To this end, it can be said that the financial crisis impacted the theory 
of discouragement as good and bad borrowers could not easily be exempted from 
being discouraged in their credit application rejections. Financial constraints and SME 
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borrower discouragement affect greater proportion of small firms than larger firms 
(Kay et al., 2014). 
2.4 The financial crisis and its role in SME funding 
The problem of IA existed prior to the financial crisis and it can be said to have 
gained more popularity and momentum during the crisis. The financial crisis 
originated in USA and extended all over the world (Clarke et al., 2012; Ivashina and 
Scharfstein, 2010). Although the crisis started in the banking sector, some banking 
institutions were more exposed to higher risk associated with their lending style 
(Cowling et al., 2012). According to Clarke et al. (2012, p. 372), ‘access to external 
credit’ during the crisis contributed to the survival of many firms. Firm size and age 
played a major role in the lending decision making process as credit lenders favoured 
larger and older firms during the recessionary period (Cowling et al., 2012). Small 
firms were particularly more vulnerable during the financial crisis and the 
vulnerability was more noticeable in the microfinance sector (Wagner and Winkler, 
2013). Ahlin et al. (2011) also believe that microfinance firms can be hampered by 
their operating environment and do better in richer countries as a result of more 
financial competition, lower interest rate and lower operating cost. According to 
European Investment Fund (2013), microfinance contributed immensely to reduce the 
impact of the financial crisis on vulnerable businesses in Europe. To this end, 
microfinance providers were not exempted from the harshness of the financial crisis 
and this had a consequent effect on micro-borrowers. 
The financial crisis affected small firms and financial institutions causing 
reduced availability of credit (Cornett et al., 2011) and expensive credit (Fraser, 
2008). During recessionary times, many SMEs performed badly (Angwin and 
Meadows, 2012). Smallbone et al. (2012) found that the financial crisis had a 
differential effect between the UK and New Zealand. Whilst domestic factors (such as 
slow housing market activity, temporary drought on the agricultural sector and falling 
household demand) contributed to the crisis in New Zealand, the UK was affected by 
global factors. According to Smallbone et al. (2012), the UK was particularly affected 
as a result of its economic closeness to the USA, the epicentre of the financial crisis. 
They found that the UK was one of the major economies to exit the recession late. As 
a way of survival, Smallbone et al. (2012) found that small firms from the UK and 
New Zealand became resilient, adaptable and flexible. SMEs are required to shift their 
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strategic focus in recessionary times in order to survive the economic turbulence (Huu 
and Kock, 2011). Indeed, the shifting of strategic focus enabled some small firms to 
survive the credit crunch. There were short term policy impacts (such as interest rate 
cut, reduction of VAT and quantitative easing) resulting from the ‘credit crunch’ 
(Cosh et al., 2009, p. 7). However, these short term policy impacts were part of the 
UK government intervention to support the economy in turbulence. 
Whilst Goodhart (2008) attributed the cause of the financial crisis to 
regulatory failures, Rötheli (2010) identified the misunderstanding of complex risk 
factor among banks. The complex event that led to the financial crisis can further be 
explained by the ‘shortcomings on the side of monetary policy, rating agencies, and 
bank regulation’ (Rötheli, 2010, p. 119). Moshirian (2011, p. 502) discussed issues of 
‘regulatory arbitrage and the lack of adequate cross border information and data’ to 
resolve matters concerning the global financial crisis. It appears that the hope of a 
lasting solution to the financial crisis is not near as researchers say it is now time to 
look beyond Basel III (Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson, 2010). Indeed, the Basel I and 
II Accords could not stop the recent financial crisis because they prescribed a global 
financial risk management and the recent Basel III Accord also prescribed a similar 
solution, perhaps surreptitiously. Thus, the inadequate cross border information and 
data will render the solution ineffective. 
 Bruche and González-Aguado (2010) disclosed that some small firms were 
unable to fulfil their loan repayment responsibilities during the crisis. The crisis was 
incomparable and caused a sharp contraction in output lasting many years (Cecchetti 
et al., 2009). They confirmed that there was increase in the cost of borrowing and 
reduction in credit availability. There were also credit rejections among SMEs 
(Fraser, 2008). The venture capital funding provision was affected by the harsh 
financial crisis (BIS, 2012). They found that there was a 31% reduction in venture 
capital funding for UK SMEs in 2010. There was a sharp decline in the UK venture 
capital funding between 2008 and 2009 (OECD, 2013b). European Investment Fund 
(2013) believe that the venture capital funding provision is still very disappointing in 
Europe as government fundraising contributed up to 40% of venture capital funding in 
2012 to support the market counter-cyclically. They confirmed that the venture capital 
funding gap is partially being filled with local business angels. National Audit Office 
(2010) reported that there was a shortfall of £30 billion in the business lending 
commitments of two major UK banks during 2009 to 2010. The ‘net monthly flows of 
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business lending fell from £7.4bn in 2007 to an overall net repayment of £3.9bn in 
2009’ (Cowling et al., 2012, p. 778). SME credit rejections in the financial crisis show 
that the lenders were managing their available liquidity (Cornett et al., 2011). Amidst 
the credit rejections recorded in the aftermath of the crisis and the reduction in the 
available credit facilities, SMEs seeking finance increased from 23% in 2007-2008 to 
26% in 2010 (OECD, 2013b). They reported that 68% of finance seeking SMEs 
received their sum while 6% received less than they requested. 
 The volatile economic environment during the credit crisis caused SMEs to 
apply changes to their funding strategy (Smallbone et al., 2012). Although some 
entrepreneurs failed to secure their desired funding during the financial crisis, 
disadvantaged borrowers reduced their desire for funds (Fraser, 2008). Small firms 
were found to be more credit constrained during the crisis than before (Popov and 
Udell, 2012). SMEs using external finance are now 39%, reduced from 50% in 2012 
(BDRC, 2013). They confirmed that during the 4th quarter of 2012 or 1st quarter of 
2013, 38% of SME credit applicants identified a challenging borrowing process while 
36% of them were totally discouraged from applying. The use of personal savings, 
reduced investment and debt reduction were some of the strategic financial changes 
applied to some businesses (Fraser, 2008; Smallbone et al., 2012). Indeed, the small 
firm sector took the greatest shock in their funding during the credit crunch and 
afterwards (Kay et al., 2014; Cowling et al., 2012). 
2.5 Personal characteristics: ethnic minorities and female entrepreneurs 
There is an on-going debate in the management literature regarding the role of 
personal characteristics on external finance (Wright et al., 2015; Irwin and Scott, 
2010; Muravyev et al., 2009; Ram and Smallbone, 2003; Blanchflower et al., 1998). 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, research show that ethnic minorities and 
female entrepreneurs suffered more challenges in accessing finance (Irwin and Scott, 
2010; Muravyev et al., 2009). For example, ethnic inequality and marginalisation in 
entrepreneurs seeking business finance caused diversity issues for the UK small firm 
sector and these marginalised business owners were ‘ethnic minority owner 
managers’ (Irwin and Scott, 2010, p. 245). Ram and Smallbone (2003) also identified 
marginalisation as a major hindrance for ethnic minority owner-managers to accessing 
finance in the small firm sector. Afro-Caribbean owner-managers suffer the greatest 
disadvantage in accessing finance for their business start-up, innovation and growth 
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(Smallbone et al., 2003). They found that Afro-Caribbean owner-managers were more 
educated amongst the ethnic groups while the Chinese were least educated. However, 
the Afro-Caribbean owner-managers were more likely to be unsuccessful in accessing 
bank loans than their white and other ethnic minority counterparts. In a USA study, 
Blanchflower et al. (1998) found that blacks are far more likely to report problems 
associated with access to credit for their business as they suffered more loan 
rejections and were charged higher interest rates in comparison to their white 
counterparts. Although it was acknowledged that ethnic minority owner-managers in 
the UK suffer more financial problems in their business start-up, the situation cannot 
automatically be attributed to discriminatory practice of finance providers (Cowling et 
al., 2012). However, the researchers were unable to ascertain the reasons for the 
funding discrepancy associated with differential funding provisions between ethnic 
and non-ethnic minority owner-managers in the UK. Recent research shows that the 
challenges to ethnic minority businesses are complex but concern access to finance 
amongst other factors (Wright et al., 2015). 
The UK government has not actually recognised disadvantaged entrepreneurs 
in its policy statement (BIS, 2012).  Unless disadvantaged owner-managers are duly 
recognised in the UK society, it will be difficult to identify their actual entrepreneurial 
issues. Smallbone et al. (2003) suggested the need for targeted support provision for 
certain ethnic groups in their business start-up but as the UK government did not 
specifically identify disadvantaged groups, it may not have any targeted provision.  In 
a more recent study, BIS (2012) showed that the UK government has not investigated 
the ethnic related issues in small firm finance. Hence, no targeted provisions exist. 
Ethnic minority owner-managers preferred ‘less intrusive’ financial options for 
funding their business to ensure they keep full control of their venture (Hussain and 
Matlay, 2007, p. 487). Thus, ethnic minority owner-managers may have difficulty 
accessing venture capital and angel capital funding because these fund providers tend 
to participate in running the venture-backed business to ensure greater chance of 
success. 
Female owner-managers do not experience greater level of credit rejections 
than their male counterparts (Kim, 2006). De Bruin et al. (2007) and Lean and Tucker 
(2001) also show inconclusive findings in their gender related research. The limitation 
in the venture capital funding of female entrepreneurial ventures is ‘extremely small’ 
(Greene et al., 2001, p. 78). They discovered that disproportionate venture capital 
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funding provisions exist for male centric entrepreneurial ventures as compared to their 
female counterparts. Regardless of gender characteristics, venture capitalists provide 
funding for early stages of start-up and high technology firms where IA and high risk 
exists (Gompers, 1995). The trend of venture capital funding is changing in support of 
both gender entrepreneurs (Greene et al., 2001). The ‘lower levels of financial capital 
that women business founders achieve are associated with lower early business 
growth compared with their male counterparts’ (Alsos et al., 2006, p. 667). Whilst 
female entrepreneurs are more likely to pursue social priorities, their male 
counterparts prioritise financial/economic considerations in their entrepreneurial 
ventures (Saridakis et al., 2014). Muravyev et al. (2009) concluded that some 
evidence exist to suggest positive differential treatment of male against their female 
counterparts. Although there are seemingly gender differential treatment in 
entrepreneurial access to finance (Muravyev et al., 2009), the research did not explore 
other considerations such as collateral, entrepreneurs with track record, relationship 
lending and uncertain economic environment. New firms encounter difficulties in 
accessing finance for lack of adequate collateral and the risk associated with their 
start-up (OECD, 2006). Therefore, the early stages of business start-up are 
characterised by high risk causing lenders to be cautious of the risk factor by rejecting 
more credit applications or seeking collateral. 
Female owner-managers are ‘disadvantaged’ in their access to business 
finance as their innovation and growth are impeded (Marlow and Patton, 2005, p. 
721).  In evidence, they referred to an Australian study involving both male and 
female owner-managers in their entrepreneurial ventures. However, Marlow and 
Patton (2005) revealed that male owner-managers had more assets than females in the 
research. Irrespective of gender, various researches (Bester, 1987; Besanko and 
Thakor, 1987; Hanley and Girma, 2006; Mattesini, 1990; Wang, 2010) show that the 
availability of assets can determine the approval of credit as lenders favour 
collateralisation, especially in times of credit crisis (Cornett et al., 2011; Ivashina and 
Scharfstein, 2010). Therefore, it is well established in research that male or female 
owner-managed small firms that cannot provide adequate collateral for their credit 
application, suffer more credit rejections. However, it is a worry that BIS (2012) show 
that there was no investigation of gender related issues in SME access to finance and, 
hence, the UK government has not taken any action on the matter. In the 
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circumstance, unless the UK government identifies the gender related issues in SME 
finance, no intervention will suffice. 
2.6 Government intervention 
The UK government over many decades recognise the value of SMEs in economic 
development and, hence, made efforts to support businesses (BIS, 2013a, 2013b). In 
the Macmillan Report there was need to support businesses in the aftermath of the 
1931 stock market crash and the report recognised the existence of a finance gap in 
the financing of SMEs (Stamp, 1931). The Bolton Report particularly favoured the 
establishment of small firms as a way to increase entrepreneurship, economic 
activities and improve societal wellbeing (Bolton, 1971). However, the Bolton Report 
acknowledged that small firms were in long term decline following numerous 
challenges including bureaucracy, excessive taxation and lack of access to finance. 
The Cruickshank Report (Cruickshank, 2000) also identified the existence of a 
finance gap in SME funding and the lack of competition in the UK banking industry. 
Indeed, although the UK government has increased its understanding of the small 
firms sector since 1931, the SME funding challenges have not been resolved. 
The UK government supports SME funding using different types of schemes 
such as Funding for Lending (FLS) and Enterprise Finance Guarantee (EFG) schemes 
(BIS, 2013b). Other UK government schemes include Enterprise Capital Funds 
(ECFs), Enterprise Investment Scheme (EIS) and Seed Enterprise Investment Scheme 
(SEIS) (OECD, 2013b). Hence, although there are different government funding 
support schemes directed at different types of businesses, there are still some SMEs 
that experience funding challenges. In particular, BIS (2013a) show that the number 
of EFG facilities offered in January 2009 was 1221 but dropped to 759 in December 
2012 with knock-on effect on SME funding. Whilst the numbers of EFG facilities 
offered to SMEs continue to decrease quarterly, the value of the EFG facilities also 
continue to decrease quarterly from £104.25million in January 2009 to £70.69million 
in December 2012 (BIS, 2013a). OECD (2013b) confirmed that the level of 
guaranteed loan in OECD member countries declined in both 2010 and 2011 as a 
result of reduction in the level of government guarantee limit for lenders. Although 
the EFG fund providers are made up of banking and non-banking institutions, the UK 
Parliament identified poor communication between the government, EFG fund 
providers and potential borrowers (UK Parliament, 2009). According to BIS (2013a), 
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the EFG scheme has offered £2 billion credit and SME borrowers have drawn £1.77 
billion between January 2009 and December 2012. Accordingly, a total of 20013 
credit finances were offered and 17517 were drawn, being 87.5% drawn over four 
years and the EFG scheme is benefiting some target businesses. In the FLS, the UK 
central bank provides funding to lenders at below the prevailing market rates for over 
a period of four years to facilitate loans to businesses (OECD, 2013b). As at the 4th 
quarter of 2012, 25% of SMEs were aware of the FLS and 20% of them think such 
schemes is encouraging (BDRC, 2013). Furthermore, 50% of SMEs were aware of 
the various schemes for encouraging SME access to finance. Thus, the inadequacy of 
awareness about the available SME support schemes and non-existent policy support 
can discourage non-banking sector (the informal sector lending institutions) 
participation with negative effect on small businesses and the economy. 
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter critically reviews key studies from leading economics and management 
journals to provide understanding of access to finance in the UK for small firms, 
especially after the credit crunch. SMEs faced varying levels of challenges in 
accessing finance and the financial crisis increased the difficulty. Start-up firms 
encountered greater challenges in their survival as a result of their young age, low 
level track record and the absence of collateral to secure credit. Venture capital and 
angel capital firms assess funding applications on a case by case basis and there is 
competition among entrepreneurs for these funds. IA is a major concept linked to key 
themes (e.g. collateral, credit scoring, market intermediation, business status, 
collateral, law and banking relationship) in SME finance research. IA is a major 
problem in SME funding because lenders and borrowers disagree on the level of 
information perfection – one often claims superiority over the other. IA has become a 
controversial concept as a result of conflicting research views and lenders have 
varying interpretation of the level of information perfection expected for success in 
SME credit applications. IA and finance gap tends to be directly related in small firm 
research because larger firms do not suffer the same level of finance deprivation and 
rejections. 
Our review shows that the availability of collateral is a major determinant of 
SME access to finance but the financial crisis affected the collateral value of property 
assets causing negative equity. Also, the lender is able to rely on a trusted and/or good 
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long term banking relationship in assessing the eligibility of the owner-manager of the 
business. A good credit history of small firms and their owner can contribute to 
successful access to finance. Financial intermediation and registered business status 
can reduce IA towards favourable bank lending. Further, a good legal and regulatory 
environment improves SME funding as lenders have more confidence. Good legal and 
regulatory environment provides a progressive financial sector development. In the 
quest for business funding after the credit crunch, owner-managers should exploit 
their strong human capital, build a positive banking relationship, exploit non-bank 
lending platforms, seek lending information widely and use intermediaries (e.g. 
mortgage broker, financial adviser, etc.). 
Turning to individual characteristics, Black ethnic minority owner-managers 
face the greatest challenge in raising finance for their businesses as they are often 
marginalised, more so in the credit crunch. Although research show that the non-
availability of credit for Black ethnic minority owner-managers is not attributed to 
discrimination, there is need for further research to find out the reasons for the bias. 
Moreover, it is not clear whether there is a stereotypic connotation against female 
entrepreneurs and favouritism for male owner-managers because research results tend 
to be inconclusive. Though there are many gender related research in management 
and SME finance, the issue of gender related bias remain unresolved. Further research 
in this area, however, should consider other factors (such as collateral, credit history, 
banking relationship, business status, the use of intermediary, human capital, age of 
the firm, type and size of the business) since researching gender related issues in 
isolation could result in false conclusions being drawn without achieving any positive 
outcomes. 
Whilst research indicates that the UK government has been playing an active 
role in making finance more accessible for SMEs over many decades, it is suggested 
that there be further research into the sustainability of SME funding provisions to 
ensure that key sections of the small firms sector are not isolated. This will also 
ensure targeted SME funding to meet the desired needs of businesses. Undeniably, the 
various government funding schemes are benefiting some businesses while others 
suffer but it will take time for recent intervention to take effect. The businesses that 
are suffering for lack of funding need to be supported before they fail and the 
available schemes should be communicated widely among SMEs, advisory 
organisations and government agencies to ensure adequate awareness. 
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Indeed, the financial sector development of the UK is advanced yet the 
financial crisis of 2007 was able to propagate bad effects. A good financial sector 
development relies on an efficient regulatory framework. Thus, although research has 
discussed a number of possible causes and effects of the financial crisis (e.g. 
regulatory failures, inadequate cross border information, weakness of the Basel 
Accords, etc.), there should be further research to review and evaluate the financial 
sector development of the UK with a view to providing a coherent policy response to 
mediate future situations. Accordingly, the globalised nature of Basel I and II 
rendered them ineffective during the 2007 financial crisis and the recent Basel III with 
perceived better risk management still has a globalised dimension. Therefore, a UK 
solution is inevitable for better financial risk protection and prevention, albeit an 
additional and parallel solution to the Basel Accords. 
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Chapter 3 Firm Growth: Access to Venture Capital Finance
3
 
3.1 Introduction 
Access to finance is important for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to 
start-up, innovate, grow and survive (Jackson et al., 2012; Megginson, 2004). SMEs 
use different cocktails of methods of raising funds for their businesses (Saridakis et 
al., 2008). Venture capital (VC) is an ‘alternative’ (Denis, 2004, p. 301) or ‘substitute’ 
(Maier and Walker, 1987, p. 207) method of raising finance for business venture 
because VC funding can be used instead of debt finance. According to Maier and 
Walker (1987, p. 207), VC is a ‘substitute, but not a perfect substitute’ for funding 
entrepreneurial ventures following the different approach to access VC funding and 
debt finance. VC or private equity is one way that innovative SMEs use to raise 
money for their start-up and growth (Cumming and MacIntosh, 2003; Jackson et al., 
2012). Utterback and Abernathy (1975) described innovation in firms in terms of their 
innovative capacity, competitive strategy and production resources. However, in the 
business environment, there is no clear definition of best innovation because there is 
no universal standard of measurement for innovation from one business environment 
to another (Downs Jr and Mohr, 1976). Therefore, the reliance of VC firms (VCF) on 
innovation in their entrepreneurial funding decision varies across VC industry; and 
they employ their funding criteria in making investment decisions. VCF often target 
their funding towards innovative SMEs as they have the potential for high growth and 
job creation (OECD, 2002; Smallbone et al., 1995). New growth SMEs are most 
likely to pursue external funding and they are more susceptible to rejections (Riding 
et al., 2012).  
Although VC is useful for raising finance for business ventures, they are not 
widely available worldwide (Cumming and MacIntosh, 2003; Megginson, 2004). For 
example, Pistor et al. (2000) disclosed the legal and regulatory bottlenecks in 
transitional economies which are having negative effect on finance contracts. On the 
other hand, Megginson (2004) discussed the value of a strong legal and regulatory 
framework to protect the VC investment environment and participants alike. The 
financial crisis of 2007 caused a reduction in the availability of VC in Israel 
(Avnimelech and Harel, 2012), the UK (BIS, 2012; Fraser, 2008) and other parts of 
                                                          
3
 An earlier version of this chapter was accepted and presented as a conference paper at the ISBE 
Conference 2013 at Cardiff City Hall, Cardiff, Wales, UK. Hence, the chapter was published as part of 
conference proceedings for delegates. 
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the world. For example, there was a 31% decrease in VC for UK SMEs in 2010 (BIS, 
2012). VCF in the UK, USA, Netherlands and France identified strategic involvement 
as their key role in their investment (Sapienza et al., 1996). In the USA, VCF and 
their investments tend to be concentrated within some geographical areas (Chen et al., 
2010). According to Revest and Sapio (2012), UK VCF helped the European VCF to 
catch up with their USA counterparts in their funding provisions. The USA and 
Europe VCF have similar prospect of initial public offering (IPO) exit (Axelson and 
Martinovic, 2013). There is competition among VCF and these increases funding 
prospects and provisions for entrepreneurs (Elitsur and Gavious, 2011; Sapienza et al., 
1996). Also, there is competition for VC among SMEs and some of them do not get 
their desired fund. However, VC was largely unknown and clouded in secrecy about 
four decades ago (Bean et al., 1975). 
3.2 Main focus of the chapter 
This chapter aim to answer the following research questions associated with SMEs 
and their access to VC finance: (a) To what extent do innovative SMEs in the UK 
access VC finance? (b) Is there supply and demand equilibrium in access to VC 
finance in the UK? (c) Does globalisation and competition play a role in the supply of 
and demand for VC? (d) How has legal and regulatory regime supported VC 
expansion? (e) How could entrepreneurs and innovative SMEs benefit more from VC 
finance? These questions are very important in further understanding the VC terrain in 
the UK and beyond. In a research of 21 European countries, Popov and Roosenboom 
(2013) found that VCF are actively involved in funding new businesses. According to 
Guo and Jiang (2013), VC-backed businesses in China outperform their non-VC-
backed firms considerably and VC-backed firms encounter astronomical growth after 
their IPO exits. Although Cornelius (2005) identified risk aversion in VCF, numerous 
research (e.g. Chen et al., 2010; Guo and Jiang, 2013; Jackson et al., 2012; 
Megginson, 2004; Popov and Roosenboom, 2013) show that VCF have the capacity 
to fund innovative entrepreneurial projects. 
There is a plethora of information about formal VCF in the research and 
theoretical literature. Although research (Jackson et al., 2012; King, 2008) shows that 
formal VCF constitute a great source of access to finance, many entrepreneurs and 
business people are not fully aware and informed of the potentials of VCF and their 
investment behaviour. This is particularly apparent in the popularity of VCF in the 
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UK and USA but less so in developing countries in Asia and Africa (Lingelbach, 
2012). Different VC research literatures tend to explore minor areas at a time and it is 
difficult to find a single research literature resource containing enormous information 
relevant for key aspects of VC and VCF behaviour. The absence of such a literature 
resource is a research gap. This research will fill the gap in providing a concise, 
critical and relevant historical information resource about formal VCF, encompassing 
the evolutionary trend, for researchers, graduate students, business owners, 
entrepreneurs and policymakers. This inquiry conceptualises, synthesises and 
integrates the historical perspectives and evolutionary trend of VCF over a period 
spanning four decades to inform, especially in times of economic uncertainty. This 
chapter explores a range of published research literature over four decades with the 
aim to provide research perspectives on VCF and their relationship to entrepreneurial 
funding activities relevant to developed and developing countries, advanced and 
emerging economies. Research literature will provide a more realistic account of 
VCF, their behaviour and investment environment. This research mostly differs from 
Wright and Robbie (1998) that adopted a combination of industry and firm level 
analytical techniques to review and synthesise the concept of VCF and private equity. 
Similar to their work, this research differentiate VCF as distinct from other sources of 
business finance but used key themes derived from different research literature to 
explain the behaviour of VCF and their investment environment over many decades. 
The remainder of this chapter is divided into sections made up of key themes. 
Conceptualisation of venture capital examines the VC concept and private equity 
including the expansion and exposure of VCF worldwide, how debt financing differ 
from equity financing; Competitive business environment provides a discussion of the 
competitive business terrain involving the VCF and entrepreneurs as well as their 
investment geography; Government and the law explores the government and legal 
aspects of VC with reference to the legal and regulatory framework and government 
intervention to support VCF and participants; Behaviour of VCF reviews the 
behaviour of VCF including exit strategy, investment decision, the valuation of 
entrepreneurial project for VC purpose and the involvement of VCF in their VC-
backed investment; and further discussions provide solutions and recommendations, 
future research directions and conclusions. 
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3.3 Background 
Formal and informal VCF are two different concepts in business, management and 
finance research. Harrison and Mason (2000) identified formal and informal VCF as 
lacking adequate research and, generally, wider research (Cumming and MacIntosh, 
2003; Megginson, 2004) shows that VCF were not available worldwide until about 
two decades ago. Thus, as VCF were not available, their popularity was restricted to 
few countries such as the UK, Canada and USA. Formal VCF are the VC companies 
or fund managers (Mason and Stark, 2004) while informal VCF are business angels 
(van Osnabrugge, 2000). In discussing the difference between formal and informal 
VCF, researchers (e.g. Harrison and Mason, 2000; van Osnabrugge, 2000) described 
informal VCF as ‘business angels’. The behaviour of business angels and VCF in the 
society tends to be similar in some ways but they are different (van Osnabrugge, 
2000). Business angels may invest in VCF and vice versa, hence, there is a complex 
disparity between VCF and business angels in modern times. However, formal and 
informal VCF have some complementing features such as ‘co-investing in deals; 
sequential investing in ventures; business angels as investors in venture capital funds; 
and deal referring’ (Harrison and Mason, 2000, p. 223). As a major difference 
between formal and informal VCF, van Osnabrugge (2000) shows that they adopt a 
different approach in resolving agency risks associated with their investments. 
According to Mason and Stark (2004), business angels are more attentive to the 
entrepreneur than formal VCF in the process of making funding decision. To this end, 
it can be argued that formal VCF and business angels have some similar 
characteristics but they exhibit different investment behaviour, especially in the 
currently complex business environment characterised by globalisation and a global 
financial crisis. Consequently, this chapter focuses on formal VCF only. 
3.4 Conceptualisation of venture capital 
3.4.1 What is venture capital and private equity 
Venture capital and private equity finance have some similarities and 
differences. The following definitions and descriptions provide more clarity 
between both phenomena: 
 
Private equity is medium to long-term finance provided in return for an equity 
stake in potentially high growth unquoted companies. Some commentators use 
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the term “private equity” to refer only to the buy-out and buy-in investment 
sector. Some others, in Europe but not the USA, use the term “venture 
capital” to cover all stages, i.e. synonymous with “private equity”. In the USA 
“venture capital” refers only to investments in early-stage and expanding 
companies (BVCA, 2010). 
 
Venture capital firms are professional investors who dedicate 100% of their 
time to investing and building innovative companies on behalf of third party 
investors or their limited partners… Venture capital is a subset of the larger 
private equity asset class. The private equity asset class includes venture 
capital, buyouts, and mezzanine investment activity. Venture capital focuses 
on investing in private, young, fast growing companies (NVCA, 2013). 
 
[Venture capital]…this is when private equity is invested into young, 
entrepreneur-led, high-potential companies that are typically driven by 
technological innovation (EVCA, 2012). 
VC is defined as an ‘independent, professionally managed, dedicated pools of 
capital that focus on equity or equity-linked investments in privately held, high 
growth companies’ (Gompers and Lerner, 2001, p. 146). The definitions of venture 
capital and private equity attributed to BVCA (2010), ECVA (2012) and NVCA 
(2013) indicate little differences in the meaning of VC from one country to another. 
However, for the reason of simplicity, this research will adopt VC as a professionally 
managed fund focussed on equity investments in private and high growth unquoted 
business. 
Figure 3.1 shows venture capital and private equity in the context of the flow 
of money from investors to investees. Limited partners fund is illiquid and exist for up 
to ten years to allow funds to be utilized for funding innovative businesses via VCF 
(EVCA, 2012). Although investors are able to invest directly in any investee or 
portfolio companies of their choice, they are also at liberty to invest in VC and private 
equity fund. Private equity and VCF are general partners in their fund management 
role. Therefore, venture capital is a subset of private equity. 
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Figure 3.1. Venture capital and private equity funding 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The concepts of technology and biomed venture capital are extensions of the 
VC dynamics worldwide. According to NVCA (2013), the VCF in USA invest in 
different innovative SMEs which include, but not limited to, clean technology, 
healthcare and information technology. There is also the dynamics of seed, earliest-
stage, early-stage, mixed stage and later-stage financing in VCF (Elango et al., 1995). 
However, regardless of the financing stage of a VCF, the basic principle of pursuing 
high returns and risk mitigation remains apparent in their character. 
 Clustering in the VC industry assume different characteristics and 
descriptions. VCF that are concentrated in terms of their geographical location or co-
location with their investment or similarity in the type of business tend to be described 
accordingly. For example, Rosiello and Parris (2009, p. 185) described the co-location 
of VC investments in dedicated biotech firms in Scotland and Cambridge as ‘bio-
clusters’. As VC start-up co-evolution and technology advancement started and grew 
in Israel, Avnimelech and Teubal (2004, p. 33) referred to the phenomenon as ‘high 
tech cluster’. The VC investment in clean environmental technology in USA has seen 
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a drastic increase (beside biotechnology and computing) and majority of VCF in the 
USA are concentrated in the region of California, New York and New England as a 
result of the presence of other financial institutions as well as co-investment and 
syndication opportunities (Florida and Kenney, 1988). They described this regional 
concentration as regional cluster made up of reputable VC networks and investments. 
This research will now explore the differences between equity financing and debt 
financing. 
3.4.2 Comparison between debt financing and equity financing 
There are similarities and differences between debt financing and equity financing in 
access to finance for SMEs (Winton and Yerramilli, 2008). Entrepreneurships in the 
high growth sector tend to embrace equity funding as a result of the potential size of 
their funding requirement, the inherent high risk and their desire for strategic support 
from VCF (Gompers, 1995; Greene et al., 2001; Hellmann and Puri, 2002). Amongst 
the many tasks of VCF in new start-up ventures, they help to ‘review business plans 
and design contracts’ (Gompers, 1995, p. 1461). VCF engage in high innovative start-
up firms such as technology firms in Silicon Valley in USA to exploit their potential 
high returns (Hellmann and Puri, 2002). This may explain why VCF are very 
selective in determining their entrepreneurial venture funding (Maier and Walker, 
1987; Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984). Debt finance sources provide overdraft or loan 
facilities to entrepreneurs for their business after credit assessment of the owner has 
been made, and they tend to support less risky projects as well as businesses with 
track records (Saridakis et al., 2008). Generally, businesses with track records attract 
more funding opportunities from investors (Gompers et al., 2006). According to 
BVCA (2010), creditors have legal right to contractual interest and repayment of 
capital for their debt finance, whether the debtor profits or not. However, equity 
funding is an investment in exchange for a stake or part ownership of the funded 
business with the proviso to share in the risks and returns. 
According to Winton and Yerramilli (2008), whilst debt finance sources are 
associated with less intensive monitoring, VCF engage in more intensive monitoring 
of the entrepreneurial venture to protect their investment. Researchers (De Bettignies 
and Brander, 2007; Hellmann, 1998; Kanniainen and Keuschnigg, 2004; Megginson, 
2004; Pruthi et al., 2003; Sapienza et al., 1996) explored the monitoring character of 
VCF worldwide and it can be argued that the monitoring of VC-backed investments is 
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associated with information asymmetry inherent in existing businesses as well as new 
start-up ventures. The major reason for the existence of VCF is their ability to resolve 
information asymmetry (Amit et al., 1998) and this is quite unlike debt finance 
sources. VCF have a competitive edge over debt finance sources in resolving issues of 
information asymmetry as they are able to use investment monitoring and selection 
techniques in an efficient manner (Amit et al., 1998). Thus, while traditional debt 
finance institutions (e.g. banks) do not monitor borrower businesses, VCF have the 
traditional competence in screening and monitoring of their investments. 
Debt finance takes the form of overdraft or loans from banks while VC or 
equity funding is in the form of convertible debt (Winton and Yerramilli, 2008). A 
debt owed to a bank is in the form of a loan which is expected to be paid back with 
interest but the VCF acquires or purchases shares in the entrepreneurial venture as an 
investment (Cumming and MacIntosh, 2003). According to them, the number of 
shares purchased or acquired by the VC in relation to the total shares of the business 
will determine its percentage ownership and control of the business. VCF use more 
equity features as a way to ensure business continuity in the most difficult and risky 
situation (Winton and Yerramilli, 2008). According to Gatchev et al. (2009), firms 
with high potential for agency cost problems and high asymmetric information are 
most likely to seek equity financing. However, they found that firms with high 
asymmetric information pursue debt financing for fixed assets.  
In relation to debt finance, De Bettignies and Brander (2007: 808) disclosed 
that ‘the entrepreneur keeps full control of the firm and has efficient incentives to 
exert effort.’ However, with equity finance, De Bettignies and Brander (2007, p. 808) 
further revealed that ‘there is a two-sided moral hazard problem’ because both parties 
in the transaction provides ‘unverifiable effort’. Entrepreneurs tend to perform better 
where they possess high value stake in the business and they reduce their incentive to 
provide effort where VCF have greater value stake (Amit et al., 1998). There is a 
potential to favour VC finance over debt finance because VCF contribute high 
productivity even with less entrepreneurial effort (De Bettignies and Brander, 2007). 
Also, VCF are more active in supporting their VC-backed companies while debt 
financiers are ‘captive’ because they are not involved in the running of their funded 
business (Bottazzi et al., 2008, p. 488). On the other hand, VCF are described as 
active investors because they actively participate in the affairs of their VC-backed 
businesses and hence, they create value (Megginson, 2004). The expansion and 
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exposure of VCF are not the same as debt finance institutions because they have 
different funding behaviour. 
3.4.3 Expansion and exposure of venture capitalists 
VCF started in the USA and expanded throughout the developed world including the 
UK, Canada and Israel (Hege et al., 2009). Venture capital expansion and exposure in 
entrepreneurial business finance tend to vary from country to country and from 
locality to locality (Jackson et al., 2012; Megginson, 2004; Cumming and MacIntosh, 
2003). These variations in VCF existence means that exit behaviour, risks, returns and 
strategy are different (Cumming and MacIntosh, 2003). It has been revealed that VCF 
involvements in their portfolio of VC-backed investments can be affected if the VCF 
over-commit its available but limited resources (Jackson et al., 2012). 
In 1975, ‘very little’ was known about VC and the government of USA could 
not formulate a policy to support VC because it was largely unfamiliar and the 
available VC information was not in the public domain (Bean et al., 1975). According 
to their study, whilst many VCF were looking for investment opportunities, potential 
entrepreneurs were looking for investors. The lack of adequate information about 
technological innovation and sources of funding meant that VCF were largely 
unidentified, unfamiliar and wrapped in confidentiality (Bean et al., 1975). However, 
the expansion of VCF has continued for two and a half decades (Megginson, 2004). 
The international expansion of VCF has given a good funding alternative to 
innovative entrepreneurs to support their businesses (Sapienza et al., 1996). Hege et 
al. (2009, p. 1) stated that VC is an ‘American invention’. The USA has ‘about two-
thirds of the world’s total private equity fund-raising and investment’; VCF are part of 
‘American practices’ and other countries are following the same idea to experience 
growth in their private equity market (Megginson, 2004, p. 89). The expansion and 
growth of VCF in the USA has been widely researched and Hege et al. (2009) show 
that the growth of VCF in the USA is continuing at a higher rate in comparison with 
other parts of the world. VCF are the ‘primary and unique source of funding for small 
firms’ because these small firms have limited access to the capital market, hence, they 
are very restricted in seeking traditional ways of accessing fund for their business 
innovation, growth and survival (Maier and Walker, 1987, p. 207). VCF fund ‘high-
risk, potentially high-reward projects’ regardless of the high level of uncertainty 
associated with the business ventures (Gompers and Lerner, 2001, p. 145). 
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Alsos et al. (2006) assert that the VC industry is very underdeveloped in many 
countries except the UK and USA. Although VCF are expanding worldwide, from 
developed to developing countries and from advanced to emerging economies, the 
expansion and exposure of VCF originated in the USA (Riding et al., 2012; Sapienza 
et al., 1996). According to Sapienza et al. (1996) and Hege et al. (2009), it can be 
argued that VCF in the USA is continuously expanding and other countries are 
following the pace already set by VCF in the USA. VCF in the UK and USA 
generated the most value in comparison with other countries (Sapienza et al., 1996). 
However, Hege et al. (2009) disclosed that USA VCF generate the highest value in 
comparison to their European counterparts. While the global VC activity is currently 
80 per cent in USA, it is 13 per cent in Europe (Mason and Landström, 2012). Revest 
and Sapio (2012) discussed the wide expansion of UK VCF and their support for 
European counterparts to increase their value to reach the USA. A more recent 
research (Axelson and Martinovic, 2013) show that VCF in Europe and the USA have 
similar IPO exit but Europe underperforms in trade sales compared to the USA. Thus, 
the expansion and exposure of VCF may not be as important as their business funding 
potential. However, it can be argued that the expansion and exposure of the VCF 
should be measured based on their VC-backed investment in their locality and global 
reach. Thus, the expansion and exposure of VCF across borders encouraged greater 
competition between VCF and entrepreneurs locally, nationally and internationally. 
3.5 Competitive business environment 
3.5.1 Competition among entrepreneurs 
It is widely recognised in research that VCF provide funding for entrepreneurial 
ventures but there is competition for VC among entrepreneurs (Bowden, 1994; De 
Bettignies and Brander, 2007; Elitzur and Gavious, 2011; Gifford, 1997). Therefore, 
in keeping with simple economic principles, the competition among entrepreneurs for 
VC can affect the supply of VC available for innovative SMEs. Chen et al. (2010) and 
Cumming and Dai (2010) discussed the impact of localising VC-backed investments 
in the same location as their VCF. The major impact of localising VC-backed 
investments in the same location as their VCF is the competition for VC finance 
(Chen et al., 2010). Local bias is more prevalent if the VCF is the only investor in the 
area (Cumming and Dai, 2010). Although it can be argued that entrepreneurs seeking 
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finance within the locality of VCF may be more advantageous than their counterpart 
outside the zone, the full assessment of a viable investment opportunity is often 
conducted by the VCF prior to any investment decision. Thus, the competition for 
funding among entrepreneurs may become more and more unfavourable the further 
away they are from the VCF but Megginson (2004) show that the principle of 
globalisation can make a positive difference to help entrepreneurial ventures. This 
indicates that globalisation can alter the demand and supply of VC as entrepreneurs 
will be able to exploit the funding opportunities available in the global VC 
environment. Cumming and Dai (2010) supports Megginson (2004) in that 
globalisation can make a difference in reducing local biases. Cumming and Dai 
(2010) stated that reputable VCF exhibit lesser local bias as they have the tendency to 
expand their reach far beyond their locality. This suggests that VCF that exhibit local, 
regional or sector bias are susceptible to be outperformed in the global community. 
However, high competition for VC finance suggests that some entrepreneurs may face 
timewasting in a futile pursuit resulting from a lack of VC. 
Elitzur and Gavious (2011) revealed the stiff competition for VC finance 
among entrepreneurs but VCF are able to provide funds for proven entrepreneurial 
ventures. The huge effort exerted by entrepreneurs in the VC finance seeking process 
means that valuable entrepreneurial time are wasted in the event of funding rejection 
(Elitzur and Gavious, 2011). According to Cornelius (2005, p. 599), ‘Competition for 
ever increasing pools of capital, combined with an increasingly homogenized 
experiential background for venture capitalists world-wide, has resulted in increased 
risk aversion and a preference for later stage investments’. Whilst some VCF prefer 
later stage investments to reduce risk, some others provide fund for early-stage 
investment with value-added services to mitigate the risks (Gompers and Lerner, 
2001; Jackson et al., 2012; Winton and Yerramilli, 2008).  
In discussing the BVCA members’ funding engagements, BVCA (2013) 
revealed that the UK has the greatest number of companies funded as well as the 
greatest amount invested during 2010, 2011 and 2012. Apart from the UK, they show 
that BVCA members invest more in Europe than the USA and Rest of the World put 
together. During 2010, 2011 and 2012, BVCA members’ VC-backed investments in 
the UK increased but declined in other parts of the world. Although the number of 
VC-backed companies and amount of funds invested were greater in the UK, the 
extended funding in the USA, Europe and Rest of the World indicate a globalisation 
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effect and supports the globalisation phenomenon as shown in Cumming and Dai 
(2010) and Megginson (2004). Therefore, the increasing availability of VC through 
globalisation impacts positively on the entrepreneurs and SMEs seeking VC 
opportunity to start-up, innovate and grow their businesses. 
BVCA (2013) shows the distribution of global investments of BVCA 
members from 2005 to 2012. Although the distribution shows an increase in the 
amount invested from 2005 (£11,676m) to 2007 (£31,634m), the amount fell 
drastically in 2008 (£20,025m) and the decline continued to 2012 (£12,288m). The 
initial decline in 2007 could be attributed to the financial crisis (Saridakis et al., 2008) 
and the UK government (BIS, 2012) also confirmed the decline in VC associated with 
the recessionary times. The decline in the amount invested reduced the number of 
VC-backed companies that could have been funded in the intervening period. As 
much as there is competition among entrepreneurs for VC, the competition among 
VCF is also strong as VCF seek good investment opportunities in their habit of 
screening entrepreneurial ventures. 
3.5.2 Competition among venture capital firms 
The expansion of VCF has enabled increasing competition in the industry and opened 
different funding choices such as better funding terms for entrepreneurs (Greene et al., 
2001; Hochberg, 2010). VCF competition is on the increase (Gupta and Sapienza, 
1992; Hochberg, 2010). According to Gupta and Sapienza (1992), the number of VCF 
increased in USA by 300% from 1980 to 1989. Thus, the expansion of VCF is a great 
opportunity for business formation as entrepreneurial competition for funds will 
become less fierce as more VCF begin to compete for entrepreneurial project funding. 
As VCF increase locally and globally, their competition will increase with greater 
supply of VC to satisfy the demand among innovative SMEs. 
The international expansion of VC has enabled more entrepreneurs to benefit 
from business funding from VCF (Sapienza et al., 1996). Their study shows that the 
international expansion of VCF will encourage globalisation to create a larger market 
to support entrepreneurs in their start-up, innovation and growth. According to 
Megginson (2004, p. 89), ‘a global market for venture capital and private equity is 
emerging’. They added that VCF in Western Europe and North America are 
experiencing similarly high levels of funding provision, funding patterns and rate of 
return. Hence, as the number of VCF increase from national territories to the 
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international stage, their competition will also increase at an alarming rate. That 
indicates the impact of globalisation on VCF and how innovative SMEs will benefit 
from the competition. 
Tian (2011) suggested that some VCF engage in staged financing of 
entrepreneurial ventures towards a positive investment outcome. Staged financing can 
compel the management of entrepreneurial ventures to deliver better returns as a pre-
condition for further VC finance. VCF with reputation contribute to better investment 
performance (Nahata, 2008). They revealed that the reputation of VCF is largely built 
on their cumulative performance in IPO exits. This suggests that VCF with reputation 
have competitive advantage over their counterparts and entrepreneurs seeking finance 
for their ventures are most likely to approach them. It also shows that VCF with 
reputation have a higher success rate in achieving their funding objective, improved 
firm growth and contribute to better economic growth. There is competition between 
one VCF and another (Elitsur and Gavious, 2011). Therefore, as competition is rife 
between VCF, it creates better funding opportunities for innovative SMEs as they 
access funds for their businesses. Competition in VCF and among entrepreneurs is not 
restricted by geographical location and globalisation has played a major enabling role 
to determine the demand and supply of VC. 
3.5.3 Geographical situation 
There is an advantage in concentrating VC investments in the immediate locality of 
the VCF (Chen et al., 2010). Denis (2004) is also in support of the localisation of VC 
investments. Hence, localisation of VC funding opportunity has the capacity to 
increase local supply of funds in the immediate vicinity of the VC firm. This shows 
that the geographical location of the VC can impact the supply of VC if the VCF has 
locality bias and vice versa. VCF and their investment in the USA were concentrated 
in San Francisco, Boston and New York (Chen et al., 2010). They also reported that 
the concentration of the VCF and their associated investment-backed companies in 
certain geographical locations impacts funding outcomes. VCF consider geographical 
location for their investment as a result of monitoring requirement because the VCF 
may not be able to adequately resource the monitoring of distant VC-backed firms 
(Denis, 2004). It will be better for government to encourage the establishment of new 
VCF rather than subsidise existing VCF (Chen et al., 2010). Therefore, the 
establishment of new VCF could improve the existence of more VC-backed 
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investments and promote competition among VCF to the advantage of entrepreneurs 
and, eventually, the economy. 
The cost of monitoring the proposed VC-backed firm in its geographical 
location is a key determining factor for VCF investment (Denis, 2004). Consequently, 
if the perceived monitoring cost cannot be justified for the geographical location, 
there could be a decision to decline VC for the business. This shows that the cost of 
monitoring can impact VCF decision to invest causing a possible fall in supply of VC 
where the monitoring cost is high. Although Chen et al. (2010) show the benefit for 
VCF in engaging in localised investment, the decision to invest or not in any business 
is part of the pre-screening assessment of any VCF. Hence, Denis (2004) agreed that 
the geographical location is very important in reaching that decision. However, Tian 
(2011) argued that localisation may not be necessary as staged financing can mitigate 
the high cost of monitoring distant VCF investments. 
 The use of distant geographical location to determine rejection of VC can be 
disadvantageous in a competitive market (Hochberg, 2010; Megginson, 2004). VCFs 
that invest in distant entrepreneurial ventures use staging as a strategic solution to 
ensure better outcome (Tian, 2011). Staging is a strategic tool for resolving high 
monitoring cost and Ahlstrom and Bruton (2006) argue that VCF in developed 
economies have a tendency for rich features in their VC provisions to support their 
funded businesses. Hence, the strategic staging mechanism for resolving high 
monitoring costs may not be present in developing, emerging and transitional 
economies. 
 VCF in the UK make up 60% of VCF in Europe (BVCA, 2010). This suggests 
that VCF in the UK are greater in size and reach than VCF in other European 
countries. According to BVCA (2013), the percentage of VC invested by BVCA 
members in the UK and Overseas in 2012 was 47% in the UK, USA 12%, Europe 
38% and Rest of the world 3%. They revealed that whilst seed capital and total 
expansion funds have fallen in recent times, other financing stages such as 
management buy-out / management buy-in had increased VC finance. According to 
them, although the demand for seed capital VC has increased recently, many VCF 
have concentrated their investment on later-stage, management buy-out and buy-in 
thereby increasing the supply of the associated VC. 
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3.6 Government and the law in venture capital funding 
3.6.1 Legal and regulatory framework 
Different countries have different rules and regulations guiding their VCF to protect 
the market and participants (Cumming et al., 2010; Cumming and MacIntosh, 2003). 
Cumming and MacIntosh (2003) and La Porta et al. (1998) identified the impact of 
the legal and regulatory regime in VCF across different countries. VCF in mature 
economies like the UK and USA are more advanced and feature-filled to support 
business funding engagement (Ahlstrom and Bruton, 2006). According to Cumming 
et al. (2010, p. 54), ‘better laws facilitate faster deal screening and deal origination, a 
higher probability of syndication and a lower probability of potentially harmful co-
investment’. The emerging economies are undergoing the processes of economic 
changes and institutional transformation to attain maturity (Ahlstrom and Bruton, 
2006). Consequently, it can be argued that the main contributory factor to the maturity 
of VCF in the UK and USA is the advanced legal and regulatory systems protecting 
all participants through valid contractual engagements. Thus, VCF in emerging and 
transitional economies could still have some teething problems associated with 
underdeveloped legal and regulatory systems. VCF are more inclined to fund SMEs 
where there are valid legal protection for their fund with impact on the demand or 
supply of VC (Ahlstrom and Bruton, 2006; Cumming et al., 2010). 
Developing economies are characterised by high agency fees of monitoring 
associated with asymmetric information, difficulty in contract enforcement and weak 
regulatory framework (Dutz et al., 2000). Amidst developed legal framework in law 
books, there are still constraints on financial markets because the documented legal 
framework in transition economies (e.g. Bulgaria, Romania, Poland and Uzbekistan) 
is not adequately exercised by the legal institutions in those countries (Pistor et al., 
2000). Therefore, the quality of the legal and regulatory framework documented in the 
national law books should be implemented to make it relevant in financial 
transactions for the protection and benefit of all participants. Developing economies 
are characterised by underdeveloped financial and legal systems (Beck et al., 2005) 
and these put huge financial constraints on SMEs as VCF are discouraged from 
investing. 
Government policies can exert a remarkable influence on regulating and 
galvanising financial operations (Jeng and Wells, 2000). Efficient and effective legal 
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and regulatory regime has the potential to create better financial relationships 
(Cumming et al., 2006). There are difficulties in initiating VC system through policy 
formulation in India as the Indian macroeconomic environment is characterised by 
lack of stability and history of government ownership (Dossani and Kenney, 2002). 
Thus, the benefit of sound government policies cannot be overemphasised because a 
reliable and relevant government policy will result in an efficient and effective legal 
framework to support and protect the VC investment environment and participants. 
Megginson (2004) and Cumming et al. (2006) discussed the usefulness of a relevant 
legal regime to protect the investment environment and their participants. Research 
shows that ‘countries with English common law codes offer greater protection to 
investors’ and apart from USA, the ‘European Union has had little success in 
establishing community-wide commercial laws, taxation regimes, or corporate 
governance policies (Megginson, 2004, p. 89). Each of the countries in the European 
Union have a ‘segmented national markets, and investment also tends to be largely 
localized’ (Megginson, 2004, p. 89). They further argued that the Asian markets are 
even more fragmented than the European Union markets because VC market is 
underdeveloped in Japan and China as they lack the requisite basic legal infrastructure 
to support VCF. Although the introduction of VCF in China can be traced back to the 
1980s, substantial development did not start until recently with the support of VCF in 
major economies like USA (Lu and Tan, 2012). Indeed, the majority of the countries 
in Asia are either developing or emerging economies, hence the VC industry is still 
not advanced and this will have effect on the available legal and regulatory 
framework. 
La Porta et al. (1998, 2000) and Cumming et al. (2006) discussed the 
usefulness of a reliable legal system to support VC relationship with their VC-backed 
companies. According to Cumming et al. (2006, p. 214), ‘Legality is a central 
mechanism which mitigates agency problems between outside shareholders and 
entrepreneurs, thereby fostering the mutual development of IPO markets and venture 
capital markets.’  Although the relevance of a good regulatory regime is well 
established, research shows that countries have varying levels of soundness in their 
framework (La Porta et al., 1998, 2000). According to Cumming et al. (2006, p. 214), 
‘the quality of a country's legal system is much more directly connected to facilitating 
VC-backed IPO exits than the size of a country's stock market.’ Therefore, in the 
absence of a solid legal and regulatory regime, there could be less VCF and the 
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agency cost will be high. However, staged financing may reduce the high agency cost 
(Dutz et al., 2000) associated with SMEs in emerging and developing economies but 
this is largely unproven. Consequently, the demand and supply of VC relies on the 
quality of the legal framework in operation and where the legal provision supports 
investors as well as investees, there will be favourable VC funding opportunities. 
3.6.2 Government intervention 
Governments now recognise the value of VCF in economic development (Megginson, 
2004; Cornelius, 2005; Chen et al., 2010). Chen et al. (2010) recommends the 
establishment of new VCF rather than subsidising existing VCF because new VCF 
will be able to support new portfolio of VC-backed companies. The government 
should carefully target support for VC initiatives that can support portfolio companies 
as a way to boost economic gains (Cornelius, 2005). The governments should direct 
their effort to support VCF by ‘eliminating regulatory road-blocks, lowering taxes, 
and providing a favourable investor climate’ (Megginson, 2004, p. 89). VCF with 
reputation contribute to greater entrepreneurial venture success (Nahata, 2008). 
Accordingly, as VCF with reputation fulfil their objective of delivering excellent 
result for SMEs, there will be a positive impact on economic development. Therefore, 
the government can encourage VCF to forge an excellent reputation, and thereby 
provide indirect support for entrepreneurial ventures. 
The government of any nation has the responsibility to ensure laws and their 
enforcements are effective and efficient at all times to support VCF and other 
financial deals, especially to protect investors and uphold positive corporate 
governance (La Porta et al., 1998, 2000). Cumming et al. (2006) also argued for the 
relevance and value of legality in VCF and entrepreneurial venture funding with 
particular reference to exit strategy. Israeli VC environment was facilitated by the 
involvement of the Israeli government using targeted programmes at different groups 
including start-ups, university spin-offs and incubators (Avnimelech and Harel, 2012). 
The support of businesses with high growth potential and VCF is an encouragement 
for better economic growth (Lerner, 2010). Therefore, as well as innovative 
businesses, VCF require government support in policy formulation to contribute to 
greater economic development. 
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3.7 Behaviour of venture capital firms 
3.7.1 Exit strategy 
The exit strategies of VCF vary between countries (Black and Gibson, 1998; 
Cumming and MacIntosh, 2003). Cumming and MacIntosh (2003) disclosed two 
levels of VCF exits including full and partial exits. These two levels of VCF exits can 
be subdivided into ‘full acquisition..., partial acquisition…, write-off… and partial 
write-off’ (Cumming and MacIntosh, 2003, p. 514). There are two exit strategies 
associated with VCF in the USA including rapid exit from portfolio investment and 
exit through an IPO (Black and Gibson, 1998). Partial exits could be a tax efficient 
way to limit tax burden on exit thereby eradicating or reducing tax liability at a later 
date (Cumming and MacIntosh, 2003). Partial exit strategy in VCF ownership shows 
a signal of quality (Cumming and MacIntosh, 2003). In measuring IPO success, 
experienced VCF and entrepreneurs contribute to a better exit factor (Axelson and 
Martinovic, 2013). However, it can be argued that the reason for partial exit could be 
a ploy to limit losses and make the business appear attractive to potential investors or 
it could be an attempt to share the huge losses of the business with other potential 
investors. So, a partial exit signal should not be used to determine VCF investment 
decision or measure potential returns on investment. 
The VCF is unable to exactly time its exit from the market (Ball et al., 2011). 
Consequently, the entry and exit of VCF from the market is a valid business decision, 
however, the timing of entry and exit can be impacted by normal market forces, the 
activities of other participants and economic downturn. To this end, economic 
downturn such as the financial crisis of 2007 can impact negatively on IPO exit. 
Axelson and Martinovic (2013) disclosed the use of trade sales as an exit strategy. 
They believe that Europe VCF have 8% lower probability of achieving trade sales 
compared to USA. The experience of the entrepreneur and VCF can determine the 
level of success in their exit (Axelson and Martinovic, 2013). However, VCF exit 
strategy associated with trade sales could be impacted by economic conditions such as 
the financial crisis of 2007. 
3.7.2 Investment decision 
The decision to invest or not in an entrepreneurial venture is the sole responsibility of 
the VCF considering its investment criteria (Chen et al., 2010; Denis, 2004; Hisrich 
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and Jankowicz, 1990). Investment decisions take huge management time and depend 
on the portfolio composition of the VCF (Petty and Gruber, 2011). The role of 
‘intuition’ in the VCF investment decision process is very important and 
entrepreneurs seeking VC should adopt different approaches to meet the requirements 
of different VCF (Hisrich and Jankowicz, 1990, p. 49). Although some VCF may 
adopt intuition in their funding decision (Hisrich and Jankowicz, 1990), the same 
approach may not be relevant to other VCF because Elitsur and Gavious (2011) show 
that high competition exist among VCF for entrepreneurial funding opportunities. As 
there are diverse VCF, entrepreneurs seeking VC finance should widen their approach 
to different VCF (Hisrich and Jankowicz, 1990). There are different types of VCF and 
they adopt different approaches to their funding decisions (Elango et al., 1995). 
Therefore, whilst some VCF engage in early or late stage of project funding, others 
are more flexible in pursuing a mixed investment agenda. However, recent research 
shows that there is concentration of VC funding opportunities in the later-stages and 
management buy-out/buy-in because VCF have become more risk averse (Cornelius, 
2005). Hence, entrepreneurs can expand their funding search as wide as possible to 
attract potential VCF. 
Franke et al. (2006, p. 803) acknowledged ‘similarity biases’ associated with 
the evaluation of VCF investment. There are VCF that concentrate their investment 
on entrepreneurial ventures similar to themselves in their investment decision (Franke 
et al., 2006). They confirmed that VCF with experience of new business formation or 
large companies tend to give priority to the entrepreneurs exhibiting such contextual 
traits. Also, ‘VCF who themselves have an engineering and managerial education 
tend to rate teams in which both competencies are present’ (Franke et al., 2006, p. 
803). According to them, other similarity biases identified are age and educational 
attainment. 
The unwillingness to take risk is dominating the world of VC (Cornelius, 
2005); hence, the rejection of funding based on the over riskiness of the 
entrepreneurial project could become the norm.  However, there is overwhelming 
research which supports the propensity of VCF to take risk both at the early-stage and 
later-stage of entrepreneurial venture formation and growth (Gompers and Lerner, 
2001; Jackson et al., 2012; Winton and Yerramilli, 2008). According to Tyebjee and 
Bruno (1984), VCF are able to assess the riskiness of projects prior to funding 
decision in accordance with their criteria. However, VCF have the potential to over-
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commit themselves in their VC finance decision (Jackson et al., 2012). Also, some 
VCF have ‘prior business experience’ to support their investment decision (Bottazzi 
et al., 2008, p. 488). Cumming and Dai (2010) argued that some VCF developed a 
rule whereby their VC-backed firm must be within twenty minutes travel from their 
office location. To this end, different VCF adopt different approaches to funding 
projects and whilst some VCF engage in traditional funding approaches, others are 
more flexible. As a result, the rejection decision of one VCF may not affect the 
acceptance decision of another. 
VCF tend to use excessive control rights as a contract tool in their 
entrepreneurial venture funding (Hellmann, 1998) but Black and Gibson (1998) show 
that some VCF give good entrepreneurs the opportunity to retake their rights to 
control their business through an exit IPO. Hence, at the time of contract, VCF ensure 
they have control rights over the VC-backed companies so that they can adequately 
protect their interest in the entrepreneurial venture. There can be tension between 
VCF and the entrepreneur in determining their rights during their relationship as a 
result of conflicting interests (Black and Gibson, 1998). According to Hellmann 
(1998, p. 57), the excessive control rights of the VCF can include ‘the right to fire 
entrepreneurs.’ The use of control rights enables the VCF to remove the strong hold-
up of the entrepreneur from the leadership of the business venture to allow more 
‘superior management team’ (Hellmann, 1998, p. 57). However, entrepreneurs could 
interpret the excessive control rights of VCF as meddling with the potential to 
heighten tension and conflict. Meanwhile, Florin (2005) show that entrepreneurs who 
do not wish to relinquish business control may not seek VC because Hellmann (1998) 
suggest that VCF are known to exert control rights over their investment at the 
possible detriment of the entrepreneur. 
3.7.3 Risks and returns 
Indeed, to exit or not is a strategic business decision that must be taken to ensure 
optimal performance of the VCF and the associated portfolio of VC-backed 
companies. The decision to invest is marred by complexity and difficulty with serious 
risks of adverse selection (Fried and Hisrich, 1994). VCF have limited resources to 
invest and they engage in protectionist activities (such as screening, monitoring and 
controlling) aimed at reducing their investment risks and maximising returns (Jackson 
et al., 2012). Hence, VCF activism can improve investment performance to a limited 
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extent unless it is optimally resourced. The growth of the portfolio size has a tendency 
to over-extend the available scarce resources of the VCF with reduction in returns 
(Jackson et al., 2012). Kanniainen and Keuschnigg (2004, p. 1935) revealed the 
existence of ‘optimal VC portfolio size with a trade-off between the number of 
companies and the value of managerial advice.’ Using the simple principle of 
economics, whilst the portfolio size growth of VCF investment increases to an 
optimum level, there will be increasing returns but at the stage where the VCF 
investment increases beyond the optimum level, there will be diminishing returns 
resulting from lesser performance associated with scarce human and financial 
resources. 
 The monitoring of VC-backed companies may become reduced with the 
increase in the portfolio of VC-backed companies (Jackson et al., 2012). VCF 
increase the monitoring of their investment in response to the inherent agency risks 
involved (Sapienza et al., 1996). VCF increase monitoring at the early-stage ventures 
following the intrinsic uncertainty involved (Sapienza et al., 1996).  Kanniainen and 
Keuschnigg (2004) also argued that VCF strictly monitor entrepreneurial start-up 
investments. Risk is a key reason for VCF monitoring (Gompers, 1995). Many VCF 
opt for later-stage investments as a way to limit their risk and increase returns 
(Cornelius, 2005). Thus, the reduced monitoring of high risk VC-backed companies 
could lead to business failure of the associated investment and financial losses for the 
VCF. 
Pruthi et al. (2003) discussed the investment monitoring behaviour of foreign 
and local VCF to determine similarities and differences. In India, Pruthi et al. (2003, 
p. 175) disclosed that foreign VCF were more involved at ‘strategic level’ while 
domestic VCF were more involved at ‘operational level’.  According to them, as a 
way to limit risks, foreign VCF engage in limiting their VC-backed companies from 
further borrowing commitments. Thus, the restriction on further borrowing could be a 
form of staged financing, which is a strategic tool to raise the performance of the VC-
backed firm and reduce potential losses. 
The VCF financing of projects associated with serial entrepreneurs tend to 
produce huge success for the VCF investors (Gompers et al., 2006). Entrepreneurs 
with previous record of accomplishment in their business are more likely to progress 
than new entrepreneurs without experience (Gompers et al., 2006). Researchers (e.g. 
Cumming and Dai, 2011; Jackson et al., 2012; Kanniainen and Keuschnigg, 2004; 
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Sapienza et al., 1996) corroborate the usefulness of experience in entrepreneurial 
capability in business performance. According to Gompers et al. (2006), the success 
of a previous business venture is a signal of the capability and quality of the 
entrepreneurs thereby increasing their chance of getting more funding for further 
business ventures. 
Whilst Beckham et al. (2007) revealed that the composition of the 
management team of the entrepreneurial venture being VC-backed can determine 
success or failure of the investment, King (2008) disclosed that the use of funding 
rounds will ensure the management team perform better with clear milestones. 
According to Beckham et al. (2007), the presence of rich diversity in the team 
demography of the management team improves broad access to information about the 
firm performance and helps to support the VC-backed business. The top management 
team show huge improvement as a result of a diversity of prior affiliations and 
extensive experiences with functional diversity in the management team (Beckham et 
al., 2007). They revealed the value of a diversity of management skills, experience 
and affiliations in limiting the risk of failure in VC-backed companies. There were 
better positive outcomes recorded for VCF investment in entrepreneurial businesses 
with excellent top management team and returns were impacted positively (Beckham 
et al., 2007). The VCF may introduce the concept of funding rounds as a way to 
release funding in stages to meet certain critical milestone (King, 2008). Tian (2011) 
also supported the use of funding rounds as a staged funding arrangement that can 
lead to positive outcomes. Hence, unless the entrepreneurial venture is able to fulfil 
the expected milestone, the next funding round could be delayed or cancelled. The 
release of funds in stages puts the management team of the VC-backed business in 
check and improves the success of the business or reduces the loss associated with 
possible business failure (King, 2008; Tian, 2011). VC-backed entrepreneurial 
ventures in distant places get funding through the process of staged funding rounds 
and leads to positive entrepreneurial outcomes as the funded business is able to 
progress to IPO in a short time (Tian, 2011). 
The arrival of a new generation of industry participants has changed the 
original character of VCF from being inclined to take risk to more risk aversion 
(Cornelius, 2005). This suggests that there is increased risk aversion over time among 
VCF as they reduce their investment concentration in start-up businesses. Although 
VCF may reduce their funding for seed and early stage entrepreneurial projects, they 
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could increase funding for other financing stages like management buy-out or buy-in 
(BVCA, 2013). Thus, investing in management buy-out or buy-in is a risk reduction 
strategy. Megginson (2004) and Chen et al. (2011) show that VCF have tolerance for 
high risk depending on the business venture and King (2008) provided a strategic 
safeguard against risk using staged financing in different rounds with milestone 
review. Whilst some VCF specialise in early-stage funding, another type of VCF 
engage more in later-stage (Gompers and Lerner, 2001; Jackson et al., 2012; Winton 
and Yerramilli, 2008). However, the early-stage funders in high technology 
innovative SMEs with high risk have the potential for huge returns. Therefore, VCF 
may fund a business after successful risk assessment but the real test is the 
marketplace where the product is expected to outperform its rivals to produce high 
returns. 
3.7.4 Valuation of entrepreneurial ventures 
The valuation of entrepreneurial ventures during the initiation of VC finance is a 
controversial issue and subject to intense negotiations (Cumming and Dai, 2011). 
VCF aims to maximise their returns on their investment as much as possible (Jackson 
et al., 2012). Networked VCF can restrict market entrants and determine the valuation 
of entrepreneurial projects as they force a decrease in actual market valuation to 
benefit themselves (Hochberg et al., 2010). They found extremely lower market 
valuations recorded for densely networked markets. Thus, there is a great need for 
equitable project valuation to ensure fairness during the negotiation stages of the VC 
finance arrangement. Apart from public company valuation, private company 
valuations are subject to negotiations between the entrepreneur and the VCF 
(Cumming and Dai, 2011). Unlike public company valuation, Cumming and Dai 
(2011) revealed that there are no established guidelines for private company 
valuation. Hence, networked VCF can limit new entrants with a restricted market in 
their favour and lead to undervaluing of proposed VC-backed businesses (Hochberg 
et al., 2010). According to Cumming and Dai (2011, p. 2), ‘firm valuations are 
positively correlated to measures of limited attention.’ Thus, the greater the value of 
the firm on valuation and the greater the VC ownership, the more attention the VC 
firm will show to the investment and vice versa. The VCF increases its power of 
negotiation where there is a proportionate increase in the value of its ownership of the 
VC-backed company (Cumming and Dai, 2011).  
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Bowden (1994, p. 307) identified the concept of ‘cooperative bargaining’ as 
an encounter between the VCF and the entrepreneur in the process of arranging VC 
finance. It is cooperative bargaining that determines the terms of the funding 
arrangement between the VCF and the entrepreneur to create mutually beneficial 
arrangement (Bowden, 1994). A networked VCF environment (Hochberg et al., 2010) 
could artificially determine the deal between the VCF and the entrepreneur thereby 
removing cooperative bargaining. Thus, whilst the VC and entrepreneur will 
cooperatively reach a mutually beneficial arrangement in the funding transaction in a 
non-networked VCF domain, there could be no mutually beneficial bargain in a 
networked VC environment. The findings of Hochberg et al. (2010) about networked 
VCF suggests that market forces of demand and supply could be altered artificially in 
favour of networked VCF in the valuation of entrepreneurial ventures. 
3.7.5 VC involvement 
VCF in the UK and USA are more involved in their VC-backed investments than their 
counterpart in other parts of the world (Sapienza et al., 1996). The involvement of 
VCF in their portfolio companies is an attempt to reduce information asymmetry and 
show their desire to protect their investment towards attaining better return while 
reducing risk considerably (Amit et al., 1998). However, Jackson et al. (2012) show 
that the involvement of VCF in their VC-backed companies can become overstretched 
to the point of overextending their limited resources. They further argued that 
financial and human resources are limited to the extent that when they become 
depleted, the capacity of the VCF to fulfil further investment opportunities becomes 
reduced or non-existent. Therefore, VCF cannot overextend their scarce resources and 
continually attain success in their VC-backed investments. Also, the support and 
mentoring of VC-backed business in a syndicated arrangement can be problematic 
(Cumming et al., 2010) but some VCF are involved in co-investment and syndication 
(Florida and Kenney, 1988) to support their risk exposure. 
Sapienza et al. (1996, p. 439) identified ‘strategic involvement’ as one of the 
key role of VCF in their investment. VCF provide ‘financial and business advice and 
functioning as a sounding board’ (Sapienza et al., 1996, p. 439). Keuschnigg and 
Nielsen (2003) echoed the significance of good business advice to aid the survival of 
businesses. Interpersonal and networking roles are other valuable functions of VCF 
for their portfolio companies (Sapienza et al., 1996). They described interpersonal 
79 
 
roles of the VCF to include mentoring and confidant of the executive officers of the 
VC-backed business. According to them, the networking role of VCF is characterised 
by the maintaining of valuable professional contacts to support their VC-backed 
companies. 
Timmons and Bygrave (1986) discussed the involvement of VCF in their VC-
backed companies as a way of adding value to the entrepreneurial venture.  Timmons 
and Bygrave (1986) stated that intelligent entrepreneurs who seek VC finance tend to 
approach VCF with reputation, recognition and experience as a way of adding value 
to the entrepreneurial venture rather than funding alone. Nahata (2008) also identified 
the relevance of a reputable VCF in entrepreneurial search for fund because such VCF 
are able to support their VC-backed investment for a quicker IPO with better asset 
value. Therefore, knowledgeable entrepreneurs seek funding and value-added 
involvement from VCF.  This shows that apart from VCF verification and validation 
of entrepreneurial venture suitability for funding, intelligent entrepreneurs also 
perform checks on their VCF for funding suitability. VCF who are able to play a 
highly productive role in new and evolving firms will attract better quality ventures 
(Timmons and Bygrave, 1986). Hence, a highly constructive role for VCF will 
encompass strategic, interpersonal and networking involvement in their VC-backed 
companies. 
VCF are actively involved in their VC-backed companies as a way to ensure 
success (Gifford, 1997). The partial ownership of the funded business venture dilutes 
the incentive of the entrepreneur to provide effort (De Bettignies and Brander, 2007). 
There is a preference of VC finance over debt finance where the productivity of VCF 
is higher relative to lower entrepreneurial productivity (De Bettignies and Brander, 
2007). The VCF pursues an efficient allocation of attention because it considers the 
opportunity cost of giving attention to all its VC-backed companies (Gifford, 1997). 
The VCF allocates its attention optimally to provide for its existing portfolio of VC-
backed companies as well as the assessment of potential projects for funding (Gifford, 
1997; Shepherd et al., 2005). The selecting and monitoring of investments is a major 
function of VCF in protecting their business interest (Amit et al., 1998). 
3.8 Conclusions and future research directions 
Innovative SMEs in the UK have access to VC finance. However, there are 
limitations in the supply of VC depending on the entrepreneurial project viability and 
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its level of innovativeness. As there is no clear universally accepted definition of best 
innovation, VCF make investment decisions on the basis of their criteria. As a result, 
different VCF make their investment decisions using their selection strategy. There is 
no supply and demand equilibrium in access to VC finance in the UK because there is 
no uniform supply of and demand for VC finance. Recently, VCF have targeted their 
investment on later-stage, management buy-out and buy-in to limit their risks and 
increase returns. In their risk aversion, VCF have become more stringent in their 
entrepreneurial project selection and monitoring with reduced funding of seed and 
early stage of projects. As UK VC funders are involved in global VC finance, their 
risk aversion has spread abroad. UK VCF invests more in the UK than other countries 
and this may reflect a localisation bias. However, localisation bias also applies to the 
USA because VCF are concentrated in some localities (such as San Francisco, New 
York and Boston) and the total investment of USA VCF in their locality exceeds their 
investments outside the USA. Therefore, innovative SMEs should first exploit their 
immediate locality for VC finance. 
Globalisation has positively impacted the demand and supply of VC; and 
innovative SMEs and entrepreneurial projects are at an advantage. The expansion of 
VCF from the USA, the source of VC civilisation, to outermost part of the world 
opens a massive potential market for innovative SME access to VC finance. As 
competition for VC increases among entrepreneurs, competition for entrepreneurial 
venture funding also increase among VCF following national and international 
expansion thereby creating a balanced and competitive environment to support 
businesses from both sides of entrepreneurs and VCF. Hence, globalisation has 
provided entrepreneurs with the opportunity to seek funding beyond immediate 
locality as reputable VCF are now global and able to fund innovative SME projects at 
a distance across countries and continents. 
The major contributor to the highly developed VC environment in the UK is 
the provision of a good legal and regulatory regime. This has allowed a greater chance 
of VCF expansion, hence, making the UK and USA the pioneers in VC expansion. 
The level of maturity of the legal and institutional framework impacts positively on 
the expansion of VCF and their capacity to support VC-backed investment. It is well 
known that a good legal and regulatory framework provides protection for financial 
contracts to help VCF and SMEs. The government of other countries should intervene 
to ensure adequate and valid regulatory framework to support VC provisions and 
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participants to boost new business formation, business growth and improve job 
creation towards better economic development. This research could stimulate 
discussion around existing legal and regulatory regimes around the world as 
policymakers can refocus their existing policies to support a better VC environment 
for SMEs, investors and investees. The government and policymakers in emerging, 
transitional and developing economies can now emulate VC developments in 
advanced countries like the USA and the UK. However, the UK and other developed 
economies should promote a stable economic and financial sector development to 
support the continued existence, growth and advancement of VC. While there are 
underdeveloped financial and legal systems, there is no encouragement for VCF to 
invest, expand and flourish. 
Entrepreneurs and SMEs are encouraged to use this research as their VC 
knowledge base to help them make appropriate decision when seeking VC for their 
innovative business venture. In seeking access to VC finance, knowledgeable 
entrepreneurs and innovative SMEs could target experienced and reputable VCF 
suited to the project domain and relevant to the funding stage. Globalisation is a force 
for good to support entrepreneurs in VC finance-seeking worldwide. Therefore, 
growth oriented entrepreneurs should be able to channel their funding application 
widely to a suitable VCF for their innovative project locally, nationally or 
internationally. 
VC-backed firms grow astronomically and outperform their non-VC-backed 
firms by a wide margin in growth and performance. VCF target high growth 
companies and innovative SMEs because such businesses exhibit high potential for 
job creation, high growth and innovative behaviour with consequent positive effect on 
returns and the economy. As a result, non-innovative SMEs may not be successful in 
their quest for VC regardless of their firm size. Although VCF have different areas of 
specialism, they target innovative SMEs at various stages of their formation and 
existence to take advantage of their innovative characteristics with the potential for 
higher than average returns. 
Formal VCF and their funding behaviour have increased in popularity, reach 
and significance because globalisation has enabled the expansion and exposure of 
VCF worldwide, though at a varied pace from one country to another. Debt finance 
and equity funding satisfies the financial needs of businesses. Whilst debt finance is 
used for less risky entrepreneurial projects, VCF fund more risky projects with 
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monitoring and screening as mitigation against risks. Although VCF are selective in 
their funding, they represent an alternative funding source for entrepreneurial ventures 
such as high-risk but potentially profitable projects. VCF understand that if high-risk 
projects are strategically managed, they have the potential to become profitable and 
VCF exert control rights over their VC-backed investments for their benefit. In recent 
recessionary times, risk aversion has been introduced to VCF investment decision-
making process with the result that less start-up firms are funded, except for 
management buy-outs and buy-ins. However, there are differences between VCF 
depending on their specialisation including seed, early-stage, later-stage and mixed 
group. Different types of VCF make different types of VC-backed funding decisions 
to support innovative SMEs and entrepreneurs. 
Further research is required to advance VC provisions and knowledge base to 
support innovative SMEs in the UK and worldwide. Specifically, VCF are increasing 
in popularity but declining in their funding provision and it is not clear why this is the 
case. VCF have gained increasing popularity since their introduction in the USA 
during the last four decades; however, VCF have become more risk averse even in a 
globalised business environment amidst their financial risk management, screening 
and monitoring capabilities. This is not traditionally compatible with their huge 
appetite for high risk and high returns. Therefore, this is an area requiring further 
research. 
  
83 
 
3.9 References 
Ahlstrom, D. & Bruton, G. D. (2006). Venture capital in emerging economies: 
Networks and institutional change. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice. 30(2), 
299–320. 
 
Alsos, G. A., Isaksen, E. J. & Ljunggren, E. (2006). New venture financing and 
subsequent business growth in men - and women-led businesses. Entrepreneurship 
Theory and Practice. 30(5), 667–686. 
 
Amit, R., Brander, J. & Zott, C. (1998). Why do venture capital firms exist? Theory 
and Canadian experience. Journal of Business Venturing. 13(6), 441–466. 
 
Avnimelech, G. & Teubal, M. (2004). Venture capital start-up co-evolution and the 
emergence & development of Israel’s new high tech cluster. Economics of Innovation 
and New Technology. 13(1), 33–60. 
 
Avnimelech, G. & Harel, S. (2012). Global venture capital ‘hotspots’: Israel. In 
Landström, H. & Mason, C. (Eds.), Handbook of Research on Venture Capital: 
Volume 2: A Globalizing Industry (pp. 209-226). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar 
Publishing. 
 
Axelson, U. & Martinovic, M. (2013). European venture capital: Myths and facts. 
Retrieved October 6, 2014, from  
http://www.bvca.co.uk/Portals/0/library/Files/News/2013/European_MandF_Report_
21Jan13.pdf 
 
Ball, E., Chiu, H. H. & Smith, R. (2011). Can the VCF time the market? An analysis 
of exit choice for venture-backed firms. Review of Financial Studies. 24(9), 3105–
3138. 
 
Bean, A. S., Schiffel, D. D. & Mogee, M. E. (1975). The venture capital market and 
technological innovation. Research Policy. 4(4), 380–408. 
 
Beckham, C. M., Burton, M. D. & O’Reilly, C. (2007). Early teams: The impact of 
team demography on VC financing and going public. Journal of Business Venturing. 
22(2), 147–173. 
 
Beck, T., Demirguc-Kunt, A. & Maksimovic, V. (2005). Financial and legal 
constraints to growth: Does firm size matter? The Journal of Finance. LX(1), 137-
177. 
 
BIS (2012) SME access to external finance, BIS Economics Paper Number 16, 
Department for Business, Innovation & Skills. Retrieved July 17, 2014, from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/32263/
12-539-sme-access-external-finance.pdf 
 
Black, B. S. & Gibson, R. J. (1998). Venture capital and the structure of capital 
markets: banks versus stock markets. Journal of Financial Economics. 47(3), 243–
277. 
 
84 
 
Bottazzi, L., Da Rin, M. & Hellmann, T. (2008). Who are the active investors? : 
Evidence from venture capital. Journal of Financial Economics. 89(3), 488–512.  
 
Bowden, R. J. (1994). Bargaining, size, and return in venture capital funds. Journal of 
Business Venturing. 9(4), 307–330. 
 
BVCA (2010). A guide to private equity. Retrieved March 27, 2014, from 
http://www.bvca.co.uk/researchpublications/bvcaguidetoprivateequity.aspx 
 
BVCA (2013). BVCA private equity and venture capital report on investment activity 
2012. Retrieved March 27, 2014, from 
http://www.bvca.co.uk/Portals/0/library/Files/News/2013/RIA_2012.pdf 
 
Chen, H., Gompers, P., Kovner, A. & Lerner, J. (2010). Buy local? The geography of 
venture capital. Journal of Urban Economics. 67(1), 90–102. 
 
Cornelius, B. (2005). The institutionalisation of venture capital. Technovation. 25(6), 
599–608. 
 
Cumming, D. & Dai, N. (2010). Local bias in venture capital investments. Journal of 
Empirical Finance. 17(3), 362–380. 
 
Cumming, D. & Dai, N. (2011). Fund size, limited attention and valuation of venture 
capital backed firms. Journal of Empirical Finance. 18(1), 2–15. 
 
Cumming, D. J. & MacIntosh, J. G. (2003). A cross-country comparison of full and 
partial venture capital exits. Journal of Banking & Finance. 27(3), 511–548. 
 
Cumming, D., Fleming, G. & Schwienbacher, A. (2006). Legality and venture capital 
exits. Journal of Corporate Finance. 12(2), 214–245. 
 
Cumming, D., Schmidt, D. & Walz, U. (2010). Legality and venture capital 
governance around the world. Journal of Business Venturing. 25(1), 54–72. 
 
De Bettignies, J. & Brander, J. A. (2007). Financing entrepreneurship: Bank finance 
versus venture capital. Journal of Business Venturing. 22(6), 808–832. 
 
Denis, D. J. (2004). Entrepreneurial finance: an overview of the issues and evidence. 
Journal of Corporate Finance. 10(2), 301–326. 
 
Dossani, R. & Kenney, M. (2002). Creating an environment for venture capital in 
India. World Development. 30(2), 227–253. 
 
Downs Jr., G. W. & Mohr, L. B. (1976). Conceptual issues in the study of innovation. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 21(4), 700-714. 
 
Dutz, M. A., Ordover, J. A. & Willig, R. D. (2000). Entrepreneurship, access policy 
and economic development: Lessons from industrial organization. European 
Economic Review. 44(4-6), 739–747. 
 
85 
 
Elango, B., Fried, V. H., Hisrich, R. D. & Polonchek, A. (1995) How venture capital 
firms differ. Journal of Business Venturing, 10(2), 157-179. 
 
Elitzur, R. & Gavious, A. (2011). Selection of entrepreneurs in the venture capital 
industry: An asymptotic analysis. European Journal of Operational Research. 215(3), 
705–712. 
 
EVCA (2012). The little book of private equity. 
Retrieved March 27, 2014, from https://www.evca.eu/media/19732/Little-book-of-
Private-Equity.pdf 
 
Florida, R. L. & Kenney, M. (1988). Venture capital, high technology and regional 
development. Regional Studies. 22(1), 33–48. 
 
Florin, J. (2005). Is venture capital worth it? Effects on firm performance and founder 
returns. Journal of Business Venturing, 20(1), 113-135. 
 
Franke, N., Gruber, M., Harhoff, D. & Henkel, J. (2006). What you are is what you 
like – similarity biases in venture capitalists’ evaluations of start-up teams. Journal of 
Business Venturing. 21(6), 802–826. 
 
Fraser, S. (2008). Small firms in the credit crisis: Evidence from the UK survey of 
SME finances. Warwick, England: The University of Warwick. 
 
Fried, V. H. & Hisrich, R. D. (1994). Toward a model of venture capital investment 
decision making. Financial Management. 23(3), 28–37. 
 
Gatchev, V. A., Spindt, P. A. & Tarhan, V. (2009). How do firms finance their 
investments? : The relative importance of equity issuance and debt contracting costs. 
Journal of Corporate Finance. 15(2), 179-195. 
 
Gifford, S. (1997). Limited attention and the role of the venture capitalist. Journal of 
Business Venturing, 12(6), 459–482. 
 
Gompers, P. A. (1995). Optimal investment, monitoring, and the staging of venture 
capital. The Journal of Finance. 50(5), 1461–1489. 
 
Gompers, P. A., Kovner, A., Lerner, J. & Scharfstein, D. S. (2006). Skill vs. luck in 
entrepreneurship and venture capital: Evidence from serial entrepreneurs. Social 
Science Research Network –NBER Working Paper Series, 12592, 1–28. 
 
Gompers, P. A. & Lerner, J. (2001) The venture capital revolution. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 15(2), 145–168. 
 
Greene, P. G., Brush, C. G., Hart, M. M. & Saparito, P. (2001). Patterns of venture 
capital funding: is gender a factor? Venture Capital: An International Journal of 
Entrepreneurial Finance. 3(1), 63–83. 
86 
 
Guo, D. & Jiang, K. (2013). Venture capital investment and the performance of 
entrepreneurial firms: Evidence from China. Journal of Corporate Finance, 22, 375-
395. 
Gupta, A. K. & Sapienza, H. J. (1992). Determinants of venture capital firms’ 
preferences regarding the industry diversity and geographic scope of their 
investments. Journal of Business Venturing. 7(2), 347–362. 
 
Harrison, R. T. & Mason, C. M. (2000). Venture capital market complementarities: 
The links between business angels and venture capital funds in the United Kingdom. 
Venture Capital: An International Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance. 2(3), 223–
242. 
 
Hege, U., Palomino, F. & Schwienbacher, A. (2009). Venture Capital Performance: 
The disparity between Europe and the United States. Finance. 30(1), 1–39. 
 
Hellmann, T. (1998). The allocation of control rights in venture capital contracts. 
RAND Journal of Economics. 29(1), 57–76. 
 
Hellmann, T. & Puri, M. (2002). Venture capital and the professionalization of start-
up firms: Empirical evidence. The Journal of Finance. 57(1), 169–197. 
 
Hisrich, R. D. & Jankowicz, A. D. (1990). Intuition in venture capital decisions: An 
exploratory study using a new technique. Journal of Business Venturing. 5(1), 49–62. 
 
Hochberg, Y.V., Ljungqvist, A. & Lu, Y., (2010). Networking as a barrier to entry 
and the competitive supply of venture capital. Journal of Finance. 65(3), 829–859. 
 
Jackson, W. E., Bates, T. & Bradford, W. D. (2012). Does venture capitalist activism 
improve investment performance? Journal of Business Venturing. 27(3), 342–354. 
 
Jeng, L. A. & Wells, P. C. (2000). The determinants of venture capital funding: 
evidence across countries. Journal of Corporate Finance. 6(3), 241–289. 
 
Kanniainen, V. & Keuschnigg, C. (2004). Start-up investment with scarce venture 
capital support. Journal of Banking & Finance. 28(8), 1935–1959. 
 
Keuschnigg, C. & Nielsen, S. B. (2003). Tax policy, venture capital, and 
entrepreneurship. Journal of Public Economics. 87(1), 175–203. 
 
King, B. L. (2008). Strategizing at leading venture capital firms: of planning, 
opportunism and deliberate emergence. Long Range Planning. 41(3), 345–366. 
 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F. & Shleifer, A. (1998). Law and finance. Journal of 
Political Economy. 106(6), 1113–1155. 
 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R. (2000). Investor 
protection and corporate governance. Journal of Financial Economics. 58(1-2), 3–27. 
 
87 
 
Lerner, J. (2010). The future of public efforts to boost entrepreneurship and venture 
capital. Small Business Economics. 35(3), 255–264. 
 
Lingelbach, D. (2012). Global venture capital ‘hotspots’: developing countries. In 
Landström, H. and Mason, C. (Eds.), Handbook of Research on Venture Capital: 
Volume 2: A Globalizing Industry (pp. 251-282). Edward Elgar Publishing: UK. 
 
Lu, H. & Tan, Y. (2012). Global venture capital ‘hotspots’: China. In Landström, H. 
and Mason, C. (Eds.), Handbook of Research on Venture Capital: Volume 2: A 
Globalizing Industry (pp. 227-250). Edward Elgar Publishing: UK. 
 
Maier, J. B. & Walker, D. A. (1987). The role of venture capital in financing small 
business. Journal of Business Venturing. 2(3), 207–214. 
 
Mason, C. & Landström, H. (2012). Introduction. In Landström, H. and Mason, C. 
(Eds.), Handbook of Research on Venture Capital: Volume 2: A Globalizing Industry 
(pp. 3-16). Edward Elgar Publishing: UK. 
 
Mason, C. & Stark, M. (2004). What do investors look for in a business plan? A 
comparison of the investment criteria of bankers, venture capitalists and business 
angels. International Small Business Journal. 22(3), 227–248. 
 
Megginson, W. L. (2004). Toward a global model of venture capital? Journal of 
Applied Corporate Finance. 16(1), 89–107. 
 
Nahata, R. (2008). Venture capital reputation and investment performance. Journal of 
Financial Economics. 90(2), 127–151. 
 
OECD (2002). High-growth SMEs and employment. Paris: OECD. 
 
NVCA (2013). National Venture Capital Association FAQ. Retrieved January 20, 
2014, from http://www.nvca.org/ 
 
Petty, J. S. & Gruber, M. (2011). “In pursuit of the real deal” A longitudinal of VC 
decision making.  Journal of Business Venturing. 26(2), 172–188. 
 
Pistor, K., Raiser, M. & Gelfer, S. (2000). Law and finance in transition economies. 
Economics of Transition. 8(2), 325–368. 
 
Popov, A. & Roosenboom, P. (2013). Venture capital and new business creation. 
Journal of Banking & Finance, 37(12), 4695-4710. 
 
Pruthi, S., Wright, M. & Lockett, A. (2003) Do foreign and domestic venture capital 
firms differ in their monitoring of investees? Asia Pacific Journal of Management. 
20(2), 175–204. 
 
Revest, V. & Sapio, A. (2012). Financing technology-based small firms in Europe: 
what do we know? Small Business Economics. 39(1), 179–205. 
 
88 
 
Riding, A., Orser, B., Spence, M. & Belanger, B. (2012). Financing new venture 
exporters. Small Business Economics. 38(2), 147–163. 
 
Rosiello, A. & Parris, S. (2009). The patterns of venture capital investment in the UK 
bio-healthcare sector: the role of proximity, cumulative learning and specialisation. 
Venture Capital: An International Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance. 11(3), 185–
211. 
 
Sapienza, H. J., Manigart, S. & Vermeir, W. (1996). Venture capitalist governance 
and value added in four countries. Journal of Business Venturing, 11(6), 439–469. 
 
Saridakis, G., Mole, K. & Storey, D. J. (2008). New small firm survival in England. 
Empirica. 35(1), 25–39. 
 
Shepherd, D. A., Armstrong, M. J. & Levesque, M. (2005). Allocation of attention 
within venture capital firms. European Journal of Operational Research. 163(2), 
545–564. 
 
Smallbone, D., Leig, R. & North, D. (1995). The characteristics and strategies of high 
growth SMEs. International Journal of Entrepreneurial Behaviour & Research. 1(3), 
44-62. 
 
Tian, X. (2011). The causes and consequences of venture capital stage financing. 
Journal of Financial Economics. 101(1), 132–159. 
 
Timmons, J. A. & Bygrave, W. D. (1986). Venture capital's role in financing 
innovation for economic growth. Journal of Business Venturing. 1(2), 161–176. 
 
Tyebjee, T. T. & Bruno, A. V. (1984). Venture capital: investor and investee 
perspectives. Technovation. 2(3), 185–208. 
 
Utterback, J. M. & Abernathy, W. J. (1975). A dynamic model of process and product 
innovation. Omega, 3(6), pp. 639-656. 
 
Van Osnabrugge, M. (2000). A comparison of business angel and venture capitalist 
investment procedures: An agency theory-based analysis. Venture Capital: An 
International Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance. 2(2), 91–109. 
 
Winton, A. & Yerramilli, V. (2008). Entrepreneurial finance: Banks versus venture 
capital. Journal of Financial Economics. 88(1), 51–79. 
 
Wright, M. & Robbie, K. (1998). Venture capital and private equity: A review and 
synthesis. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting. 25(5-6), 521–570. 
 
 
  
89 
 
Chapter 4 Exploring the Spheres of Crowdfunding
4
 
4.1 Introduction 
Crowdfunding is a method of fundraising directly from members of the public with 
small individual contributions using the internet (European Crowdfunding Network, 
2014). The spheres or types of crowdfunding are reward-based, equity-based, 
donation-based and credit-based. These spheres were discussed in FCA (2014a) and 
Bradford (2012) because the need for regulation in crowdfunding has become 
apparent. Apart from the UK, the USA has recognised crowdfunding as a way of 
funding entrepreneurial projects and this initiated the Jumpstart Our Business Start-
ups Act (JOBS Act) (Stemler, 2013). Prior to the JOBS Act in the USA, researchers 
(Burkett, 2011; Hemingway, & Hoffman, 2012) disclosed the conflict between 
equity-based crowdfunding and the existing United States securities laws. Therefore, 
for crowdfunding to be operated lawfully in the USA, changes had to be made to 
existing securities laws. Accordingly, the former President of USA, Barak Obama, 
stated in one of his speeches that the provisions of the JOBS Act are a potential game 
changer in the USA as businesses will have the opportunity for start-up and growth to 
the next level (Thompson, 2012). Apart from business reliance on personal savings, 
loans, private equity, venture capital and angel capital, crowdfunding is a new concept 
in access to business finance. 
Venture capitalists left a funding gap in the early stage of new business 
development and crowdfunding is quite capable of filling that gap (Ley, & Weaven, 
2011). Thus, crowdfunding is a relatively new, alternative and additional method of 
access to finance for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and other early 
stage projects. As crowdfunding is increasing in popularity in social media, business 
and research community, it is beginning to make impact as a seed and start-up fund 
for new firms. Crowdfunding has been identified as one of the alternative finance 
mechanisms for individuals and businesses to explore for their capital needs (Collins, 
Swart, & Zhang, 2013). Therefore, members of the public can fund a project with 
                                                          
4 This chapter was published as a Business Reference book chapter (ISBN 978-1-4666-9604-4) – 
Imarhiagbe, B. O. (2016) Exploring the spheres of crowdfunding. In D. Assadi (Ed.), Strategic 
Approaches to Successful Crowdfunding (pp. 190-209). Hershey, PA: Business Science Reference. 
doi:10.4018/978-1-4666-9604-4.ch009 
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little individual financial contribution in collaboration with others through the 
internet. 
As crowd funders or investors are distributed all over the world, different 
regulatory provisions are being introduced from one country to another. Developed 
countries have introduced crowdfunding associations. One of these is the UK 
crowdfunding association (UKCFA, 2014) which was formed by fourteen 
crowdfunding businesses in 2012 and the membership has since grown to forty-three 
in December 2014; this is a 250% increase in membership over two years. Other 
crowdfunding related associations include National Crowdfunding Association in 
USA (NLCFA, 2014), National Crowdfunding Association of Canada (NCFA, 2014), 
Crowdfunding Professional Association in USA (CFPA, 2014) and Crowdfund 
Intermediary Regulatory Advocates in USA (CFIRA, 2014). 
Web technology is the key driver of all the spheres of crowdfunding 
(European Crowdfunding Network, 2014; InfoDev, 2013). Entrepreneurial access to 
crowdfund platform is a globalisation phenomenon (Agrawal et al., 2011). As web 
technologies provide the enabling platform for many business successes, 
crowdfunding is being propelled using the internet (European Crowdfunding 
Network, 2014). Greater levels of crowdfunding campaign are initiated by creative 
individuals and within metropolitan areas (Antonenko, Lee, & Kleinheksel, 2014). 
This shows an evidence of spatial proximity in crowdfunding. 
European and North American organisations have recognised the relevance of 
crowdfunding for project fundraising. However, World Bank research confirmed that 
developing economies are at different stages of recognising crowdfunding in their 
policy framework with South Africa leading with four crowdfunding platforms 
(InfoDev, 2013). Although the UK financial regulator, the Financial Conduct 
Authority, has produced a policy statement for crowdfunding and approved some 
providers, it is still interacting with stakeholders and providing guidance to potential 
entrepreneurs on the operational models (FCA, 2014a). 
According to Danmayr (2014), North America and Europe represent 98% of 
the worldwide crowdfunding industry and the crowdfunding industry has grown 
periodically from 64% in 2011 to 81% in 2012 and the growth has continued 
unabated. Thus, the growth of crowdfunding has become astronomical over a few 
years and the future potential of growth is unimaginable. There is a strong positive 
signal of better access to crowdfunding money and this could lead to improved access 
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to other forms of finance such as venture capitalists and business angels (Lehner, & 
Nicholls, 2014). It is now confirmed that crowdfunding is helping to raise money for 
scientific research and success factors abound (Wheat, Wang, Byrnes, & 
Ranganathan, 2013). 
Successful crowdfunded projects show the value of small contributions in 
access to finance for entrepreneurial projects (Firth, 2012). Siva (2014) also report a 
success story of a science based crowdfunded project. In the UK, equity-based 
crowdfunding increased 618% and reward-based crowdfunding increased 387% from 
2012 to 2013 (Collins et al., 2013). 
There are huge management implications in the spheres of crowdfunding. 
These are summarised as follows: 
 A new phenomenon: As a new manifestation, crowdfunding is a growing 
business area for expansion. 
 Lack maturity and increasingly popular: Crowdfunding lack maturity but it is 
increasing in popularity and some projects exhibit competitive advantage. 
 Subject to regulation: Equity-based and credit-based crowdfunding will be 
subject to regulation to protect participants and system integrity, especially the 
protection of consumers, vulnerable members of the society and investors. 
 Trusting relationship yield reward: Project initiators such as business owners or 
entrepreneurs will reap reward from the crowd if their initial crowdfunding 
engagement is a trusting relationship. 
 Community support agenda: Some crowd contributors and platforms are 
targeted for community support only. 
 Crowd investor portfolio mix: The spheres of crowdfunding and the relative 
small size of fund contribution provide opportunities for investor portfolio mix 
likened to a mini venture capitalist. 
 Stakeholder management: Crowdfunding participants must be managed within 
strategic stakeholder engagement. 
 Project planning is necessary: Crowdfunding projects and their associated 
activities must be planned to ensure success. 
 Feature rich platforms: Different crowdfunding platforms have different 
features for the entrepreneur to explore before requests for funding are made, to 
ensure project funding success. 
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 Improve crowd profile and support others: Entrepreneurs should back other 
entrepreneurs to increase their community profile and participation. 
 Crowdfund training required: There is need for crowdfunding training for non-
technology savvy entrepreneurs and investors. 
 Increasing entrepreneurial innovation: There is a bandwagon effect of new 
innovative firms relying on crowdfunding activities. 
4.2 Main focus of the chapter 
This chapter aim to answer the following research questions associated with 
entrepreneurs and their access to crowdfunding: (a) What are the spheres of 
crowdfunding? (b) What are the theories of crowdfunding in finance, economics and 
management research? These questions are important for entrepreneurs, small firms 
and researchers because they provide the meaning and spheres of crowdfunding as 
well as explore the relevant extant theories. 
The contribution of this chapter is a knowledge base containing a systematic 
review of the different spheres of crowdfunding literature, identifying key relevant 
theories, support further research and a conclusion. This review is pertinent in 
understanding the spheres of crowdfunding around the world. Although there is an 
increasing popularity of traditional methods of access to finance, crowdfunding is 
innovative, new and a growing phenomenon (Tomczak, & Brem, 2013). Academic 
research about crowdfunding is limited and the phenomenon is still evolving as a way 
of access to finance for entrepreneurial projects (Lehner, & Nicholls, 2014; Lehner, 
2013; Giudici, Nava, Lamastra, & Verecondo, 2012) and other fundraising projects 
(FCA, 2014a). As a result, there are limited academic research outputs on the subject 
as shown in Table 4.1. 
To achieve our aim, electronic databases (ScienceDirect, Google Scholar, 
EBSCO and Emerald) were interrogated using keyword search method. It was also 
necessary to perform a keyword search of relevant reports published by government 
bodies and international organisations. In the keyword searches, ‘crowdfunding’, 
‘crowdfund’, ‘credit crowdfund’, ‘lending crowdfund’, ‘donation crowdfund’, ‘equity 
crowdfund’, ‘investment crowdfund’ and ‘reward crowdfund’ were the keywords 
used. 
The remainder of this chapter is presented thus. It examine investment or 
equity-based crowdfunding; credit-based crowdfunding; reward-based crowdfunding; 
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and donation-based crowdfunding. Further discussion provides recommendations as 
well as conclusion and further research directions. 
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Table 4.1. Date chronology of key crowdfunding research and policy literature 
Authors Year Sphere Policy/Research Authors’ affiliate country 
Antonenko, Lee, & Kleinheksel 2014 Reward Research USA 
Belleflame, Lambeth, & Schwienbacher 2014 Equity, reward Research Belgium, France, Germany 
Boeuf, Darveau, & Legoux 2014 Reward Research Canada 
Canadian Regulators 2014 Equity Policy Canada 
Danmayr 2014 Donation, equity, lending, reward Research Austria 
Dragojlovic, & Lynd 2014 Donation Research Canada 
Financial Conducts Authority (FCA) 2014 Donation, investment, loan, reward Policy UK 
Kuppuswamy, & Bayus 2014 Reward Research USA 
Lehner, & Nicholls 2014 Donation Research UK 
Meer 2014 Donation Research USA 
Mollick 2014 Equity, reward Research USA 
Pitschner, & Pitschner-Finn 2014 Donation, equity, lending, reward Research Spain, Germany 
Rossi 2014 Donation, equity, lending, reward Research Canada 
Siva 2014 Donation, reward Research UK 
Yeoh 2014 Investment Research UK 
Zheng, Li, Wu, & Xu 2014 Donation Research China, USA 
Zvilichovsky, Inbar, & Barzilay 2014 Donation, reward Research Israel 
Agrawal, Catalini, & Goldfarb 2013 Equity, non-equity Research USA 
Belleflame, Lambeth, & Schwienbacher 2013 Equity, reward Research Belgium, France, Germany 
Collins, Swart, & Zhang 2013 Donation, equity, lending, reward Research UK, USA 
Cumming, & Johan 2013 Equity Research Canada 
Gerber, & Hui 2013 Donation, reward Research USA 
InfoDev 2013 Donation, investment, loan, reward Research USA 
Lehner 2013 Donation Research UK 
Stemler 2013 Investment Research USA 
Tomczak, & Brem 2013 Investment Research Germany 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 2013 Investment Policy USA 
Valanciene & Jegeleviciute 2013 Investment Research Lithuania 
Wheat, Wang, Byrnes, & Ranganathan 2013 Reward Research USA 
Ahlers, Cumming, Gunter, & Schweizer 2012 Equity Research Canada, Germany 
Bradford 2012 Donation, equity, lending, reward Research USA 
Carvajal, García-Avilés, & González 2012 Donation Research Spain 
Cohn 2012 Equity Research USA 
Collins, & Pierrakis 2012 Donation, equity, lending, reward Research UK 
De Buysere, Gajda, Kleverlaan, & Maron 2012 Donation, equity, lending, reward Research Germany 
Giudici, Nava, Lamastra, & Verecondo 2012 Donation, equity, lending, reward Research Italy 
Hazen 2012 Investment Research USA 
Hemingway, & Hoffman 2012 Equity Research USA 
Knight, Leo, & Ohmer 2012 Equity Research USA 
Lee, & Lee 2012 Lending Research Republic of Korea 
Mitra 2012 Donation, equity, lending, reward Research Canada 
Parrino, & Romeo 2012 Investment Research USA 
Schwienbacher, & Larralde 2012 Donation, reward Research UK 
Agrawal, Catalini, & Goldfarb 2011 Investment Research USA 
Ley, & Weaven 2011 Equity Research Australia 
Ordanini, Miceli, Pizzetti, & Parasuraman 2011 Investment Research Italy, USA 
Note: This list represents the key research and policy based literatures relevant to different spheres of 
crowdfunding since the inception of the phenomenon. This table indicates a chronological list of crowdfunding 
literatures from 2011 to 2014, compiled from crowdfunding research and policy based sources only. 
 
4.3 Background 
The global financial crisis of 2007 caused a huge reduction in the availability of 
business finance for early stage and existing businesses (Smallbone, Deakins, Battisti, 
& Kitching, 2012; Saridakis, Mole, & Storey, 2008). Following the crisis and in the 
absence of adequate access to finance, start-up and existing businesses had financial 
constraints. Although different businesses explored personal savings, private 
equity/venture capital funding, invoice finance, loans and overdraft in their attempt at 
resolving access to finance issues, it was difficult to access the funding required for 
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their survival and innovation. Crowdfunding came into the limelight in the business 
environment during the financial crisis of 2007 in the midst of financial constraints in 
small firms (InfoDev, 2013). 
It is possible to think that crowdfunding is in existence to resolve the inherent 
financial constraints of the time among early stage businesses. However, although the 
financial crisis caused financial constraints for all levels of businesses, there was a 
greater financial constraint for small and start-up firms (Saridakis et al., 2008; 
Smallbone et al., 2012). However, some researchers (Belleflamme, Lambert, & 
Schwienbacher, 2014; Danmayr, 2014; Zheng, Li, Wu, & Xu, 2014; Gerber, & Hui, 
2013) believe crowdfunding existed prior to the financial crisis of 2007 as a way of 
funding creative projects in the arts, music, film and other specialist terrain. 
Crowdfunding originated from crowdsourcing, which is a way of getting support from 
online collaborators towards gaining new ideas, resolving problems and proffering 
solutions (Hazen, 2012). Moreover, it can be argued that the financial crisis of 2007 
and the financial constraints on small firms created the opportunity for the online 
community to seek to extend funding for creative projects to entrepreneurial projects 
among online friends and like-minded people (InfoDev, 2013). 
The spheres or types of crowdfunding are different as contained in the 
literature (Bradford, 2012; FCA, 2014a; U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 
2013). Equity-based crowdfunding (Barnett, 2013) is a subset of investment-based 
crowdfunding and it involves sharing in the equity ownership of a business by 
contributing a small amount of money in internet collaboration with other 
contributors. Donation-based and reward-based crowdfunding are not regulated in the 
UK because they are classed as not-for-profit (FCA, 2014a). According to Rossi 
(2014), the proportion of different spheres of crowdfunding in 2012 was: reward-
based (43.5%), credit-based (14.5%), donation-based (28%) and equity investment-
based (14%). As different countries begin to apply different regulations locally, it can 
restrict the size of private investors for crowdfunding projects (Schwienbacher, & 
Larralde, 2012). This is particularly relevant to investment-based crowdfunding 
because sharing in the equity ownership of firms still apply old regulatory rules to 
check unwholesome practices. The United States regulatory authorities went through 
a period of checks and balances in promulgating the JOBS Act regulation and 
amending current securities laws aimed at supporting equity-based crowdfunding 
(Clifford, 2013). Therefore, while reward-based and donation-based crowdfunding 
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will not be regulated through securities laws, credit-based and investment-based 
crowdfunding will be regulated. The World Bank reported in a recent research that 
reward-based crowdfunding has a compound annual growth rate of 524% from 2009 
through 2012 followed by equity (114%), lending (78%) and donation-based (43%) 
(InfoDev, 2013). 
4.4 Theories relevant to crowdfunding 
The key theories that impact access to finance in small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) are also systematically relevant to crowdfunding. These key theories include 
agency cost (Jensen, & Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973), signalling (Ross, 1977; Spence, 
1973; Weiss, 1995), credit rationing (Stiglitz, & Weiss, 1981), pecking order (Frank, 
& Goyal, 2003; Myers, 1984), discouraged borrower (Kon, & Storey, 2003), 
stakeholder (Ackermann, & Eden, 2011; Freeman, 1984), social capital (Zheng et al., 
2014) and network exchange (Zvilichovsky, Inbar, & Barzilay, 2014) theories. 
 The agency cost theory identifies information asymmetry, moral hazard and 
adverse selection (Jensen, & Meckling, 1976). They define agency cost as the sum of 
monitoring costs, bonding costs and residual loss. Giudici et al. (2012) and Agrawal, 
Catalini, & Goldfarb (2013) believe that information asymmetry, moral hazard and 
adverse selection represent major issues in crowdfunding. In agency cost theory, 
members of the public (the crowd) are unable to determine adequate due diligence of 
the crowd project prior to making financial contribution. If the crowd make financial 
contribution without due diligence, it can be astounding (Agrawal et al., 2013). 
Therefore, in each crowd project, the entrepreneur or project initiator has the superior 
information which may not be known to the crowd funders or contributors. Giudici et 
al. (2012) and Agrawal, Catalini, & Goldfarb (2013) indicates that information 
asymmetry means imperfect information. Thus, moral hazard and adverse selection 
are the result of imperfect information. There will be cost implications for 
contributors if they engage third party agency as a way to gather more information 
about the entrepreneur and the viability of the project for funding. In this case, the 
actual sum contributed may be too small to warrant monitoring and screening of the 
project. However, the entrepreneur or project initiator could provide detailed and 
relevant information about the project to enable contributors to make informed 
decisions. 
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Signalling theory provides an indicator to inform lenders of the credulity and 
potential viability of the entrepreneurial project. Whilst Weiss (1995) discussed the 
relevance of human capital as a signalling effect in labor economics, Ross (1977) 
revealed the role of incentive-signalling in the determination of corporate financial 
structure. The experience and education of the entrepreneur or project initiator can act 
as a positive signal to lenders, crowd contributors (Gruber, MacMillan, & Thompson, 
2012). Signalling theory provides crowd contributors with an indicator of the project 
initiator to inform their funding decision. According to La Porta et al. (1998), a good 
legal system can act as a signal of an improved financial sector development. It 
follows that signalling theory is directly relevant to crowdfunding transactions as the 
strength of the legal system can determine the efficiency and effectiveness of 
crowdfunding. However, crowdfunding platforms currently rely on their legal 
jurisdiction to resolve disputes. Therefore, if the legal system is unable to sustain 
crowdfunding transactions, there could be unforeseen transaction limitations as 
investors gain awareness through online due diligence. 
Stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984) in relation to crowdfunding places a 
responsibility on the entrepreneur or project initiator to manage the affairs of the 
project diligently with a view to create value ethically for its crowd investors. 
According to the stakeholder theory, in managing the affairs of any business, there 
must be interface between multiple stakeholders and the business. A good 
entrepreneur and business owner should be able to manage the affairs of multiple 
stakeholders efficiently and effectively (Freeman, 1984). Ackermann, & Eden (2011) 
advocate the need for a strategic management of stakeholders to ensure business 
success. Therefore, the project initiator in crowdfunding has a responsibility to all 
stakeholders to ensure project success. 
Pecking order theory (Frank, & Goyal, 2003) shows the hierarchy of methods 
of access to finance that an entrepreneur use in the process of seeking project funding. 
In pecking order principles, owner managers of small firms prefer internal sources of 
business financing over external sources, hence, they prefer debt finance over equity 
(Myers, 1984). Businesses in the small firm sector prefer the pecking order approach 
because it allows them to select their funding option while maintaining full control of 
their business (Holmes, & Kent, 1991). Thus, the application of pecking order theory 
depends on the sphere of crowdfunding because different rules apply to reward, 
donation, equity and credit. 
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Stiglitz, & Weiss (1981) introduced the concept of credit rationing as a way 
for lenders to reduce the risk associated with borrowers in an uncertain times and in 
the absence of collateral. Hence, credit rationing reduces the amount of credit finance 
available for entrepreneurial projects and reduces access to finance for SMEs. Crowd 
funders may withdraw or reduce their funding support if the entrepreneurial project is 
not adequately defined with due diligence to reduce information asymmetry and 
eliminate information distortion. Therefore, as a way to eliminate credit rationing, the 
entrepreneur or project initiator has a responsibility to provide adequate information 
about the project to inform the decision making of crowd contributors. 
The discouraged borrower theory points to self-rationing credit approach 
where the entrepreneur may be discouraged from seeking funds for fear of being 
rejected (Kon, & Storey, 2003). As an example of self-rationing, Mijid, & Bernasek 
(2013) find that women are self-rationing themselves in the capital market rather than 
being rejected by the bank for credit facilities. Kickstater (2014) shows that high 
number of rejections and successes are recorded for projects in its crowdfunding 
platform. It follows that crowd contributors may withdraw from funding 
entrepreneurial projects with inadequate prospects and reduced due diligence. 
Although crowd contributors are not skilled in screening the crowd projects, they 
have access to online information sources to inform their funding decision (Indiegogo, 
2014). Therefore, entrepreneurs who fail to meet their funding target for their project 
may become discouraged. 
Social capital theory is a valuable asset as it allows common problems to be 
resolved easily with combined effort. Following social capital theory, the online 
social media environment is an efficient place to develop and nurture social networks 
that can help to expand social capital. The social network perspective of an 
entrepreneur helps to define their strategic intent (Aldrich, & Kim, 2007). Zheng et al. 
(2014) find that the social network of the entrepreneur impacts the crowdfunding of 
its project. They discussed a multidimensional aspect of social capital in 
crowdfunding and they believe that social capital is embedded in social network. It 
follows that social capital is a trusted network connection of like-minded people. 
However, the herding behaviour of social network participants suggests that the 
success of crowd projects can depend on the social leaning of network members 
(Kuppuswamy, & Bayus, 2014). 
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Zvilichovsky et al. (2014) discuss the network exchange theory and find the 
principle of reciprocity to be applicable in the crowdfunding environment. They find 
that the entrepreneurs who double as backers have a funding advantage and higher 
success rate. This is particularly relevant to a project entrepreneur or initiator who 
also acts as crowd contributor, a double-sided active participant in the crowdfunding 
market. 
4.5 Investment or equity-based crowdfunding 
[Investment-based crowdfunding]… people invest directly or indirectly in new or 
established businesses by buying shares or debt securities, or units in an unregulated 
collective investment scheme (FCA, 2014a, p. 11). Equity-based crowdfunding 
(Barnett, 2013) is a subset of investment-based crowdfunding and it involves sharing 
in the equity ownership of a business by contributing small amounts of money. For 
example, according to Symbid (2014), there is a minimum investment of €20 for each 
crowdfunding investor and there are many entrepreneurial projects to be funded. The 
greatest obstacle to equity-based crowdfunding is regulation (Collins, & Pierrakis, 
2012). The regulatory authorities in the UK (FCA, 2014a) and USA (Barnett, 2013; 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2013; Cohn, 2012) believe in the 
regulation of investment or equity-based crowdfunding to protect investors or 
contributors. Yeoh (2014) discovered that the fine tuning of the regulatory framework 
in the UK and USA will lead to better crowdfunding provisions for all stakeholders. 
The regulatory provisions in Canada are targeting equity-based crowdfunding and 
many securities laws are earmarked for amendment to meet general crowdfunding 
needs (Canadian Regulators, 2014). 
 Apart from Symbid crowdfunding platform based in Rotterdam in the 
Netherlands, other examples of investment or equity-based crowdfunding are 
VentureCrowd (Melbourne, Australia), Crowdonomic (Singapore), CrowdCube 
(Exeter, UK) and Seedrs (London, UK). Although these example crowdfunding 
platforms currently pursue the investment or equity fundraising approach, their 
operational strategies are different as a result of their regulatory origin and business 
choice. 
Researchers are sceptical about the amendment to the securities laws of the 
USA (Hemingway, & Hoffman, 2012). In discussing the JOBS Act amendment of the 
USA, Cohn (2012) states that the plan was focused on supporting capital raising in 
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small firms but it appears to be fraught with ‘limitations, restrictions, obligations, 
transaction costs and innumerable liability traps’ (p. 1445). In Canada, there was a 
demand-driven regulation of the equity-based crowdfunding environment following 
the speed of crowd investor acceptance of the phenomenon (Cumming, & Johan, 
2013). It is possible to appropriately adopt crowdfunding to compensate for the gap in 
venture capital funding at early stage of project finance (Ley, & Weaven, 2011). 
There is a quiet revolution associated with equity-based crowdfunding relating 
to the securities laws in the USA (Knight, Leo, & Ohmer, 2012). They argue that 
crowdfunding platforms would have to support project initiators in satisfying the 
requirements of equity-based regulatory provisions. Hence, entrepreneurs must be 
aware of regulation or potential regulation for investment or equity-based 
crowdfunding. Although different countries have varied regulatory systems, the 
regulatory provision for crowdfunding is also varied. 
FCA (2014a, 2014b) disclosed that the investment-based crowdfunding will be 
subject to UK regulation to protect participants and system integrity, especially the 
protection of consumers and vulnerable members of the society. According to the 
FCA (2014a), investment-based and credit-based crowdfunding platforms are subject 
to the UK regulation and current approved operators are registered. Barnett (2013) 
and U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (2013) report on the regulatory 
provisions to support crowdfunding in the USA. As much as the regulation for 
crowdfunding is encouraged, securities laws must not become ineffective for general 
investor protection (Stemler, 2013; Hazen, 2012). 
European Crowdfunding Network (2014) revealed that there is no single 
European Union in terms of regulatory provisions in crowdfunding. According to 
them, there are uncoordinated regulatory actions from one country to another in 
Europe. There are differences in the spheres of crowdfunding and different 
operational rules apply from country to country. There are differences between 
investment and donation; hence, the regulatory provisions for investment-based 
crowdfunding do not include donation-based crowdfunding. De Buysere, Gajda, 
Kleverlaan, & Maron (2012) provide useful guidelines to inform regulators, 
crowdfunding platforms, their investors and the general public. According to Thomas 
(2014), the initial barrier to market entry in crowdfunding requires disclosure of 
important documents to the regulatory authorities. Therefore, businesses that are 
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unable to action all the required disclosure could be dissuaded from operating 
crowdfunding projects. 
The principle of mandatory disclosure for crowdfunding has been supported in 
the aftermath of the approval of the JOBS Act legislation because although it is good 
to provide funding facilities to support small businesses, it is very important to ensure 
adequate protection for investors (Hazen, 2012). However, it is important to note that 
the success and continuous growth of crowdfunding will depend on the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the regulatory provisions applicable to the given crowdfunding 
platform (Gelfond, & Foti, 2012). They disclosed that a lean and simplistic set of 
rules will encourage start-up and other early stage entrepreneurs. Although the JOBS 
Act has eased the securities regulation to support start-up and small companies, there 
could be an increase in investment scams and fraud associated with the change 
(Parrino, & Romeo, 2012). They confirmed that the JOBS Act reduces the regulatory 
burden on start-up and small companies to enable them to expand unimpeded. 
The JOBS Act and the securities regulation of the USA is not a panacea 
against fraud and it is not intended to prevent fraud but an attempt to promote capital 
formation for new business (Bradford, 2012). Thus, the fact that there could be 
investment scams or fraud associated with crowdfunding is not an adequate reason to 
kick against crowdfunding activities. Crowdfunding has the potential to outperform 
any type of business funding because the number of people involved in the crowd is 
enormous; being greater than any one country market. 
 Whilst investment-based and credit-based crowdfunding aim to make profit 
(e.g. shared equity and credit interest) for crowd contributors, donation-based and 
reward-based crowdfunding rely on personal non-monetary reward and community 
support (European Crowdfunding Network, 2014). The decline in major music 
industry labels following piracy and online music distribution has created an 
alternative avenue for artists to showcase their expertise and intellectual property 
through equity-based crowdfunding (Agrawal et al., 2011). The spheres of 
crowdfunding and the relative small size of fund contribution provide opportunities 
for investor portfolio mix. The crowdfunding investor portfolio mix could introduce a 
type of mini venture capitalists into an otherwise simplistic investment and capital 
raising terrain. 
Crowdfunding has been described as an alternative to the traditional form of 
venture capital financing (Mollick, 2014). Whilst the traditional form of venture 
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capital financing involves investment in high-valued entrepreneurial projects, 
crowdfunding investors contribute small amount in collaboration with many others to 
create a large crowd of small funders (Zheng et al., 2014). Therefore, there is a one-
to-many relationship between one entrepreneurial project and a mix of crowd funders 
drawn from all over the internet world. In the UK, equity-based crowdfunding 
increased 618% from 2012 to 2013; a short period of just over one year (Collins et al., 
2013). However, the making of financial contribution in the equity-based and non-
equity-based crowdfunding platforms without due diligence can be shocking and 
susceptible to uncertainty (Agrawal et al., 2013). 
Researchers produced an investment model with reward models to support 
crowd investors and investees in their funding decision process (Tomczak, & Brem, 
2013). Case studies of three crowdfunding platforms including Sellaband, Trampoline 
and Kapipal were analysed to identify the variation in their risk factors and associated 
risk to guide investors and provide guidance on investment payoffs (Ordanini et al., 
2011). They show that there are different levels of risk and returns associated with 
different spheres of crowdfunding. Ahlers et al. (2012) emphasised the significance of 
financial roadmaps, internal governance and risk factors in the success of fundraising 
through equity crowd funders. 
 In the same way that entrepreneurs learnt about other ways of accessing 
project funding, crowdfunding is not different. It is very easy to assume that all crowd 
participants such as entrepreneurs and investors are technology savvy. There is a clear 
need for training for entrepreneurs or project initiators to enable them to present their 
ideas properly online for crowdfunding. Entrepreneurs and crowd investors need a 
deeper understanding of crowdfunding to enable them operate efficiently and 
effectively in the crowd environment (Valanciene, & Jegeleviciute, 2013). A trained 
entrepreneur will be able to articulate their ideas in the social media platform and 
failure to present the right information online could jeopardise the crowd funding 
application with a knock-on effect on the project. Siva (2014) suggests proposal 
review for entrepreneurial projects prior to submission for crowdfunding to weed out 
inappropriate and fraudulent ideas submitted for funding. 
4.6 Credit-based crowdfunding 
[Credit-based crowdfunding]… people lend money to individuals or businesses in the 
hope of a financial return in the form of interest payments and a repayment of capital 
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over time (this excludes some business-to-business loans) (FCA, 2014a, p. 10). 
Entrepreneurs or business managers are able to establish a crowdfunding platform or 
setup an entrepreneurial project for crowdfunding (Greenwald, 2012; Rossi, 2014). 
Ordinary people are able to invest in credit-based crowdfunding with a view to make 
profit through credit interest (Symbid, 2011). According to Collins et al. (2013), debt-
based securities in the UK grew 170% from 2012 to 2013. 
Lenders in the crowdfunding peer-to-peer lending market are not professional 
investors and they face high risk as no collateral is offered for microloans (Lee, & 
Lee, 2012). However, the high risk of lending has not dissuaded the increasing 
platform participation among contributors in the UK, USA and Korea. It follows that 
capital contribution can be lost totally without any remedy in the event of 
entrepreneurial project failure. 
Notable examples of credit-based crowdfunding are the Prosper 
(www.proper.com), Zopa (www.zopa.com) and Lending Club 
(www.lendingclub.com), which are reported to be growing unrelenting. Although all 
crowdfunding platforms are experiencing phenomenal growth, credit-based 
crowdfunding has the lowest share of growth (Mitra, 2012). While Symbid (2011) 
show that contributors in its credit-based crowdfunding platform are paid interest and 
capital, it is confirmed that Kiva (www.kiva.org) credit-based crowdfunding platform 
do not pay interest to contributors. Instead, Kiva pays the capital to the contributor at 
the end of a successful project and the contributor may contribute again in another 
project. 
Researchers confirm that the accrued interest in some of the projects in Kiva 
crowdfunding platform are used to cover operating cost of providing microfinance to 
projects across the world (Bradford, 2012; Mitra, 2012). These show that while some 
credit-based crowdfunded projects pay interest and capital on successful completion, 
others pay capital only and use interest as operating cost. However, contributors in 
unsuccessful projects on the Kiva credit-based crowdfunding platform do not get any 
payment. If contributors are promised interest in a credit-based crowdfunding 
platform, the investment instrument could be regarded as securities for regulatory 
purpose (Bradford, 2012). 
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4.7 Reward-based crowdfunding 
[Reward-based crowdfunding]… people give money to receive a reward, service or 
product (such as tickets for an event, an innovative product, a download of an e-book 
or a new computer game) (FCA, 2014a, p. 10). Reward-based crowdfunding is not 
subject to regulation in the UK (FCA, 2014a). In the UK, reward-based crowdfunding 
grew 387% from 2012 to 2013 (Collins et al., 2013). A major determining factor for 
crowdfunding could be the level of community support and reward associated with 
the project (Gerber, & Hui, 2013). According to them, crowdfunding supporters are 
motivated by personal rewards and the support for other people as part of a 
community of like-minded people. Reward-based and donation-based crowdfunding 
are the largest operational models of crowdfunding (Antonenko, Lee, & Kleinheksel, 
2014; Mitra, 2012). 
Kickstater and Indiegogo are two important and global crowdfunding 
platforms offering rewards for contributions received from the crowd. According to 
Kickstater (2014), the highest successfully funded projects were in the music, film 
and video industry. Indiegogo (2014) disclose that there is a minimum of $500 
fundraising requirement on its crowdfunding platform and contributors are rewarded 
with non-monetary incentives called ‘perks’. Kickstater has a funding model of all-or-
nothing and this suggest that if entrepreneurs are unable to get their full targeted fund, 
the amount raised will be withdrawn and returned to the investors (Kickstater, 2014). 
According to Dragojlovic, & Lynd (2014), crowdfunding is a big benefit for 
early stage projects with early proof of concept. Research projects are known to face 
difficulty in raising finance for their investigation and development of new ideas 
(Dragojlovic, & Lynd, 2014). Crowdfunding are emerging as a way of funding 
community support projects around the world (Grossman, 2012). Kickstarter 
crowdfunding platform was started as a way to fund creative projects but this has 
grown extensively for funding technology start-up firms (Greenwald, 2012). A 
number of crowdfunding platforms use a tiered system of rewards for its contributors 
(Antonenko, Lee, & Kleinheksel, 2014). Contributors to crowdfunding campaigns 
expect reward and technology-based projects tend to give rewards such as software 
and performance tickets (Wheat et al., 2013). Although crowd contributors get 
rewards, their motivation may include social and intrinsic value (Collins, & Pierrakis, 
2012). 
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 Project initiators or entrepreneurs will reap reward from the crowd if their 
initial crowdfunding engagement is a trusting relationship. A lack of trust is one of the 
deterrents of crowdfunding among supporters (Gerber, & Hui, 2013). It is good 
practice to engage in an online prelaunch relationship prior to launching the 
crowdfunding campaign online (Helmer, 2014). The online prelaunch of the 
entrepreneurial project will introduce the idea to the social media environment and 
feedback can be systematically collected to guide the crowdfunding campaign 
towards supporting and building trusted crowd relationships. Zheng et al. (2014) 
confirmed that the social capital of the entrepreneur can improve access to 
crowdfunding investors. 
Kickstater, a reward-based crowdfunding platform, is one example of a 
crowdfunding platform that could generate the social information required to better 
understand the behaviour of crowd funders (Kuppuswamy, & Bayus, 2014). They 
confirmed that social information can help to understand the behaviour of project 
backers. Hence, the success or failure of an entrepreneurial project can be dependent 
on the available social information. According to Zvilichovsky et al. (2014), backing 
the project of other entrepreneurs is a rewarding fundraising strategy because it 
introduces a sub-community of active backers. They find that backers who also 
operate as project initiators have positive funding outcomes. 
4.8 Donation-based crowdfunding 
[Donation-based crowdfunding]… people give money to enterprises or organisations 
whose activities or purchases they want to support (FCA, 2014a, p. 10). Similar to the 
reward-based crowdfunding system, donation-based crowdfunding is not subject to 
regulation in the UK (FCA, 2014a). According to Grossman (2012), there is a 
continuous increase in crowdfunding platforms around the world and local people in 
the UK are using community initiative to fund public projects through the crowd. 
Research shows that non-profit projects receive greater sums of money from each 
crowd funder and are more likely to meet the project funding objective (Pitschner, & 
Pitschner-Finn, 2014). Also, non-profit initiatives in crowdfunding tend to be more 
successful at reaching fundraising goal (Belleflamme, Lambert, & Schwienbacher, 
2013; Collins, & Pierrakis, 2012). 
Donation-based crowdfunding is similar in some ways to reward-based 
crowdfunding. Notable examples of donation-based crowdfunding platform include 
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CrowdRise (Delaware, USA), GoFundMe (San Diego, California, USA) and 
RocketHub (New York, USA). Although these example platforms are donation-based, 
it should be noted that different crowdfunding platforms have their operational 
strategy and subject to local laws. 
In the UK, donation-based crowdfunding and peer-to-peer online fundraising 
constitute the largest fundraising market sector with £785million raised over a period 
of three years from 2011 to 2013 (Collins et al., 2013). Crowdfunding entrepreneurs 
should endeavour to contribute towards the fundraising of other entrepreneurs in the 
crowd community (Boeuf et al., 2014). They consider it advantageous for an 
entrepreneur to support the project of other entrepreneurs in the crowd environment. 
Extending support to other entrepreneurs in the crowd increases the profile of 
the entrepreneur and shows full participation in the community and cohesion; hence, 
the entrepreneur will get increased support from the crowd (Boeuf et al., 2014). 
Mollick (2014) confirmed that personal networks and signal of project quality 
contribute to successful crowdfunding. This shows that the personal networks of the 
entrepreneur made up of other entrepreneurs and like-minded people can lead to 
successful fundraising. The price of giving a donation has an effect on the behaviour 
of crowd contributors and the higher the competition, the lower the likelihood of 
donation (Meer, 2014). 
The availability of crowdfunding in the form of online donation has 
challenged traditional journalism and removed the revenue and profit making 
paradigm into a non-business model concept (Carvajal, García-Avilés, & González, 
2012). Crowdfunding as a form of social enterprise fundraising can provide the 
positive signal of potential funding through mainstream sources such as venture 
capitalists and business angels (Lehner, & Nicholls, 2014). They assert that 
crowdfunding can provide the legitimacy and leverage to enable fundraising in a 
venture capitalist and business angel environment. Crowdfunding is useful in the 
social entrepreneurship context and a model is provided to guide crowdfunding 
platforms and contributors (Lehner, 2013). The forms of returns associated with 
donation-based crowdfunding are intangible and contributors are motivated by social 
and intrinsic value (Collins, & Pierrakis, 2012). The contributions received through 
donation-based crowdfunding are not classified as securities for regulatory purpose in 
the USA (Bradford, 2012). 
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4.9 Recommendations 
Entrepreneurs and SMEs are gaining access to finance through crowdfunding but they 
must consistently maintain a good relationship with the crowdfunding platform. As 
much as project initiators or entrepreneurs need access to project funding, they should 
adhere to the guidelines provided by the crowdfunding platform and country level 
regulation. The guidelines are generated as protection for all crowdfunding 
stakeholders including service providers, contributors and entrepreneurs. 
Entrepreneurs should not be restricted by the geographical location of 
crowdfunding platform because crowdfunding opportunities abound all over the 
world. Globalisation has positively impacted the demand and supply of 
crowdfunding; and entrepreneurial projects are at an advantage. Although 
conventional wisdom associated with the traditional ways of project funding attribute 
success to geographical co-location, crowdfunding has used online mechanisms to 
mostly eliminate spatial proximity. Although crowdfunding platforms are 
concentrated in North America and Europe, most of the available platforms (e.g. 
Crowdcube, Indiegogo, Kickstarter, Seedrs, Invesdor and Abundance Generation) are 
expanding internationally as they are beginning to allow global access to their 
crowdfunding platforms. However, the originating country of the crowdfunding 
platform will determine the applicable legal jurisdiction for mediating disputes. 
Entrepreneurs or project initiators who act as backers for other crowdfunding 
projects are able to increase their crowd profile positively. As project initiators 
increase their positive profile among the crowd community, they will continue to have 
fundraising success with many willing backers. Therefore, entrepreneurs are 
encouraged to back the projects of other entrepreneurs.  
Entrepreneurs and SMEs are encouraged to use this research as their 
crowdfunding knowledge base and exploit the potentials identified. The potential of 
crowdfunding is huge and entrepreneurs seeking early stage business and project 
funding have the opportunity to gain adequate funding from the crowd. The 
acquisition of knowledge is to increase conventional wisdom and this chapter gives a 
wide understanding of crowdfunding and its different spheres. 
4.10 Conclusion and future research directions 
This investigation shows a systematic review of research and policy literature on the 
spheres of crowdfunding. Crowdfunding is a new, innovative, alternative and 
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additional method of access to finance for seed, start-up and other early stage project 
fundraising from many small contributors via the internet. The existing economic and 
management theories (e.g. pecking order, signalling, stakeholder, social capital and 
agency cost) of SMEs are also applicable to crowdfunding.  Globalisation and web 
technology has provided the driving force for a quicker expansion of crowdfunding all 
over the world. Regulation is also providing the necessary drive for the expansion of 
crowdfunding in developed countries and many developed countries in Europe and 
North America have recognised and approved the requisite regulatory support. 
However, regulatory authorities in developing countries are at different stages of the 
recognition of crowdfunding in their policy framework. The regulation of reward-
based and donation-based crowdfunding can rely on existing rules on charitable 
giving and other existing social provisions in the UK and elsewhere. However, equity-
based and credit-based crowdfunding require updated regulatory provisions with 
compliance monitoring. 
As a new concept, crowdfunding is growing as a means of access to finance 
for entrepreneurs. There are opportunities for further research to advance 
crowdfunding, its knowledge base and usefulness in meeting the needs of mostly seed 
and other early stage project funding. Crowdfunding is increasing in popularity in 
social media, business and research environments. It is very important that researchers 
explore crowdfunding widely with a view to broaden the knowledge of project 
initiators (such as entrepreneurs, business owners and managers). The necessity for 
further research is centred on the need for better information sharing and knowledge 
exchange to support new and existing entrepreneurs all over the world. 
The period of the financial crisis which started in 2007 closed many 
businesses and many new businesses were born through crowdfunding with impact 
around the world. Crowdfunding has gained international recognition and approval 
from developed countries but less so in developing countries. Although regulatory 
authorities in the UK and USA have supported crowdfunding with the necessary 
regulation, many countries are still in their infancy in crowdfunding. Therefore, there 
is need for crowdfunding research in emerging and developing countries to expand 
the worldwide knowledge base of crowdfunding. 
Access to finance theories (e.g. pecking order, signalling, agency cost, credit 
rationing and discouraged borrower) have been explored widely in finance, 
economics and management research. Also, social capital, network exchange and 
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stakeholder theories are relevant to crowdfunding but there are limited researches in 
these areas. There is limited research exploring crowdfunding as a method of access 
to finance for businesses with links to extant theories. As a result, there are limited 
research based literature associating crowdfunding and the theories. Hence, it is 
important that further research uncovers the impact of economics, management and 
finance theories on crowdfunding. This will allow adequate understanding of the 
various theories and how they relate to crowdfunding. 
In agreement with other researchers, crowdfunding require more empirical 
study to share successes and failures across crowdfunding platforms and countries. 
Empirical study will provide research based knowledge to enhance existing provisions 
from all over the world. In the absence of clear empirical study, there will be 
continuous assumptions across the online news and opinion pages. 
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Chapter 5 Does financial education pay?
5 
The Role of Financial Education on unlimited small firms Bank Finance 
5.1 Introduction 
In recent years, business, economics and finance researchers have debated whether 
the ‘education’ of owner managers contribute positively to entrepreneurial venture 
formation (e.g. Ganotakis, 2012; Baptista and Mendonça, 2010; Saridakis et al., 2008; 
Bates, 1990), growth and survival (e.g. Saridakis et al., 2008, 2012; Cornett et al., 
2011; Crook et al., 2011; Mahsud et al., 2011; Colombo et al., 2004). On the one 
hand, it is argued that education increases human capital/skills levels (the terms 
‘skills’ and ‘human capital’ are used here interchangeably) enabling owner managers 
to make positive funding proposals (Unger et al., 2011; Hsu, 2007) and enhancing 
business performance (Block et al., 2013; Saridakis et al., 2013; Townsend et al., 
2010; Dickson et al., 2008; Colombo and Grilli, 2005; Tamkin, 2005; Cooper et al., 
1994). On the other hand, it is argued that financial management skills in small firms 
(Chaston, 1994) and the educational attainment of the business owner does not impact 
business survival (see Coad et al., 2016; Taylor, 1999; Storey and Wynarczyk, 1996). 
However, there are only limited empirical evidence to suggest a potential link 
between financial education and successful access to bank finance for small 
businesses (see Saridakis et al., 2013; Hsu, 2007; Colombo and Grilli, 2005). 
Although the relationship between education and business performance has received 
much empirical attention, the relationship between financial education and access to 
bank finance has limited research evidence. 
The skill levels of the owner manager and entrepreneurial access to bank finance 
have become very important in current times following the financial crisis of 2007 
and the resulting recessionary times. Researchers from different academic disciplines 
have widely discussed the financial crisis phenomenon (McGuinness and Hogan, 
2016; Saridakis et al., 2013; Cowling et al., 2012; Smallbone et al., 2012; Cornett et 
al., 2011; Unger et al., 2011; Mahsud et al., 2011; Baptista and Mendonça, 2010; 
Fraser, 2008; Hsu, 2007; Colombo and Grilli, 2005). Therefore, financial education is 
part of the human capital endowments that individuals may possess and 
owner/managers may be financially qualified to support their business. Human capital 
                                                          
5
 An earlier version of this chapter was accepted and presented as a conference paper at the ISBE 
Conference 2013 at Cardiff City Hall, Cardiff, Wales, UK. Hence, the chapter was published as part of 
conference proceedings for delegates. 
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is strongly linked to corporate performance (Crook et al., 2011) thus provides a 
positive link between education and firm survival. The business experience of the 
owner manager also plays a major role in the human capital endowment of the firm as 
older firms are favoured in access to finance (Cowling et al., 2012). This could be 
attributed to their experience in writing business plans, establishing longer and better 
relationships with banks and understanding the terms and conditions of borrowing.  
Education is linked to human capital theory suggesting that skills and knowledge 
are important qualities that build human capability (Keeley, 2007; Schultz, 1961; 
Smith and McCulloch, 1863). Smith and McCulloch (1863) described human capital 
as the acquired and useful abilities of a person. Schultz (1961) defines human capital 
as a form of skills and knowledge that people acquire. In its foreword, Keeley (2007, 
p. 3) defined human capital as ‘the knowledge, skills, competencies and attributes that 
allow people to contribute to their personal and social well-being, as well as that of 
their countries’. This general link between human capital and positive outcome has 
been embraced by promoting financial literacy. Hence, financial education has been 
embraced by numerous bodies seeking to improve society and the economy. 
A recent charity campaign recognises and suggests that financial education should 
be an important part of the National Curriculum in the UK for school children 
(MyBnK, 2013; PFEG, 2013). To this end, a number of the UK Members of 
Parliament became involved in the campaign for introducing financial education in 
the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2007. The charities (e.g. MyBnK, 2013; PFEG, 
2013) launched various campaigns to support the teaching of financial education in 
UK schools. Consequently, financial education is now part of the National 
Curriculum for secondary schools in England (Department for Education, 2014). The 
OECD (2006) already expressed the importance of financial education in society to 
resolve financial illiteracy. Business school programmes around the world have 
grown in popularity, value and relevance (O’Brien et al., 2010; Friga et al., 2003). 
The increasing fees of business management courses at university show its 
importance all over the world (Bhagat et al., 2010). 
The aim and objective of this chapter is to empirically examine the role of 
financial education on bank finance outcomes for small firms. We focus on bank 
finance because overdrafts and commercial loans are the most common credit 
facilities available to small firms (see ECB Monthly Bulletin, 2014; Scottish 
Government, 2014; BIS, 2012). Previous work has found that access to bank finance 
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is strongly related to business lifespan and growth (Fraser et al., 2015; Han et al., 
2015; Saridakis et al., 2013). Apart from human capital, research shows that business 
age and gender can also determine the outcome of business finance (BIS, 2012; 
Cowling et al., 2012; Bellucci et al., 2010; Irwin and Scott, 2010; Alsos et al., 2006). 
Jones and Tullous (2002) find, for example, that female start-up entrepreneurs tend to 
be deficient in the areas of finance and accounting. Also, research shows that female 
entrepreneurs are more likely to be financially constrained in business in comparison 
to their male counterparts (Bellucci et al., 2010; Kirkwood, 2009). Although an 
established banking relationship can improve access to finance, new firms may not be 
able to present a long term relationship to support lending (Cotugno et al., 2012). 
Apart from checking the viability of the SMEs, lenders assess the credit history of 
small business owners before making lending decisions (Berger and Udell, 2006). 
Research shows that lenders consider substantial collateral in their lending decision 
and small firms have difficulty in fulfilling high collateral requirements (Voordeckers 
and Steijvers, 2006). 
Hence, this chapter attempts to answer the following research questions. (i) What 
is the role of financial education on bank finance outcomes? (ii) What is the role of 
business age (start-up or non-start-up) on bank finance outcomes? (iii) To what extent 
does gender impact bank finance outcomes? These questions are salient because they 
contribute to our understanding of the relevance of financial education as a form of 
human capital as well as the dimension of business age and gender aspects in the 
course of seeking business finance.  
The results show that the financial education of owner managers has no significant 
effect on the bank finance rejection rate. However, we find that the financial self-
confidence of owner managers significantly lowers their bank finance rejection rates. 
Start-up firms were found to be more financially constrained as they had greater 
difficulty in accessing bank finance than non-start-up firms. In our gender analysis, 
the gender of the owner manager has no significant effect on bank finance rejection 
rates; hence it is not possible to determine financial constraint on the basis of the 
gender of the owner manager. The contribution of this chapter, therefore, is to provide 
a more nuanced interpretation of the effect of financial human capital on businesses. It 
focuses on the effect on self-confidence rather than simple financial outcomes. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature review with 
hypotheses development. Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 describes the 
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empirical methodology. Section 5 presents the analysis with empirical results. Section 
6 presents the conclusion with summary of the research findings as well as directions 
for further research. 
5.2 Literature review and hypotheses development 
5.2.1 Financial education, human capital and access to bank finance 
There is a substantial literature on the relationship between human capital and means 
to bank finance (Gruber et al., 2012; Crook et al., 2011; Unger et al., 2011; Colombo 
and Grilli, 2005; Bates, 1990). This has tended to present a positive relationship, 
sometimes based on evidence, sometimes on an act of faith. 
Jo and Lee (1996) suggest that if an entrepreneur lacks education, it could 
have a negative effect on the profit of the firm. Entrepreneurs who possess industry 
specific skills do better in business performance (Shepherd et al., 2000). 
Entrepreneurial fund providers, such as banks, attribute success to the education and 
experience of the owner manager of the business venture (Unger et al., 2011; Bates, 
1990). This suggests that as the human capital resource endowments of an owner 
manager increases, the chance of business survival also increase with better access to 
bank finance. 
Collier et al. (2005) showed that organisations that engage in training of its 
workforce are more likely to avoid business closure. According to Tamkin (2005), 
employers who provide workforce training enjoys better employee motivation and 
improved work attitude. As employers reap the reward of improved workforce 
productivity, employees reap the reward of better qualification and skills, better 
potential for promotion and reduced chance of redundancy. This is supported with 
macro-economic data. The percentage value added per employee in Germany in 
comparison with the UK is between 15% and 25% higher in Germany as a result of 
higher spending on human capital development and differences in qualification levels 
(Tamkin et al., 2004). It follows that the higher the investment in the education of the 
workforce, the better the outcomes by way of increased value adding and better 
returns. However, Coad et al. (2016) show that when banks provide entrepreneurship 
training seminars for new and small firms, there may not be performance benefit but 
customer loyalty. In this case, the entrepreneurs acknowledged high levels of 
satisfaction with the training but robust statistical findings show modest or zero 
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impact on firm performance. This resonates with the earlier work of Westhead and 
Storey (1996) who found only a weak relationship between management training and 
small firm performance. 
 Bosma et al. (2004, p. 227) found that ‘survival, profits, and generated 
employment’ are the performance measures of human capital investments which 
produce good performance results for the business. These identified performance 
measures were found to have substantial and significant effect on the entrepreneurial 
venture. Consequently, the identified performance measures could represent the 
outcome of his effort and a growing entrepreneurial venture has the potential to 
contribute towards positive economic growth. 
Ganotakis (2012) suggests that formal business education and management 
experience can contribute to business success. In this case, business education and 
management experience can be the subject of financial investment as a way to 
develop the relevant human capital. The continuous increase in management course 
fees all over the academic world is a clear evidence of the value of such qualification 
(Bhagat et al., 2010). Entrepreneurs or owner managers from high social economic 
background have the potential to develop their human capital through family 
investments and support from extended acquaintance (Dunn and Holtz-Eakin, 1996). 
To this end, access to finance may be linked to the human capital investments of the 
owner manager through positive signalling effect on lenders. 
There is some evidence that the academic qualification and entrepreneurial 
experience of the owner manager can influence better business performance and thus 
access to finance (Saridakis et al., 2008; Colombo and Grilli, 2005; Colombo et al., 
2004). Colombo and Grilli (2005) performed their research in Italy using owner 
managers from Italian small firms and found that the higher the qualification of the 
owner manager, the greater the opportunity to access funding from lenders. However, 
Gimmon and Levie (2010) found that the academic qualification of the owner 
manager does not contribute to business survival in the Israeli small business 
environment. Therefore, they suggested that academic status does not support access 
to finance for business growth and expansion. Hence, it can be argued that there may 
be variations in access to finance among academically qualified owner managers as a 
result of different national orientation. This suggests that different countries may 
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exhibit different ways of recognising the quality of human capital such as academic 
qualification, managerial competence, financial education and specialist skills. 
Lenders in those countries could have different assessment levels and lending criteria 
for entrepreneurs seeking finance for their businesses. 
 Research suggests that higher levels of education of entrepreneurs have a 
positive effect on business performance (Doms et al., 2010). Lynch and Black (1995) 
discussed the value of education in attaining high business performance in the context 
of USA manufacturing and service sectors. Whilst productivity increased in the 
manufacturing sector by between 4.9% and 8.5%, it increased in the services sector by 
between 5.9% and 12.7%. Tamkin et al. (2004) and Tamkin (2005) also confirm the 
link between educational qualifications in achieving better business productivity in 
the UK. The increased human capital (e.g. education and experience) of the owner 
manager results in more positive growth rate of the business (Audretsch, 2002). 
Similarly, Segal et al. (2010) hypothesised that founder education and managerial 
experience contribute to increased organisational performance. The review by Nolan 
and Garavan (2016) found a positive relationship between HRD in SMEs and 
business performance. The OECD (2006) and Disney and Gathergood (2013) 
identified the importance of financial education and the inherent challenge in 
persuading people about their possible weakness in financial knowledge. PFEG 
(2013) and MyBnK (2013) also discussed the relevance of financial education in 
school age children to help them understand money matters early in their life. These 
suggest that financial education contributes to the human capital endowment of the 
owner manager. Although academic qualification adds to the human capital of owner 
managers, financial education provides a specific and specialist finance skill for 
business. 
Although there are poor financial management skills in small firms (Chaston, 
1994), education contributes immensely to better business performance (Audretsch, 
2002; Block et al., 2013; Doms et al., 2010; Lynch and Black, 1995). It follows that 
education could lead to better access to bank finance.  We therefore propose the 
following hypothesis: 
H1: Financial education of owner managers reduces the likelihood of bank finance 
rejection. 
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5.2.2 Business start-up, human capital and access to bank finance 
Cooper et al. (1994) asserted that the initial human capital of the owner manager 
contributes significantly to the performance of start-up firms. In making investment 
decisions, venture capitalists tend to emphasise the human capital of new firms (Baum 
and Silverman, 2004). It is widely recognised in research that entrepreneurial start-ups 
encounter difficulty in their inception and survival (Saridakis et al., 2013; Irwin and 
Scott, 2010; Fraser, 2008). Start-up firms experience greater problems accessing 
finance (OECD, 2006). Beck and Demirguc-Kunt (2006) identified the sharing of 
credit information as a way of facilitating SME funding. The credit scoring of the 
small firm extends to the owner-manager of the firm as a way to ascertain a clearer 
understanding of the business history and performance (Berger and Udell, 2006). A 
body of research indicates that the experience (Gruber et al., 2012) and education 
(Saridakis et al., 2008, 2013) of the owner-manager can have a positive signalling 
effect on lenders in SME access to finance and business survival. Similarly, Moro et 
al. (2012) found that entrepreneurial competence and voluntary disclosed information 
was influential in bank lending decisions. This is most likely to favour the borrower 
where there is a good and established relationship with the lender (Cotugno et al., 
2012). Therefore, new firm owners may not have credit history, entrepreneurial 
experience, collateral and good banking relationship to support their business venture.  
New businesses face financial challenges during their start-up (Saridakis et al., 
2013; Irwin and Scott, 2010; Fraser, 2008; Baum and Silverman, 2004). Older firms 
have fewer constraints in accessing finance (Cowling et al., 2012). Hence, older 
businesses with experienced owner managers are able to produce better business 
plans, form longer and better banking relationship and understand bank lending terms 
and conditions (Cotugno et al., 2012; Gruber et al., 2012; Berger and Udell, 2006; 
Voordeckers and Steijvers, 2006). We therefore propose the following hypothesis: 
H2: Businesses with non-start-up status have lower probability of bank finance 
rejection 
  
5.2.3 Gender and access to bank finance 
A recurring theme in finance for entrepreneurs is the gender of the owner-manager. 
An early analysis found that gender based differences are less substantial than has 
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been suggested (Mckechie et al., 1998) however, Muravyev et al. (2009) show gender 
bias against female entrepreneurs in their access to finance. Other research (Kim, 
2006; De Bruin et al., 2007) show inconclusive findings in their gender based 
research as they could not find any form of bias against female entrepreneurs. In 
analysing the barriers to female entrepreneurship, Brindley (2005) identified the 
issues of unresolved risk factors associated with different gender. These risk factors 
vary between male and female entrepreneurs. 
In risk taking, research suggests that women invest less and hence are more 
financially risk averse than men (Charness and Gneezy, 2012). Among highly 
educated people, women are significantly more risk averse than men (Hibbert et al., 
2013). They believe that financial education mitigates the gender differences in 
financial risk aversion. Female entrepreneurs are associated with lower early stage 
growth in business and this has an impact on their firm (Alsos et al., 2006). Females 
are also more likely to run businesses in sectors that require lower levels of funding. 
Female entrepreneurs are more likely to be financially constrained in business in 
comparison to their male counterparts (Bellucci et al., 2010). Kirkwood (2009) also 
agrees that female entrepreneurs are more financially constrained than males. One 
possible explanation for the lower levels of finance amongst female entrepreneurs, 
compared with males, is their perception of financial barriers. Using Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor data, Ropes and Scott (2009) found that females are about 
7.4% more likely to perceive financial barriers to business start-up than males. This is 
also set within a broader range of factors including the confidence of women in 
seeking finance. According to a study of the perception and behaviour of male and 
female start-up entrepreneurs, females were found to be deficient in the areas of 
finance and accounting (Jones and Tullous, 2002). Therefore, financial and academic 
qualifications are strong human capital ingredients that prepare both male and female 
entrepreneurs for entrepreneurship and better business performance. It follows that 
there are differences between male and female entrepreneurs in access to finance. 
Analyses of the differential effects of recession on male and female access to finance 
provide a useful further comparison. Lenders were found to have moved away from 
human capital criteria (e.g. experience) and move towards other indicators of credit 
size, including firm size. However, female entrepreneurs were less likely to seek 
external finance than males (Cowling et al., 2012). Although the literature is 
somewhat mixed in its clarity, we propose the following working hypothesis: 
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H3: Male business owners are less likely to be rejected for bank finance than female 
business owners 
 
5.3 Data 
5.3.1 The 2004 and 2008 business finance surveys 
This chapter uses the 2004 and 2008 SME finance dataset acquired from Fraser (2004, 
2008). The data reflect the distribution of the UK SME population and captures the 
period before and soon after the financial crisis of 2007. Each of the 2004 and 2008 
datasets comprise a telephone survey of 2500 SMEs in the UK. After the 2004 survey, 
there were both repeat and new SME participants in the 2008 survey as some previous 
participants could not participate. The 2004 research was actually the first major 
survey of UK SMEs to analyse businesses with up to 250 employees, their owners 
and access to external finance. 
The aim of the 2004 and 2008 surveys was to provide benchmarking data on 
the availability of credit to SMEs, the relationship between SMEs and their providers 
of finance, and to develop a general-purpose database for quantitative research on 
SME finances. Both surveys covered the personal characteristics of the owner 
manager, firm demographics, providers of finance, relationship with main bank, use 
of grant finance, commercial loans, assets and asset-based finance, credit cards and 
equity finance, use of business advice, main business problems and financial 
management qualifications, income and balance sheet information. 
This chapter will focus specifically on gender, start-up/non-start-up, academic 
education, financial education, self-confidence in finance, experience, firm size, VAT 
registration, ethnicity and firm net worth. These variables are selected because they 
are directly relevant to the hypothesis defined. The survey data collected are 
representative of the SMEs in the UK because the businesses which participated in the 
telephone surveys were selected from all over the UK. Therefore, the sample was 
randomised, supports representativeness of the UK SME population and reliable. 
The survey methodology for both 2004 and 2008 datasets was similar. The 
surveys used the one-stage stratified or systematic random sample. For data 
collection, the questionnaires were administered through a telephone interview and 
supported with a computer assisted telephone interviewing tool. The interview 
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questions were similar in both surveys, except for a few specific questions relevant to 
the time.  
For the purpose of producing credit rejection estimates based on the type of 
business and the financial management education of the owner manager, we focus on 
the type of business (non-start-up and start-up), legal form of business (sole proprietor 
and partnership), financial management qualification, highest academic qualification 
and bank finance outcomes (outright and partial credit rejection) variables. Note that 
financial management qualification or financial qualification or financial education is 
used interchangeably throughout this research. In addition, the surveys identified 
credit rejections for different types of bank finance but this study is directed at 
overdrafts and commercial loans because they are the most popular ways SMEs 
access finance as shown in research (ECB Monthly Bulletin, 2014; Scottish 
Government, 2014; BIS, 2012). This categorisation of the type of business, financial 
management qualification and credit rejections of the owner manager reflects the 
structure of the acquired datasets for this research. 
5.3.2 The variables 
The dependent variables identify bank finance rejection made up of outright/partial 
overdraft/commercial loan rejections. Overdraft rejection is made up of 
outright/partial overdraft rejection. Commercial loan is made up of outright/partial 
commercial loan rejection. Outright overdraft rejection captures borrowers who had 
their overdraft application totally rejected. Partial overdraft rejection captures 
borrowers who had their overdraft application partially rejected – received less than 
they wanted. Outright commercial loan rejection captures borrowers who had their 
loan application totally rejected. Partial commercial loan rejection captures borrowers 
who had their loan application partially rejected – received less than wanted. Outright 
or partial credit rejection rates were recorded with two possible outcomes, ‘Yes’ or 
‘No’ taking values of 1 and 0, respectively. 
The independent variables for this study include: gender, start-up, academic 
education, financial education, self-confidence in finance, experience, firm size, VAT 
registration, ethnicity and firm net worth. These variables have adequate data 
presentation to support analysis in this study. Although VAT registration variable is 
not directly used in the hypothesis development, the variable is used to investigate 
association with financial education and credit rejection rates because many SMEs 
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register for VAT, including those that register voluntarily. Also, firms that register for 
VAT can signal a positive performance (i.e. it may help with accessing finance). 
The full list of the dependent and independent variables with summary statistics is 
in the Appendix (Table 5.A1 and Table 5.A2). However, for clarity, financial 
education is defined as financial management qualification or financial qualification. 
5.4 Sample analysis 
5.4.1 Financial management qualification and bank finance rejections 
As a result of data limitations, this analysis report financial management qualification 
for sole proprietor and partnership legal form of businesses only. Therefore, limited 
liability companies are not included in our analysis because this data was not 
collected in the surveys. 
Table 5.1 shows that overdraft and loan rejection rates are lower for 
financially educated owner managers in 2004 and 2008 for both sole proprietors and 
partnerships. During the financial crisis, the rejection rates are higher for both groups, 
but the magnitude of the effect seems to be greater for the non-financially educated 
owner managers especially for outright rejection. For partnerships, the effect is more 
consistent across the two groups and non-financially qualified owner managers had a 
relatively higher rejection rates. This is further illustrated in Table 5.1. 
 In 2004, there was 0.73% in outright overdraft rejection rate for sole proprietor 
businesses with financially qualified owner managers but this increased to 3.08% in 
2008. For sole proprietors without financial management qualifications the rejection 
rate of 5.45% in 2004 increased to 10.77% in 2008. In 2004, sole proprietor 
businesses with financially qualified owner managers had a partial rejection rate of 
0.73% but this became 0.51% in 2008. In comparison the partial overdraft rejection 
rate for non-financially qualified owner managers increased from 6.91% in 2004 to 
7.69% in 2008. 
On the other hand, partnership businesses with financially qualified owner 
managers in 2004 also had better access to finance. Partnership owner managers with 
financial management qualification had outright overdraft rejection of 1.16% in 2004 
and increased to 1.41% in 2008. However, partnership businesses where owner 
managers have no financial management qualification had an outright overdraft 
rejection rate of 3.86% in 2004 and reduced to 3.52% in 2008. Furthermore, partial 
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overdraft rejection for financially qualified partnership owner managers reduced from 
1.54% in 2004 to 1.41% in 2008. Partial overdraft rejection rate of 5.41% was 
recorded for non-financially qualified partnership owner managers in 2004 and 
increased to 6.34% in 2008. 
Owner managers with financial management qualifications had fewer loan 
rejections compared with those without a financial management qualification. In 
2004, there was 0.68% in outright loan rejection rate for sole proprietor businesses 
with financially qualified owner managers but increased to 3.37% in 2008. Sole 
proprietors without financial management qualifications had an outright loan rejection 
rate of 4.08% in 2004 and this increased to 4.49% in 2008. In 2004, 0.00% was 
recorded for partial loan rejection rate for sole proprietor businesses with financially 
qualified owner managers but this increased to 1.12% in 2008. Sole proprietors 
without financial management qualifications had a partial loan rejection rate of 4.76% 
in 2004 and 7.87% in 2008. Partnership businesses with financially qualified owner 
managers in 2004 also had better access to loan finance. Partnership owner managers 
with financial management qualifications had an outright loan rejection of 0.00% in 
2004 and this remained the same in 2008. However, partnership businesses with 
owner managers who have no financial management qualifications had an outright 
loan rejection rate of 2.16% in 2004 and this increased to 2.38% in 2008. Also, partial 
loan rejection for financially qualified partnership owner managers increased from 
1.08% in 2004 to 2.38% in 2008. The partial loan rejection rate of 1.08% recorded for 
non-financially qualified partnership owner managers in 2004 increased to 2.38% in 
2008. 
In summary, as shown in Table 5.1, businesses that have financially qualified 
owner managers had better chance of success in their access to overdraft and loan 
finance in comparison to non-financially qualified owner managers. The bank finance 
rejection rates were generally higher in 2008 than 2004. This could be attributed to 
the effect of the financial crisis as businesses were more financially constrained 
(Saridakis et al., 2013; Cowling et al., 2012; Smallbone et al., 2012) and banks 
engaged in liquidity risk management (Cornett et al., 2011). 
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Table 5.1. Financial management qualification and bank finance rejections 
FINANCIAL MGT QUALIFICATION 
 
BANK FINANCE REJECTIONS 
YES NO 
2004 2008 2004 2008 
% % % % 
Sole proprietor:     
Outright overdraft rejection 0.73(275)(0.05)
 3.08(195)(-0.00) 5.45(275)(0.05) 10.77(195)(-0.00) 
Partial overdraft rejection 0.73(275)(0.08)
 0.51(195)(0.17) 6.91(275)(0.08) 7.69(195)(0.17) 
Outright loan rejection 0.68(147)(0.03)
 3.37(89)(-0.25) 4.08(147)(0.03) 4.49(89)(-0.25) 
Partial loan rejection 0.00(147)(0.18)
 1.12(89)(0.08) 4.76(147)(0.18) 7.87(89)(0.08) 
Partnership:     
Outright overdraft rejection 1.16(259)(0.05)
 1.41(286)(0.01) 3.86(259)(0.05) 3.52(286)(0.01) 
Partial overdraft rejection 1.54(259)(0.01)
 1.41(286)(0.01) 5.41(259)(0.01) 6.34(286)(0.01) 
Outright loan rejection 0.00(185)(0.32)
 0.00(84)(0.23) 2.16(185)(0.32) 2.38(84)(0.23) 
Partial loan rejection 1.08(185)(-0.19)
 2.38(84)(0.23) 1.08(185)( -0.19) 2.38(84)(0.23) 
Note: There is no financial management qualification recorded for limited liability companies. Sample size is 
shown in parenthesis without underline. Difference in means is shown in parenthesis with underline. As the p-
value is more than 0.05 (i.e., p>0.05), there is no statistically significant difference between the means at the 5% 
level. 
 
5.4.2 Bank finance rejection rates and gender 
Table 5.2 shows gender and bank finance rejection rates. It shows the distribution of 
male and female owner managers who applied but were rejected for overdraft and 
commercial loans in 2004 and 2008. Generally, there were mixed results in the rates 
of bank finance rejections in 2004 and 2008 among male and female owner managers. 
These mixed results partly reflect the findings of Brindley (2005) that differentiating 
between genders in business can be problematic as different risk factors impact their 
growth and survival. In 2004, outright overdraft rejection rate among male sole 
proprietor owner managers was 3.64% and 2.55% for females. In 2008, outright 
overdraft rejection rates among male sole proprietor owner managers were 8.21% and 
5.64% for females. In 2004, partial overdraft rejection rate among males was 7.27% 
and females were 0.36%. In 2008, partial overdraft rejection rate among sole 
proprietor owner managers were 5.64% for males and 2.56% for females. The results 
show that outright overdraft rejection rate, as well as outright and partial loan 
rejection rate, was higher for male than female owner managers in sole proprietor 
firms. 
In partnership firms during 2004, outright overdraft rejection rates among 
males were 3.86% and none for females. In 2008, outright overdraft rejection rate 
among males was 2.68% and 1.79% for females. As for partial overdraft rejection rate 
in 2004, males recorded 4.29% while it was 2.15% for females. In 2008, partial 
overdraft rejection rate was 8.93% for males and none for females. There is also a 
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similar distribution in partial and outright loan rejection rates. This indicates that 
outright and partial overdraft rejection rate as well as outright and partial loan 
rejection rate was higher for male than female owner managers in partnership firms. 
It can therefore be stated that there was higher bank finance rejection rate 
among male owner managers than females. Although not shown in the data, one 
possible explanation could be the discouraged borrower effect; that is females were 
less likely to apply for funding because they believe that their application may be 
unsuccessful, given their experience (Carter et al., 2015). It could also be explained 
by the complex risk factors impacting different genders in business (Brindley, 2005). 
 
 
Table 5.2. Gender and bank finance rejections 
GENDER 
 
BANK FINANCE REJECTIONS 
MALE FEMALE 
2004 2008 2004 2008 
% % % % 
Sole proprietor:     
Outright overdraft rejection 3.64(275)(0.21*)
 8.21(195)(0.25*) 2.55(275)(0.21*) 5.64(195)(0.25*) 
Partial overdraft rejection 7.27(275)(-0.18*)
 5.64(195)(0.13) 0.36(275)(-0.18*) 2.56(195)(0.13) 
Outright loan rejection 4.08(147)(-0.04)
 5.62(89)(0.10) 0.68(147)(-0.04) 2.25(89)(0.10) 
Partial loan rejection 4.08(147)(-0.04)
 6.74(89)(0.06) 0.68(147)(-0.04) 2.25(89)(0.06) 
Partnership:     
Outright overdraft rejection 3.86(233)(-0.17*)
 2.68(112)(0.19) 0.00(233)(-0.17*) 1.79(112)(0.19) 
Partial overdraft rejection 4.29(233)(0.18*)
 8.93(112)(-0.24*) 2.15(233)(0.18*) 0.00(112)(-0.24*) 
Outright loan rejection 1.80(167)(-0.17)
 1.47(68)(0.35) 0.00(167)(-0.17) 1.47(68)(0.35) 
Partial loan rejection 1.80(167)(0.08)
 2.94(68)(-0.17) 0.60(167)(0.08) 0.00(68)(-0.17) 
Note: The total percentage for each year does not sum up to 100 as this reports rejected applicant only. Sample size 
is shown in parentheses without underline. Difference in means is shown in parenthesis with underline. * P-value 
is less than 0.05 (i.e., p<0.05), there is a statistically significant difference between the means at the 5% level. 
 
5.4.3 Bank finance and firm age 
Table 5.3 provides a distribution of bank finance rejections among start-up firms. 
Generally, the sample distribution shows greater bank finance rejection rates in 2008 
than 2004 in both start-up and non-start-up firms which points to the financial crisis. 
While the outright overdraft rejection rate was 0.79% in 2004 for start-up firms, it was 
4.33% for non-start-up firms. While the partial overdraft rejection rate was 0.59% in 
2004 for start-up firms, it was 6.50% for non-start-up firms. While there was no 
outright loan rejection rate in 2004 for start-up firms, it was 3.18% for non-start-up 
firms. While the partial loan rejection rate was 0.64% in 2004 for start-up firms, it 
was 2.87% for non-start-up firms.  
130 
 
In 2008, the statistical result is similar to that of 2004. However, there were 
higher bank finance rejection rates in 2008 than 2004 reflecting the effect of the 
financial crisis and associated financial constraints (Smallbone et al., 2012; Cornett et 
al., 2011; Saridakis et al., 2008). While the outright overdraft rejection rate was 
5.84% in 2008 for start-up firms, it was 9.49% for non-start-up firms. The partial 
overdraft rejection rate was 1.46% in 2008 for start-up firms, it was 8.03% for non-
start-up firms. While outright loan rejection rate was 5.63% in 2008 for start-up firms, 
it was 2.82% for non-start-up firms. This shows that non-start-up firms had an 
advantage over start-up firms in commercial loan seeking during the financial crisis 
(Cowling et al., 2012) and non-start-up firms have longer historical relationship to 
show lenders (Voordeckers and Steijvers, 2006). Although the partial loan rejection 
rate was 4.23% in 2008 for start-up firms, it was 5.63% for non-start-up firms. It is 
possible that non-start-up firms which succeeded in its full commercial loan 
application may not be seeking partial commercial loan. 
 
Table 5.3. Start-up and bank finance rejections 
START-UP 
 
BANK FINANCE REJECTIONS 
YES NO 
2004 2008 2004 2008 
% % % % 
Outright overdraft rejection 0.79(508) 5.84(137) 4.33(508) 9.49(137) 
Partial overdraft rejection 0.59(508) 1.46(137) 6.50(508) 8.03(137) 
Outright loan rejection 0.00(314) 5.63(71) 3.18(314) 2.82(71) 
Partial loan rejection 0.64(314) 4.23(71) 2.87(314 5.63(71) 
Note: The total percentage for each year does not sum up to 100 as this analysis reports outright and partially 
rejected applicant only. Sample size is shown in parenthesis. 
 
5.4.4 Variables included in the model 
Table 5.A1 and Table 5.A2 in the Appendix provide summary statistics of the 
dependent and explanatory variables. The dependent variables are bank finance reject, 
overdraft reject and loan reject. All other variables (e.g. finance qualified, degree 
qualified, start-up, etc.) in Table 5.A1 and 5.A2 are the independent or control 
variables. Turning to our key explanatory variables, the Tables show that there were 
greater proportions of start-up firms in 2008 (18.42%) than 2004 (6.51%). This 
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indicates that the financial crisis may have spurred entrepreneurs into greater self-
employment as Saridakis et al. (2014) suggest that economic factors contribute to 
greater self-employment. The proportion of financially qualified owner managers 
increased from 19.65% in 2004 to 21.34% in 2008. The proportion of degree qualified 
owner managers increased from 18.33% to 26.73%. The proportion of male gender 
owner managers increased from 79.02% to 79.88%. These proportional increases may 
have been supported by the financial crisis of the time as revealed in research 
(Saridakis et al., 2013; Cowling et al., 2012; Smallbone et al., 2012; Irwin and Scott, 
2010). 
5.5 Empirical methodology 
We use probit estimation technique to model owner manager bank finance rejection, 
and examine its association with financial education (E), controlling for individual 
and firm characteristics (X). Respondents answered the following questions: 
 “Has your business applied for overdraft and been turned down outright? 
Y/N” 
 “Has your business applied for overdraft and been offered less than you 
wanted? Y/N” 
 “Has your business applied to a bank or financial institution for a 
loan/mortgage and been turned down outright? Y/N” 
 “Has your business applied to a bank or financial institution for a 
loan/mortgage and been offered less than you wanted? Y/N” 
From the survey data, this study observes the reporting outcome for each specific 
bank finance application outcome, which is a binary outcome (either outright/partial 
rejection or not). Hence, this study define a latent variable, ri*, that represents the 
propensity of an individual to report an unsuccessful bank finance outcome. This 
drives the observed binary indicator of whether a credit application was rejected, r, 
through the following measurement equation: 
             
                                                                          𝑟𝑖
∗ = 𝛽1𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖                                                          (1) 
 
                                                                                  𝑟𝑖 = 𝐾(𝑟𝑖
∗>0)                                                                (2) 
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Where K(.) is the indicator function, equal to 1 if the individual reports a credit 
outright/partial rejection and 0 otherwise, Xi is a row vector of individual and firm 
characteristics and Ei is a binary variable capturing whether the individual has a 
financial qualification. 
 In checking “multicollinearity”6, variance inflation factor (VIF) and tolerance 
(1/VIF) were ran on the model variables (Pevalin and Robson, 2012, p. 302; Gujarati 
and Porter, 2009, p. 340). In 2004, multicollinearity show a Mean VIF of 1.65 and 
each of the VIF values are between 1.02 and 4.71. The tolerance values for 2004 are 
between 0.9788 and 0.2124. In 2008, multicollinearity show a Mean VIF of 1.94 and 
each of the VIF values are between 1.10 and 5.99. The tolerance values for 2008 are 
between 0.9069 and 0.1669. As the VIF is less than 10 and tolerance greater than 0.1, 
multicollinearity is not a problem in this case. 
5.6 Analysis and empirical results 
We show the marginal effect probit estimation of bank finance rejection for sole 
proprietor and partnership firms in Table 5.4a and Table 5.4b. We used the mfx 
command in STATA to estimate the marginal effect after each probit regression run. 
Marginal effect provides the opportunity for simple percentage interpretation of 
effect. Again the study results are restricted to sole proprietor and partnership SMEs. 
In the model
7
, bank finance reject is defined as a combination of partial/outright 
overdraft rejections and partial/outright loan rejections. Overdraft reject is defined as 
partial/outright overdraft rejections. Loan reject is defined as partial/outright loan 
rejections. 
 This study shows in Table 5.4a that the gender of the owner manager has no 
significant effect on bank finance rejection rate. Hence, it is not possible to determine 
financial constraints on the basis of the gender of the owner manager of the business. 
This rejects hypothesis H3 (Male business owners are less likely to be rejected for 
bank finance than female business owners). Although research identified financial 
constraints (Bellucci et al., 2010) and risk aversion (Charness and Gneezy, 2012) as 
features of female entrepreneurs, Brindley (2005) indicate that differentiating between 
                                                          
6
 If the model variables are highly correlated with one another, it may affect the estimates (Pevalin and 
Robson, 2012, p. 290). 
7
 All model estimates in this research were produced using STATA. 
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genders in business can be problematic as different risk factors impact their start-up 
and existence. Therefore, this analysis finds no gender effect. 
 Table 5.4a shows that start-up firms were about 27% more likely to be rejected 
for bank finance in 2004 and 22% more likely to be rejected for bank finance in 2008, 
although the latter coefficient is found to be statistically insignificant. However, when 
this study estimates the model for overdraft and loan rejection separately we find that 
the coefficients become statistically significant.  This supports hypothesis H2 
Businesses with non-start-up status have lower probability of bank finance rejection. 
It also confirms existing research that start-up firms are more financially constrained, 
including during the financial crisis of 2007 (Saridakis et al., 2013; Cowling et al., 
2012; Irwin and Scott, 2010). 
Additionally, Table 5.4a shows that although the financially qualified owner 
manager variable carries a negative sign, the coefficient is found to be statistically 
insignificant for both 2004 and 2008 samples. Therefore, hypothesis H1 (Financial 
education of owner managers reduces bank finance rejection rate) is rejected. 
However, there is a strong statistical significance of self-confidence in finance 
supporting reduced bank finance rejection rate after the financial crisis. This suggests 
that although financial education is found to be useful (Disney and Gathergood, 2013; 
OECD, 2006), the self-confidence in finance makes a significant difference between 
success and failure in access to bank finance. This analysis therefore suggests that it 
may be inadequate to rely on financial education alone as a way to gain better access 
to bank finance. This study suggest that financially self-confident owner managers 
may produce better case for their business and present appropriate information to 
banks in their access to bank finance in times of economic hardship and financial 
distress. Thus, financially self-confident owner managers have the capacity to apply 
financial capability adequately to meet the needs of the business in accessing bank 
finance in times of crisis. It is possible to seek business advice as a solution to the 
absence of financial education of the business owner as suggested in research (Han et 
al., 2014). 
We now consider the control variables. The results in Table 5.4a show that 
experienced owner managers had significantly reduced probability of bank finance 
rejection in 2004. Degree qualified owner managers are 8% less likely to be rejected 
for bank finance in 2008 but the effect is statistically insignificant. The findings of 
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human capital researchers suggest that education and experience can act as a signal of 
potentially better business performance (Nolan and Garavan, 2016; Gruber et al., 
2012; Unger et al., 2011; Segal et al., 2010; Colombo and Grilli, 2005; Colombo et 
al., 2004; Bates, 1990). Micro and small firms are less likely to be rejected for bank 
finance in 2008 with no statistical significance, hence no size effect. VAT registered 
firms are less likely to be rejected for bank finance in 2004 with no statistical 
significance. White British owner managed firms were 7% less likely to be rejected 
for bank finance in 2004 with no statistical significance. Owner managers with a net 
worth of less than £500,000 are more likely to be rejected for bank finance in 2004 
with statistical significance. Hence, the greater the net worth of the owner manager, 
the less likely the firm was rejected for bank finance. The increased probability of 
bank finance rejection of 2008 could be associated with the financial crisis as banks 
become more selective in liquidity risk management (Smallbone et al., 2012; Cornett 
et al., 2011; Saridakis et al., 2008). 
We considered industry as a control variable in Table 5.4b using marginal effect 
probit estimation of bank finance rejection. Agriculture, hunting and forestry industry 
was 8.5% less likely to be rejected for bank finance with strong statistical significance 
in 2004. Manufacturing industry was also 6.6% less likely to be rejected for bank 
finance with strong statistical significance in 2004. There was less likely to be 
overdraft rejection in 2004 for the following industry categories and with statistical 
significance: Agriculture, hunting and forestry; Manufacturing; Wholesale/Retail; and 
Real estate, renting and activities. However, all other industry categories in 2004 and 
2008 had no statistically significant effect. It is possible that all industry categories 
were affected by the financial crisis as discussed in research (Smallbone et al., 2012; 
Cornett et al., 2011; Saridakis et al., 2008). 
5.7 Potential endogeneity of the financial qualification variable 
In controlling for potential endogeneity problems associated with bank finance 
rejection outcome, financial education and financial self-confidence, this study also 
employed an instrumental variable technique as reported in Block et al. (2013). For 
example it can be argued that financially qualified and self-confident people may have 
higher ability in finance related matters (Disney and Gathergood, 2013; OECD, 
2006). 
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Table 5.5 provides the results of the instrumental variable (IV) probit 
estimation. This study shows in Table 5.5 that start-up firms have higher probability 
of bank finance rejection in 2004 and 2008 but with statistical significance in 2004. 
The IV probit estimation took a cue from Block et al. (2013) and Angrist and Krueger 
(1991, 2001) in resolving potential endogeneity and measurement errors associated 
with the financial education variable. This study treats financial education as 
endogenous in the bank finance rejection model. This study suspects that 
unobservable shocks affecting the decision of the owner managers to seek financial 
education also affects their financial self-confidence. Hence, this study treats financial 
education as endogenous. Therefore, as an instrument in Table 5.5, we use the 
financial self-confidence of the business owner. The Wald test at the bottom of the 
output on Table 5.5 confirms the finding of endogeneity (at the 10% level). This test 
used the two-step
8
 probit to produce a reduced-form model estimator (Newey, 1987) 
because an extended model is not required in this case. In Table 5.5, the model 
confirms that the endogenous variable is financial education and that gender, start-up, 
academic education, self-confidence in finance, experience, firm size, ethnicity and 
firm net worth were used as instruments. The estimates reported for 2004 shows that 
start-up firms were statistically more likely to be rejected for bank finance. The 
estimates in Table 5.4a also show that experienced owner managers were less likely to 
be rejected for bank finance with statistical significance in 2004. White British owner 
managers were less likely to be rejected for bank finance with statistical significance 
in 2004. Business owners with lower net worth were more likely to be rejected for 
bank finance with statistical significance in 2004. The instrumental variable estimates 
for 2008 are not statistically significant and has low observation. However, the 2008 
result may have been affected by the financial crisis of the time as reported in 
research (Kay et al., 2014; Cowling et al., 2012; Smallbone et al., 2012; Saridakis et 
al., 2008). The 2004 IV result confirms the robustness of the findings in the marginal 
effect probit estimates in Table 5.4a. Therefore, although the 2008 estimate is 
statistically insignificant, the 2004 estimate is adequately robust to support this 
discussion. 
This study has also attempted to solve the problem of potential endogeneity of 
financial education and financial self-confidence in the bank rejection model. A 
                                                          
8
 The alternative to two-step estimator is the maximum likelihood estimator (mle). The mle is the 
default selection in STATA and produces an extended model containing iterations of log likelihoods. 
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model where both variables are treated as endogenous was explored with degree 
qualification as an instrument (following the user guide for Fraser, 2004, p. 70). 
Another model that treats only the financial self-confidence as endogenous and both 
degree qualification and financial qualification as instruments was employed because 
it may explain the self-confidence of the business owner. Whilst the first model shows 
that financial qualification and financial self-confidence become statistically 
insignificant, the second model shows insignificant result for financial self-
confidence. As previously discussed, the financial crisis may have contributed to the 
endogeneity issues reported for 2008. However, it is suggested that the endogeneity 
issue can be better explored and treated in a panel data framework and this is an area 
for future research. 
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Table 5.4a. Marginal Effect Probit estimation of bank finance rejection – Part 1 
 Bank finance reject Overdraft reject Loan reject 
Independent variables 2004 2008 2004 2008 2004 2008 
Gender (base category: Female)       
- Male -0.0202(0.0347) -0.0509(0.0814) -0.0205(0.0358) -0.0742(0.0868) 0.0006(0.0344) 0.0804(35.4950) 
Start-up (base category: No)       
- Start-up (1=Yes) 0.2653(0.1248)** 0.2168(0.1534) 0.2237(0.1339)*** 0.3656(0.1827)** 0.1049(4.2555) 0.9999(0.0482)* 
Academic education (base category: no academic qualification)       
- Degree qualified 0.0116(0.0345) -0.0797(0.0740) 0.0043(0.0334) -0.0782(0.0769) -0060(0.3424) 0.9987(2.3837) 
Financial education (base category: no financial qualification)       
- Financially qualified -0.0031(0.0332) -0.0383(0.0959) -0.0036(0.0334) 0.0017(0.1136) 0.0036(0.1984) ---4 
Self-confidence in finance (base category: no self-confidence)       
- Self-confidence in finance -0.0038(0.0065) -0.0317(0.0178)*** -0.0053(0.0064) -0.0307(0.0181)*** 0.0015(0.0828) -0.0572(23.92) 
Experience (base category: 11+ years)       
- 0-1 years -0.0849(0.0177)* -0.0364(0.1567) -0.0504(0.0539) -0.0963(0.0949) ---4 ---4 
       - 2-4 years -0.0723(0.0257)* 0.0454(0.1182) -0.0621(0.0315)** -0.0457(0.0931) -0.0133(0.8102) -0.1376(60.458) 
       - 5-10 years -0.0240(0.0289) 0.0879(0.1144) -0.0040(0.0321) -0.0136(0.1057) -0.0162(0.9600) -0.0866(42.235) 
Firm size (base category: medium sized firms)       
- Micro firms 0.0450(0.0665) -0.1820(0.2023) 0.0327(0.0659) -0.1661(0.2060) 0.3309(35.779) -0.9999(0) 
- Small firms 0.0604(0.0873) -0.0762(0.1355) 0.0443(0.0808) -0.1013(0.1225) 0.5564(54.062) ---4 
VAT registration (base category: no VAT registered)       
- VAT registered -0.0042(0.0289) 0.0356(0.0708) 0.0032(0.0287) 0.0301(0.0762) -0.0198(1.0384) 0.0864(36.131) 
Ethnicity (base category: non-white British)       
-White British -0.0690(0.0501) 0.1015(0.0756) -0.0495(0.0485) 0.0737(0.0913) -0.0558(2.6000) ---4 
Firm net worth (base category: net worth above £999,999)       
- Net worth £1 to £99,999 0.1209(0.0649)*** 0.1047(0.1341) 0.1171(0.0672)*** 0.0437(0.1294) 0.0217(1.1215) 0.5365(106.68) 
- Net worth £100,000 to £499,999 0.0923(0.0404)** 0.1047(0.1069) 0.0768(0.0416)*** 0.1473(0.1196) 0.0332(1.7353) ---4 
- Net worth £500,000 to £999,999 0.0261(0.0549) 0.1876(0.1834) 0.0207(0.0549) 0.0527(0.1582) -0.0086(0.4991) 0.9961(5.4862) 
Marginal effects after probit y = Pr(reject) (predict) 0.0878 0.1479 0.0807 0.1394 0.0165 0.0708 
Note: This analysis report marginal effect probit regression of bank finance rejection as well as separate marginal effect overdraft and loan rejections. Bank finance reject include partial/outright 
overdraft and partial/outright loan rejections. Overdraft reject include partial/outright overdraft rejections. Loan reject includes partial/outright loan rejections. Standard error is shown in 
parenthesis. Significance: *p<0.01 **p<0.05 ***p<0.10. 4Variable!=0 predicts failure perfectly, dropped and some observations not used. Estimates are shown in marginal effect coefficients. 
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Table 5.4b. Marginal Effect Probit estimation of bank finance rejection – Part 2 
 Bank finance reject Overdraft reject Loan reject 
Independent variables 2004 2008 2004 2008 2004 2008 
Gender (base category: Female)       
- Male -0.0228(0.0349) -0.1230(0.0932) -0.0197(0.0357) -0.1589(0.0988)*** -0.0065(0.3492) -0.0388(2.1117) 
Start-up (base category: No)       
- Start-up (1=Yes) 0.2125(0.1025)** 0.2815(0.1392)** 0.2061(0.1150)*** 0.3129(0.1589)** 0.0919(3.8664) 0.7465(10.1050) 
Financial education (base category: no financial qualification)       
- Financially qualified -0.0299(0.0307) 0.0145(0.0938) -0.0261(0.0311) -0.0014(0.0965) -0.0124(0.6976) 0.1290(6.2148) 
Self-confidence in finance (base category: no self-confidence)       
- Self-confidence in finance -0.0081(0.0064) -0.0435(0.0167)* -0.0070(0.0065) -0.0349(0.0172)** -0.0015(0.0830) -0.0511(2.9378) 
Experience (base category: 11+ years)       
- 0-1 years -0.0938(0.0208)* -0.0326(0.1433) -0.0676(0.0438) -0.0633(0.1297) ---4 ---4 
       - 2-4 years -0.0579(0.0360)*** 0.0766(0.1122) -0.0402(0.0467) -0.0053(0.0990) -0.0091(0.5231) 0.2106(8.7629) 
       - 5-10 years -0.0120(0.0324) 0.1531(0.1157) 0.0136(0.0370) 0.0941(0.1180) -0.0208(1.2129) 0.3426(11.5470) 
Firm size (base category: medium sized firms)       
- Micro firms 0.1115(0.0651)*** -0.0889(0.1995) 0.0829(0.0663) -0.1016(0.2068) 0.5524(39.8530) 0.2351(47.1660) 
- Small firms 0.1268(0.1088) -0.0566(0.1593) 0.0756(0.0955) -0.1061(0.1383) 0.6963(42.7050) 0.8903(40.1050) 
Ethnicity (base category: non-white British)       
-White British -0.0646(0.0483) 0.1423(0.0603)** -0.0604(0.0503) 0.1133(0.0780) -0.0443(2.1406) ---4 
Industry (base category: other community activities)       
- Agriculture, hunting & forestry -0.0850(0.0278)* 0.1675(0.1323) -0.0845(0.0252)* 0.1223(0.2609) ---4 0.6662(9.1105) 
- Manufacturing -0.0660(0.0375)*** 0.1543(0.2729) -0.0647(0.0340)*** 0.2977(0.3456) ---4 ---4 
- Construction -0.0266(0.0437) 0.0121(0.1546) -0.0438(0.0371) 0.1825(0.2515) 0.0012(0.0699) ---4 
-Wholesale/Retail -0.0414(0.0393) -0.0489(0.1248) -0.0651(0.0315)** 0.0552(0.1888) -0.0117(0.6690) -0.0900(5.5620) 
-Hotels & Restaurants 0.0046(0.0550) 0.2457(0.2096) -0.0165(0.0490) 0.3238(0.2500) -0.0086(0.4893) 0.1216(5.9175) 
-Transport, storage & communications -0.0326(0.0453) 0.2981(0.2607) -0.0469(0.0385) 0.5619(0.2716)** -0.0138(0.8044) ---4 
-Real estate, renting & activities -0.0167(0.0443) 0.0953(0.1833) -0.0611(0.0349)*** 0.1496(0.2376) 0.0257(1.3313) -0.0824(5.0810) 
-Health & social work -0.0392(0.0428) -0.1033(0.1067) -0.0376(0.0416) -0.0086(0.1785) -0.0181(1.0729) ---4 
Marginal effects after probit y = Pr(reject) (predict) 0.0990 0.1567 0.0916 0.1513 0.0211 0.0757 
Note: This analysis report marginal effect probit regression of bank finance rejection as well as separate marginal effect overdraft and loan rejections. Bank finance reject include partial/outright 
overdraft and partial/outright loan rejections. Overdraft reject include partial/outright overdraft rejections. Loan reject includes partial/outright loan rejections. Standard error is shown in 
parenthesis. Significance: *p≤0.01 **p≤0.05 ***p≤0.10. 4Variable!=0 predicts failure perfectly, dropped and some observations not used. Estimates are shown in marginal effect coefficients. 
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Table 5.5. Instrumental Variable Probit estimation of bank finance rejection 
 Bank finance reject 
Independent variables 2004 2008 
Gender (base category: Female)   
- Male -0.1321(0.2011) -0.4872(0.4491) 
Start-up (base category: No)   
- Start-up (1=Yes) 1.0678(0.3847)* 0.5712(0.5931) 
Academic education (base category: no academic qualification)   
- Degree qualified 0.1987(0.3073) 0.4979(0.7444) 
Financial education (base category: no financial qualification)   
- Financially qualified -0.9757(1.6696) -3.4230(2.2729) 
Experience (base category: 11+ years)   
- 0-1 years -1.0200(0.6978) -0.6710(1.0686) 
       - 2-4 years -0.7779(0.4624)*** -0.1189(0.5868) 
       - 5-10 years -0.1289(0.2218) 0.4502(0.5122) 
Firm size (base category: medium sized firms)   
- Micro firms 0.0008(0.7113) -1.2965(0.9833) 
- Small firms 0.1622(0.5652) 0.7785(0.9238) 
VAT registered (base category: No)   
- VAT registered (1=Yes) 0.0136(0.1921) 0.3231(0.4304) 
Ethnicity (base category: non-white British)   
-White British -0.3936(0.2352)*** 0.7536(0.6939) 
Firm net worth (base category: net worth above £999,999)   
- Net worth £1 to £99,999 0.5158(0.3097)*** -0.0205(0.6984) 
- Net worth £100,000 to £499,999 0.4259(0.3112) -0.0660(0.6106) 
- Net worth £500,000 to £999,999 0.0816(0.3272) 0.1842(0.7231) 
   
Number of observations 540 131 
Wald chi2(14) 20.99 8.17 
Prob > chi2 0.1019 0.8800 
Wald test of exogeneity: chi2(1) 0.34 3.12 
Wald test of exogeneity: Prob > chi2 0.5610 0.0773 
Instrumented:  Financial education 
Instruments:     Gender     Start-up     Academic education     Self-confidence in finance 
Experience     Firm size     VAT registered     Ethnicity     Firm net worth 
Note: This analysis report instrumental variable probit regression of bank finance rejection. Bank finance reject 
include partial/outright overdraft and partial/outright loan rejections. Standard error is shown in parenthesis. 
Significance: *p<0.01 **p<0.05 ***p<0.10. Estimates are shown in instrumental variable coefficients.
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5.8 Conclusion 
This chapter examines empirically the relationship between financial education and bank 
finance outcomes. The analysis shows that the financial education of owner managers has no 
significant effect on bank finance rejection rate. However, there is a significant effect that the 
financial self-confidence of owner managers lowers their bank finance rejection rates. We 
suggest that financially self-confident owner managers can provide a potential signalling 
effect on bank lenders in their access to bank finance. The financial self-confidence of the 
owner manager has played a key role during 2004 and 2008 to determine the outcome of 
entrepreneurial access to bank finance. Overdraft and commercial loans are the main bank 
finance used for small firm financing and rejection rates were recorded during 2004 and 
2008. The bank finance rejection rates for 2008 exceed that of 2004. This could be attributed 
to the financial crisis of 2007 as businesses were more financially constrained as a result of 
liquidity risk management in the banks. Although there were higher bank credit rejection 
rates in 2008, financially self-confident owner managers had better access to bank finance in 
comparison to their non-financially self-confident counterparts. 
Non start-up firms were less likely to be rejected from banks. This is a confirmation 
of previous research that older established firms are more successful in access to bank 
finance, including pre and during financial crisis of 2007 (e.g. Cowling et al., 2012). 
Businesses with experienced owner managers were less likely to be rejected for bank finance 
in 2004. Therefore, we suggest that older firms are able to positively exploit their years of 
business experience in seeking bank finance. However, experience does not seem to 
significantly affect the bank finance outcomes in 2008. Hence, when operating in economic 
hardship, experience seems to play no role. 
The gender dimension in this research shows that the gender of the owner manager 
has no significant effect on bank finance rejection rate. Therefore, although many research 
show greater financial constraints and risk aversion on the female entrepreneur, there is no 
gender effect in this study. One possibility for this observation is an uneven discouraged 
borrower effect between males and females; the latter showing less confidence in external 
finance seeking.  
The findings have implication for policy. First, our research shows that financial self-
confidence contributes to success in access to bank finance for businesses. It follows that 
business owners should exploit their financial self-confidence widely in their quest for 
business funding as their positive individual characteristics has been shown to signal better 
business performance with consequent positive effect on improved funding opportunities and 
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decreased credit rejection rate. Second, whilst owner managers with no financial self-
confidence may encounter more difficulty in seeking business finance, the government may 
provide them with policy support to enhance their effort for their business venture. The 
government may provide advice and counselling to help boost business confidence in access 
to finance. Third, start-up firms face greater challenges in accessing finance. The government 
may provide direct support through start-up training and start-up finance in the form of micro 
credit. The government may also target financial support and counselling to the start-up 
entrepreneur on the basis of business potential and viability.  
There are limitations for this research. First, the data used for this research is derived 
from the surveys of randomly selected SMEs based in the UK only. Therefore, the 
generalization of findings in the UK context will be more accurate than any other country. 
Second, the time period of the data collection for this research targeted 2004 and 2008 
indicating a cross-sectional dimension rather than longitudinal panel data. Third, the 2004 
and 2008 SME finance surveys captured financially qualified owner managers from 
partnership and sole proprietor businesses and thus do not include private limited 
enterprises
9
. 
It is recommended that further research explores the role of financial education and 
financial self-confidence among owner managers in limited liability businesses, charities and 
social enterprises to support their strong growth. The relationship between specific forms of 
human capital, business finance and performance also deserves further research attention. 
  
                                                          
9
 Private limited companies account for approximately a third of all businesses in the UK (Department for 
Business Energy and Industrial Strategy, 2016). 
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5.10 Appendix 
 
Table 5.A1. Variables and summary statistics for 2004 dataset 
V1 Variable names Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min2 Max3 
D Bank finance reject 566 0.1131 0.3170 0 1 
D Overdraft reject 508 0.1043 0.3060 0 1 
D Loan reject 314 0.0541 0.2267 0 1 
I Finance qualified 753 0.1965 0.3977 0 1 
I Degree qualified 753 0.1833 0.3871 0 1 
I Gender-Male 753 0.7902 0.4075 0 1 
I Start-up 753 0.0651 0.2468 0 1 
I Self-confidence in finance 753 7.9416 1.9100 1 10 
I Experience 0-1yrs 753 0.0266 0.1609 0 1 
I Experience 2-4yrs 753 0.0558 0.2296 0 1 
I Experience 5-10yrs 753 0.1501 0.3574 0 1 
I Micro 753 0.6946 0.4609 0 1 
I Small 753 0.2550 0.4361 0 1 
I VAT registered 753 0.6614 0.4736 0 1 
I Ethnicity – White British 753 0.9017 0.2979 0 1 
I Net worth £1 to £99999 719 0.1947 0.3963 0 1 
I Net worth £100000 to £499999 719 0.4339 0.4960 0 1 
I Net worth £500000 to £999999 719 0.1349 0.3419 0 1 
I Industry – Agric., hunting & forestry 753 0.1102 0.3134 0 1 
I Industry – Manufacturing 753 0.0624 0.2421 0 1 
I Industry – Construction 753 0.1262 0.3323 0 1 
I Industry – Wholesale/Retail 753 0.1381 0.3452 0 1 
I Industry – Hotels & Restaurants 753 0.0956 0.2943 0 1 
I Industry – Transport, storage & comm. 753 0.0823 0.2751 0 1 
I Industry – Real estate, renting & activities 753 0.1912 0.3935 0 1 
I Industry – Health & social work 753 0.0876 0.2830 0 1 
Note: 
1
Variable types used – Dependent (D) and Independent (I). 2Min value of 0 denotes ‘No’. 3Max value of 1 
denotes ‘Yes’. Self-confidence in finance variable takes the values from 1 (no confidence) to 10 (complete 
confidence) as in the likert scale. 
 
 
  
150 
 
Table 5.A2. Variables and summary statistics for 2008 dataset 
V1 Variable names Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min2 Max3 
D Bank finance reject 342 0.1637 0.3706 0 1 
D Overdraft reject 311 0.1511 0.3587 0 1 
D Loan reject 163 0.0982 0.2984 0 1 
I Finance qualified 492 0.2134 0.4101 0 1 
I Degree qualified 505 0.2673 0.4430 0 1 
I Gender-Male 492 0.7988 0.4013 0 1 
I Start-up 228 0.1842 0.3885 0 1 
I Self-confidence in finance 492 7.8415 1.8418 1 10 
I Experience 0-1yrs 492 0.0366 0.1879 0 1 
I Experience 2-4yrs 492 0.1057 0.3078 0 1 
I Experience 5-10yrs 492 0.1728 0.3784 0 1 
I Micro 504 0.7341 0.4422 0 1 
I Small 504 0.2262 0.4188 0 1 
I VAT registered 505 0.6000 0.4904 0 1 
I Ethnicity – White British 505 0.8139 0.3896 0 1 
I Net worth £1 to £99999 462 0.1970 0.3981 0 1 
I Net worth £100000 to £499999 462 0.3788 0.4856 0 1 
I Net worth £500000 to £999999 462 0.1169 0.3216 0 1 
I Industry – Agric., hunting & forestry 506 0.0830 0.2762 0 1 
I Industry – Manufacturing 506 0.0751 0.2638 0 1 
I Industry – Construction 506 0.1047 0.3065 0 1 
I Industry – Wholesale/Retail 506 0.1779 0.3828 0 1 
I Industry – Hotels & Restaurants 506 0.1028 0.3040 0 1 
I Industry – Transport, storage & comm. 506 0.0652 0.2472 0 1 
I Industry – Real estate, renting & activities 506 0.1779 0.3828 0 1 
I Industry – Health & social work 506 0.1067 0.3091 0 1 
Note: 
1
Variable types used – Dependent (D) and Independent (I). 2Min value of 0 denotes ‘No’. 3Max value of 1 
denotes ‘Yes’. Self-confidence in finance variable takes the values from 1 (no confidence) to 10 (complete 
confidence) as in the likert scale. 
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Chapter 6 Do bank credit rejection and financial education affect self-
confidence in finance?
10
 
6.1 Introduction 
Self-confidence is used in behavioural finance, business and management research to 
represent self-assessed ability in accomplishing tasks (Huang and Kisgen, 2013; Kirkwood, 
2009; Trevelyan, 2008; Rae and Carswell, 2001). On this basis, we define self-confidence in 
finance (or financial self-confidence) as self-assessed ability in accomplishing financial tasks. 
Self-confidence is a positive phenomenon and entrepreneurs who exhibit self-confidence reap 
the reward in better firm performance (Disney and Gathergood, 2013; Robinson, 2001). 
Heunks (1998) discussed creativity, innovation and success as a direct result of the personal 
attitude and values of the person as well as the institutional aspects. In this research context, 
the personal attitude and values of a business owner can impact the creativity and innovation 
of the business with consequent effect on business success. A creative mind exhibits self-
confident trait (Heunks, 1998).Therefore, the link between creativity and self-confidence 
shows that new and existing businesses need self-confident owners to support new ventures 
and continuous growth and survival. 
In a deprived economic environment, financial service organisations can help poor 
people with entrepreneurial flair to build their self-confidence towards alleviating their 
poverty (Robinson, 2001). Specifically, financial self-confidence determines entrepreneurs’ 
financial behaviour and investment decision. Since the aftermath of the financial crisis of 
2007, lenders have become more risk averse and small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs), in particular, have faced financial constraints and cash flow problems (Saridakis et 
al., 2013; Smallbone et al., 2012; Cornett et al., 2011; Fraser, 2008). At the same time credit 
rejection rates by financial institutions and the percentage of discouraged borrowers (i.e. 
borrowers who do not apply for credit because they feel they will be rejected) have increased 
since the recent recession (see Abildgren et al., 2013; Fraser, 2008). 
This chapter empirically examines the determinants of financial self-confidence of 
small firm owner managers, pre and during the recent financial crisis. In particular, the 
chapter aims to understand the effect of bank credit rejection on the financial self-confidence 
of business owners in times of booms (pre financial crisis) and busts (during financial crisis). 
We argue that entrepreneurs update their self-confidence in finance over time in response to 
the economic environment and their experience with the financial institutions. For example, 
                                                          
10
 This chapter was invited for major revision in the International Journal of Entrepreneurial Behavior & 
Research. 
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entrepreneurs who are rejected for funding from a finance provider (e.g. bank) may reset their 
self-confidence to a lower level. This results in a credit rejection being negatively related to 
an entrepreneur’s self-confidence. Also, there is a potential association between self-
confidence and financial education. Financial education develops financial capabilities, and 
learning on financial matters helps to enable higher self-confidence (see Disney and 
Gathergood, 2013). It is also important to understand the gender dimension in self-confidence 
in finance. Existing research, for example, shows that there is a tendency for male financial 
overconfidence (e.g. Moore and Healy, 2008; Barber and Odean, 2001) whereas female tend 
to exert low financial self-confidence (e.g. Kirkwood, 2009; Estes and Hosseini, 1988). Little 
attention, however, has been given to whether financial self-confidence has varied differently 
between males and females over the recent recession period. 
Throughout the history and evolution of leadership, self-confidence has been 
researched and located in the Trait Theory of Leadership (Fleenor, 2006). Self-confidence is 
associated with emotional steadiness and represents a significant leader trait in any 
organisation (Kirkpatrick and Locke, 1991). However, although self-confidence is contained 
in a prescribed list of leader traits, recent leadership research suggests that situational and 
contingency aspects can have an impact on leadership effectiveness (Fleenor, 2006; 
Hollenbeck and Hall, 2004). They posit that self-confidence and leader performance in 
progressive organisations are positively linked. In Social Cognitive Theory, self-efficacy 
(another name for self-confidence) is classified as a behavioural or socio-cognitive factor 
contributing to entrepreneurial success (Amatucci and Crawley, 2011; Bandura, 1989). 
In recent research, it was found that individuals have a tendency to process 
information about their ability in a biased manner (Möbius et al., 2011). Although it is 
possible for entrepreneurs to have self-confidence in their abilities as described in Rae and 
Carswell (2001), they may have a biased tendency to have self-confidence in their abilities in 
starting and running their own business. Abilities, knowledge and future prospect are 
identified as the possible features that could be tainted towards overconfidence in humans 
(Barber and Odean, 2001). Overconfidence is used to describe a biased state of self-
confidence (Moore and Healy, 2008). Overconfidence in finance is higher in male than in 
female investors (Moore and Healy, 2008; Barber and Odean, 2001) suggesting that there is a 
potential gender dimension to overconfidence. Overconfidence is an excessive aspect of self-
confidence and it has dilemmas associated (Moore and Healy, 2008). Therefore, 
overconfidence can be a biased phenomenon because it may not be reflective of reality and 
could exhibit features of unforeseen potential for high risk with its associated negative 
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consequences. According to Trevelyan (2008), overconfidence can be harmful to the business 
when making decisions on the basis of negative outcomes. In addition, self-confident 
individuals are more willing to take risk and become entrepreneurs but Pirinsky (2013) show 
that overconfidence introduces the capacity for a high level of human error. In most corporate 
financial and investment decision making, male executives exhibit higher levels of 
overconfidence when compared with their female counterpart (Huang and Kisgen, 2013). 
However, the lack of or low self-confidence is not an encouraging factor for firm growth and 
survival (e.g. Moore and Healy, 2008; Bowen and Hisrich, 1986). This research concerns the 
financial self-confidence of owner managers and their application for credit finance for their 
business needs in periods of boom and bust. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 provides the 
background, reviews the literature and develops the hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 
describes the data. Section 4 presents the empirical methodology and section 5 discusses the 
empirical results. Finally, section 6 provides the conclusion with summary of the research 
findings as well as directions for further research and policy implications. 
6.2 Background and hypotheses development 
The self-confidence of entrepreneurs in entrepreneurial learning shows their self-belief in 
their capability in making their business viable (Rae and Carswell, 2001). Indeed, it can be 
difficult to establish an entrepreneurial venture in the absence of personal self-belief. In a 
disadvantaged community of people, financial service organisations can support local 
entrepreneurial population to increase their self-confidence in starting and operating 
businesses to eradicate poverty in their communities (Robinson, 2001). They conducted an 
extended research in many developing countries interacting with local entrepreneurs and 
potential entrepreneurs to help resolve their poverty situation in their community. They found 
that sustainable poverty solution could be found with boosting the self-confidence of the 
people in different households. Thus, this has the tendency of persuading community people 
into engaging in entrepreneurial activities. 
The credit crunch resulting from the recent financial crisis has necessitated greater 
financial constraints mostly on new firms and SMEs with negative effect on economic 
growth and development (see Saridakis et al., 2013; Smallbone et al., 2012; Fraser, 2008). In 
other words, the financial constraints of the 2007 credit crisis represent the liquidity 
management of the banking system causing reduction in business credit lending (Popov and 
Udell, 2012; Cornett et al., 2011; Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010). Since entrepreneurs and 
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their business creation mostly use bank funding for their start-up, growth and survival (ECB 
Monthly Bulletin, 2014; Scottish Government, 2014; BIS, 2012; Fraser, 2008; Saridakis et 
al., 2008), a higher level of financial constraint has been associated with firm exit and slow 
firm growth. To this end, Bayesian learning theory provides a framework in which 
individuals incorporate learned information from observation and experience with the 
financial institutions and credit rejection rates to update prior financial self-confidence. This 
reflects the prior financial self-confidence of business owners similar to wider Bayesian 
research (Mueller-Frank, 2014; Park and Kim, 2013; Walker, 2013; Fouskakis, 2012; 
Yingchun, 2012; Möbius et al., 2011; Tang and Liou, 2010; Karni, 2007). While Tang and 
Liou (2010) concentrated on differentiating between superior firm performance and 
competitive advantage, Mueller-Frank (2014) focused on choice revision in agent 
observational learning task. Entrepreneurs begin their entrepreneurial career with a prior self-
confidence in accessing finance. As entrepreneurs begin to apply for funding they observe 
their rejection rate. This results in an entrepreneur’s experiences having an effect on his or 
her self-confidence. If an entrepreneur is rejected, his self-confidence is expected to decrease. 
Alternatively, if the entrepreneur applies but is not rejected, his or her self-confidence should 
increase. Some entrepreneurs who are rejected may never re-apply for funding and become 
discouraged borrowers. Discouraged borrowers SMEs have weaker economic performance in 
terms of solvency, profitability, liquidity and debt profile (Abildgren et al., 2013). Hence, 
self-confidence in finance will change in response to this information. We therefore propose 
the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: Bank finance rejection reduces business owners’ self-confidence in finance. 
 
 
Amongst many other individual characteristics, innovations in small firms depend on 
the education and self-confidence of the owner manager (Heunks, 1998). Less literate persons 
are unlikely to exhibit financial literacy (Disney and Gathergood, 2013) and consequently, 
they may have less self-confidence in finance. According to Jayson (2007), self-confidence is 
tantamount to money in the bank reports research on self-confidence conducted at the 
University of Florida in Gainsville. In the research, self-confidence was likened to self-
concept and self-esteem. It was found that self-confidence contributes to better life 
accomplishments including more financial benefit in employment or better firm performance. 
Heunks (1998) associated self-confidence and education as a way to encourage 
creativity and innovation. In a recent UK household survey, it was found that people with less 
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financial literacy are likely to show a lack of confidence and confusion in financial matters 
(Disney and Gathergood, 2013). They show that higher financial literacy plays a major role in 
enabling higher self-confidence. Hence, self-confidence can be associated with good financial 
education accomplishment and capability. Two Australian banks offered reduced bank 
charges to gain the loyalty of university students (Pont and McQuilken, 2005). The banks 
know the future potential of the human capital of university students in terms of potential 
wage earnings and possible business start-up and growth. Entrepreneurship education has a 
positive effect on human capital (Volery et al., 2013). As a way to improve business 
performance, SMEs may engage in seeking formal or informal advice from experts such as 
accountants (Forbes Insights, 2010) and banks (Han et al., 2014). This can also contribute to 
better business performance and boost confidence. Seeking financial counselling can support 
small businesses and entrepreneurs in making better financial decisions (Drexler et al., 2013). 
There is a significant positive relationship between human capital and business success 
(Unger et al., 2011). 
Other human capital researchers (Fernandes et al., 2014; Lofstrom et al., 2014; Block 
et al., 2013; Drexler et al., 2013; Ganotakis, 2012; Crook et al., 2011; Karlan and Valdivia, 
2010; Dickson et al., 2008; Saridakis et al., 2008; Colombo and Grilli, 2005; Dakhli and De 
Clercq, 2004; Blundell et al., 1999) explored the benefits of education in the business 
environment over many years and the benefits they acknowledged include better business 
performance and better decision making. Many countries are supportive of financial literacy 
and financial education for their people towards economic growth (Fernandes et al., 2014). 
This shows that the benefits of education as a human capital can be far-reaching to include 
better credit application, able to identify market opportunities and possess a clearer 
understanding of the terms and conditions applicable to bank credits. The OECD suggests 
that financial education resolves financial illiteracy in the society (OECD, 2006b). We 
therefore propose the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: Financial education increases business owners’ self-confidence in finance. 
 
 
In self-employment choices, a recent study argues against the traditional alignment of 
social factors to female and economic factors to their male counterpart (Saridakis et al., 
2014). Although the research explored social and economic factors in male and female self-
employment, it used UK time-series data. Hence, there may be issues of cultural irrelevance 
to other countries. In developing countries, environmental and cultural factors can lead to 
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targeted policy formulation to support certain groups such as female entrepreneurs (Cho and 
Honorati, 2013). A study into the perception and behaviour of male and female start-up 
entrepreneurs exposed female deficiency in the areas of finance and accounting in 
comparison to their male counterparts (Jones and Tullous, 2002). Although this study mostly 
targeted a certain section of the United States community, the findings confirm the result 
from other researchers such as Bowen and Hisrich (1986) and Estes and Hosseini (1988). 
This shows that financial self-confidence can support entrepreneurs in starting and running 
their own business. SMEs are enablers of economic advancement in many countries through 
business start-up, job creation and employment, courtesy of self-confident entrepreneurs who 
found the businesses (OECD, 2006a; Robinson, 2001). Therefore, the sustainability of the 
economy depends on the self-confidence of entrepreneurs at engaging in new business 
formation. As financial service firms support local people to expand economic activities, their 
income and assets are positively impacted and their self-confidence improves concurrently 
(Robinson, 2001). Tyszka et al. (2011) revealed that opportunity-driven entrepreneurs exhibit 
high levels of self-confidence. Hence, as business opportunities increase, more entrepreneurs 
and potential entrepreneurs are motivated and their self-confidence is improved. 
Different risk factors contribute to different gender behaviours and unless the gender 
aspect of risk is adequately understood, it will be difficult to resolve risks and, thus, 
inappropriate to make policy recommendation (Brindley, 2005). Gender stereotype plays a 
key role in business opportunity evaluation and favours male or female depending on the 
stereotypical information context (Gupta et al., 2014). Lower early business growth of female 
entrepreneurs contributes to their limited finance in entrepreneurship compared to their male 
counterparts (Alsos et al., 2006). Although Muravyev et al. (2009) identified possible 
preferential treatment of male against female in access to finance many researches (Cotugno 
et al., 2012; Cowling et al., 2012; Berger et al., 2011; Voordeckers and Steijvers, 2006; 
Mattesini, 1990; Bester, 1987) suggest that lenders consider collateral, banking relationship 
and track record in their funding decision. According to Bellucci et al. (2010), female 
entrepreneurs are more financially constrained and low confident female loan officers are less 
likely to approve loan for start-up businesses compared to their male counterparts. This may 
suggest that female loan officers are more risk-averse. 
In a New Zealand study, women show low self-confidence in their entrepreneurial 
ability when compared to men and, as a result, the women entrepreneurs are constrained in 
growth and financial resources (Kirkwood, 2009). However, they find that self-confidence 
among women entrepreneurs grows with increase in their entrepreneurial experience. 
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According to Estes and Hosseini (1988), women show low confidence in investment-related 
tasks when compared to men. In another study, women are unable to determine their 
entrepreneurial career prospect as they feel a lack of confidence in financial matters (Bowen 
and Hisrich, 1986). Meanwhile, Wijewardena et al. (2008) find that owner manager mentality 
directly impacts the financial performance of their organisations. As women are susceptible 
to low self-confidence, it shows their level of mentality and can have negative effect on the 
performance of their firm. Thus, finance is a key resource in any business and access to 
finance becomes elusive in the absence of self-confidence in financial matters relevant for the 
start-up and smooth operation of the business. We therefore propose the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H3: Male business owners have higher level of self-confidence in finance than female 
business owners. 
 
6.3 Data 
The data for our analysis comes from the surveys of 2500 UK SMEs during 2004 and 2008 
(Fraser, 2004, 2008). The IFF Research Limited collected the 2004 data and it was sponsored 
by the Bank of England. The IFF Research Limited collected the 2008 data but it was 
sponsored jointly by Economic and Social Research Council and Barclays Bank. The data 
was deposited and held at the UK Data Archive. The aims of the surveys were: a) to provide 
benchmark SME finance data made up of the availability and types of finance for SMEs in 
the UK; b) to collect information on the relationship between SMEs and their providers of 
finance; c) to provide a general purpose data to support quantitative research on business 
finance in the UK and comparable with other countries. Both datasets are representative of 
the SMEs with up to 250 employees in the UK, numeric and used one-stage stratified random 
sampling procedure. 
As the surveys were performed in two parts, one in 2004 and another in 2008, there 
are two separate cross-sectional datasets. While the 2004 dataset provide a snapshot of the 
pre-financial crisis period, the 2008 dataset provide the situation as regards the financial crisis 
period. Therefore, the two datasets allowed for comparisons between the two periods. The 
surveys provide rich information about the characteristics of the business and its owner, self-
confidence in finance and bank finance application outcomes. Although the surveys involved 
sole proprietor, partnership and limited companies, we will concentrate our investigation on 
sole proprietor and partnership businesses because self-confidence data was not reported for 
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limited companies. Our analysis excludes those who did not apply for credit because the 
business owner thought they would be turned down (discouraged borrowers) and those who 
did not apply because there was no need for finance. 
Figure 6.1 explains our sample diagrammatically as it provides an illustration of the 
financial self-confidence of business owners and their bank finance application. It shows that 
while some business owners make an application for finance, some others do not. However, 
among business owners who do not make an application for finance, includes those that may 
not need finance and those that may be discouraged. This research looks at business owners 
who applied for finance, their financial education and how men and women revise their self-
confidence according to the outcome. To explain this further, prior to making application for 
finance, there is an initial level of self-confidence. Self-confidence in finance takes the values 
from 1 (no confidence) to 10 (complete confidence) as in the likert scale. The initial level of 
self-confidence may be revised upwards in a successful application episode (Successful) 
while it may be revised downwards in an unsuccessful application episode (Rejected). 
Appendix 6.A1 and 6.A2 provide summary statistics of the variables used in the regressions 
 
Figure 6.1. Conceptual framework of self-confidence and credit finance application 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.3.1 Sample analysis 
The proportions of overdrafts and commercial loans reported in Table 6.1 are different for 
2004 and 2008. The proportions of overall (overdraft and commercial loan) rejected in 2004 
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is 11.34% and 2008 is 16.43%. While overdraft rejected is reported as 10.51% in 2004, it is 
15.29% in 2008. Loan rejected is 5.33% in 2004 and 9.58% in 2008. The bigger change in 
overdraft rejection rate shows that overdraft is a common short term source of finance for 
SMEs confirming BIS (2012) and ECB Monthly Bulletin (2014). The figures show the 
intensity and negative effect of the recent financial crisis in 2007 on SMEs confirming 
various research evidence (Popov and Udell, 2012; Cornett et al., 2011; Ivashina and 
Scharfstein, 2010; Saridakis et al., 2008). 
 The proportions of men and women who used overdraft and commercial loan in 2004 
and 2008 show gender differences with greater proportion for men which seems to be 
relatively stable after the crisis. These variations in overdraft and commercial loan 
applications among men and women entrepreneurs may be related to varying social and 
economic factors. According to Bellucci et al. (2010), gender matters in the bank-firm 
relationship because female entrepreneurs experience tighter credit availability. Muravyev et 
al. (2009) discovered that female owned businesses in Central and Eastern Europe were less 
likely to get loan and pay higher interest rate than their male counterparts. To this end, female 
entrepreneurs may fund their business differently and are dissuaded from credits in the form 
of commercial loans and overdrafts. This partially confirms the research of Brindley (2005) 
as different risk factors are attributed to different gender behaviours. Further research shows 
that personal characteristics in terms of risk propensity and beliefs can positively impact 
entrepreneurial intention (Volery et al., 2013). GEM (2014) also disclosed the cultural and 
customary explanation for entrepreneurial choices around the world. 
In our two samples, the proportion of financially educated is generally less than non-
financially educated. The overall proportion of discouraged borrowers in 2004 is 1.80% and 
2.87% in 2008. This pattern of discouragement is reflected for both overdraft and commercial 
loan applications confirming the increase in discouragement among SMEs during the 
financial crisis of 2007 (Saridakis et al., 2013; Cotugno et al., 2012; Cornett et al., 2011). 
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Table 6.1. Sample properties (%) 
 2004 2008 
Properties Overall Overdraft Loan Overall Overdraft Loan 
Rejected 11.34 10.51 5.33 16.43 15.29 9.58 
Men 80.80 80.93 82.76 80.41 80.32 81.99 
Financial education 20.77 21.98 24.76 21.05 21.61 21.12 
N 573 514 319 342 310 161 
       
Discouraged borrowers 1.80 3.66 2.04 2.87 3.94 3.71 
N 500 246 441 383 203 350 
       
Finance is needed 6.72 5.91 4.86 5.91 4.10 5.34 
N 491 237 432 372 195 337 
Note: The sample size (N) for 2004 data is greater than 2008. 
 
6.4 Empirical methodology 
We use ordered probit estimation technique to model owner manager self-confidence in 
finance, and examine its association with credit rejection rate (RR), financial education (FE) 
and gender (GE) controlling for individual and firm characteristics (X) (see Wooldridge, 
2002). Entrepreneurs answered the question, “On a scale of 1-10 (where 1 is no confidence 
and 10 is complete confidence), how confident are you in your own abilities in finance?” 
Based on the responses, we construct a variable that captures self-confidence in finance 
taking values from 1 (no confidence) to 10 (complete confidence), assigning the numeric 
values {1 … 10}. We note that there appears to be a logical ordering in these answers. We 
can write our ordered response models as
11
: 
                                        fffff
uXbGEaFEaRRaSC  321
*
                                        (1) 
Where 
*
fSC represent the latent variable denoting the unobserved propensity of entrepreneur f 
to be self-confident in finance. Although, 
*
fSC  is unobserved, we observe fSC  such that: 
                                                   
jSC f  if jfj SC  
*
1                                                       (2) 
Where the ia  (i=1,2,3) and   are the parameters to be estimated. Xi is a row vector of owner 
manager and business characteristics.
12
 Summary statistics are provided in the Appendix 
(Table 6.A1 and Table 6.A2). 
                                                          
11
 We also use probit estimation technique for robustness check. Hence we construct a variable capturing self-
confidence in finance that takes the value of 1 for high reported-self-confidence and 0 otherwise. While high 
self-confidence in finance is derived from self-confidence levels 6 to 10 (complete confidence) on the likert 
scale, low self-confidence in finance is from 1 (no confidence) to 5. However, the results are similar to those 
reported from the ordered probit estimator. 
12
We further assume that low self-confidence in dealing with finances is exogenous in the models since previous 
work (Fraser, 2008) has reported no significant impact of financial self-confidence on the likelihood of credit 
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As a way to check ‘multicollinearity’, we employ variance inflation factor (VIF) and 
tolerance (1/VIF) on the model variables (Pevalin and Robson, 2012, p. 302; Gujarati and 
Porter, 2009, p. 340). Our multicollinearity check for 2004 data show a Mean VIF of 1.69 
and each of the VIF values are between 1.02 and 4.57. Also, the tolerance values for 2004 
data are between 0.9818 and 0.2190. However, the multicollinearity for 2008 data show a 
Mean VIF of 1.90 and each of the VIF values are between 1.06 and 5.59. The tolerance 
values for 2008 data are between 0.9472 and 0.1789. Generally, as the VIF < 10 and 
tolerance > 0.1, we suggest that multicollinearity is not a problem here. 
 
6.5 Empirical results 
We estimate the self-confidence in finance of owner managers in sole proprietor and 
partnership businesses only because self-confidence in finance data is not available for 
limited companies. We first combine the bank finance rejection together and then 
disaggregate it to examine differences between outright and partial bank rejection (Table 
6.2ai and Table 6.2aii). We further disaggregate the data for overdraft users (Table 6.2b) and 
for commercial loan users (Table 6.2c).  
The results in Table 6.2ai show that whilst outright bank finance rejection reduced the 
financial self-confidence of owner managers, partial bank finance rejection increased their 
financial self-confidence in 2004 where in 2008 the combined effect was found to be negative 
and statistically significant. Following the general negative economic climate during 2007 
(Cornett et al., 2011; Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010; Saridakis et al., 2008), it can be argued 
that partial rejections may be viewed as a successful outcome by the applicant. These 
findings provide partial support for the hypothesis H1 suggesting that (outright) bank finance 
rejection reduces business owners’ self-confidence in finance. Also, the results in Table 6.2ai 
show that financial education increases the likelihood of reporting higher financial self-
confidence supporting hypothesis H2, financial education increases business owners’ self-
confidence in finance.  This shows the benefit of human capital such as financial education as 
reported in various researches (Fernandes et al., 2014; Lofstrom et al., 2014; Block et al., 
2013; Crook et al., 2011; Unger et al., 2011; Karlan and Valdivia, 2010; Dickson et al., 
2008).  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
rejection. Using ivregress 2SLS command in Stata, we report no endogenous regressors. The test of endogeneity 
shows that under the null hypothesis, the modelled variables are exogenous. 
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Following Table 6.2ai and Table 6.2aii, we find no association between gender and 
reported self-confidence in finance and thus hypothesis H3 is rejected. 
When we run separate estimates for the overdraft users and the loan users the results 
are interesting too. Similarly as in the full sample, we observe no significant differences 
between males and females in Table 6.2b. As shown in Table 6.2b, outright overdraft 
rejection reduced the self-confidence in finance of owner managers in 2004 whereas overall 
rejection reduces self-confidence in finance in 2008. Being financially qualified still is found 
to increase self-confidence in finance, and this result is found to be consistent across the 
estimations. For loan user sub-sample, however, We find some evidence that owner managers 
with increased self-confidence in finance were more likely to be male than female. We also 
find a positive association between partial bank rejection rate and reported self-confidence in 
finance. This finding provides some support to existing research including Bowen and 
Hisrich (1986), Estes and Hosseini (1988) and Kirkwood (2009) that women lack adequate 
self-confidence in financial matters with negative effect on entrepreneurship. Being 
financially qualified is also found to have a positive effect, but the effect becomes weak 
during the crisis.  
Although research (Popov and Udell, 2012; Cornett et al., 2011; Ivashina and 
Scharfstein, 2010; Saridakis et al., 2008) show that the financial crisis of 2007 caused 
financial constraints for all levels of SMEs, our findings suggests that owner managers with 
financial education remain confident during the economic hardship. The revision or 
adjustment of prior self-confidence in finance of owner managers as a result of the financial 
crisis or bank credit rejections confirms the Bayesian inference (Mueller-Frank, 2014; Park 
and Kim, 2013; Möbius et al., 2011; Karni, 2007). 
We also run our estimates for both males and females sub-samples. As Table 6.3 
reports male empirical results, Table 6.4 reports female results. We find that bank credit 
rejection affect the financial self-confidence of males after the crisis and women before the 
crisis. The bank credit rejection associated with the crisis period for males was a major 
financial constraint on different types of firms (Cowling et al., 2012; Popov and Udell, 2012; 
Cornett et al., 2011). However, the bank credit rejection associated with female owner 
managers before the crisis shows that the rejection confirms existing research (Bellucci et al., 
2010; Kirkwood, 2009) that females are more financially constrained in their business. 
Overall, the results show some interesting differences in owner manager gender in terms of 
financial self-confidence.  
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There is a strong association for financially qualified owner managers as they are 
more likely to have self-confidence in finance supporting the findings reported earlier in this 
chapter, although the association is found to be more consistent with females than males. This 
supports the findings of Brindley (2005) that differentiating between risk factors in male and 
female entrepreneurs can be problematic because there are issues of social, economic and 
personal phenomenon contributing to individual entrepreneurial behaviour. Although there 
are different risk factors associated with male and female entrepreneurs, GEM (2014) show 
that there is variation in the level of female entrepreneurship across the world reflecting on 
cultural and custom induced limitation on female participation in economic activities. 
Turning to our control variables, we also find some interesting results. For example, 
Non-start-up is found to be associated with higher financial self-confidence than new start-
ups, especially for male owned firms. Other studies have also reported that non-start-up firms 
are generally favoured and more likely to gain access to finance (Cotugno et al., 2012; 
Cowling et al., 2012; Voordeckers and Steijvers, 2006). VAT registration is generally not 
associated with financial self-confidence, although some positive and statistically significant 
association is found for the male sub-sample. In the hypothesis development, VAT variable is 
not used. However, VAT variable is used to investigate its relationship with financial self-
confidence and credit rejection rates because many SMEs register for VAT. Many SMEs are 
known to register for VAT voluntarily. VAT registration of the firm can act as a signal of 
positive performance. We find no ethnicity effect on financial self-confidence and neither 
statistically significant firm size effect. Finally, firms with less net worth are less likely to 
have stronger financial self-confidence than firms with high net worth. 
We considered industry as a control variable in Table 6.2aii to investigate its 
association with financial self-confidence and bank finance rejection outcomes. The 
construction industry category had a reduced self-confidence in finance for 2008 with strong 
statistical significance. This reflects the negative effect of the financial crisis at the time as 
reported in research (Popov and Udell, 2012; Cornett et al., 2011; Ivashina and Scharfstein, 
2010; Saridakis et al., 2008). Other industry categories had no significant effect on financial 
self-confidence in 2004 and 2008. 
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Table 6.2ai. Ordered probit of self-confidence in finance – Part 1 
Independent variables 2004  2008  
Applied (base category: Successful)     
- Bank finance rejection -0.0462(0.1496)  -0.4363(0.2432)***  
- Partial bank finance rejection  0.3215(0.1811)***  -0.1130(0.3053) 
- Outright bank finance rejection  -0.4189(0.2212)***  -0.2817(0.3273) 
Gender (base category: Female)     
- Male 0.1069(0.1193) 0.0920(0.1196) 0.0523(0.2145) 0.0265(0.2178) 
Business type (base category: Start-up)     
- Non start-up 0.1845(0.2101) 0.1597(0.2101) 0.0269(0.2784) 0.0052(0.2798) 
Academic education (base category: no academic qualification)     
- Degree qualified 0.0067(0.1183) 0.0122(0.1184) -0.2954(0.2249) -0.2925(0.2271) 
Financial education (base category: no financial qualification)     
- Financially qualified 0.3401(0.1191)* 0.3336(0.1192)* 0.6606(0.2679)* 0.6795(0.2680)* 
Firm size (base category: medium sized firms)     
- Micro firm -0.1755(0.1978) -0.1773(0.1978) -0.0215(0.4547) 0.0005(0.4542) 
- Small firm -0.0239(0.1966) -0.0193(0.1967) -0.2800(0.4480) -0.2782(0.4478) 
VAT registration (base category: no VAT registered)     
- VAT registered firm -0.0824(0.1063) -0.0924(0.1064) 0.2044(0.2017) 0.2021(0.2052) 
Ethnicity (base category: non-white British)     
- White British 0.0591(0.1471) 0.0724(0.1475) -0.0250(0.3126) -0.0616(0.3116) 
Firm net worth (base category: net worth above £999,999)     
- Net worth £1 to £99,999 -0.2339(0.1472)*** -0.2245(0.1474)*** -0.4013(0.2773) -0.4112(0.2780) 
- Net worth £100,000 to £499,999 -0.0781(0.1193) -0.0938(0.1195) -0.0230(0.2472) -0.0302(0.2476) 
- Net worth £500,000 to £999,999 0.0253(0.1528) 0.0130(0.1530) 0.3009(0.3543) 0.2807(0.3544) 
Log likelihood -975.2305 -972.5280 -234.1324 -235.0939 
LR Chi2(12)(13) 22.96 28.36 20.23 18.30 
Prob> Chi2 0.0281 0.0080 0.0629 0.1463 
Observation 546 546 133 133 
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Significance: *p<0.01 **p<0.05 ***p<0.10. Estimates are shown in coefficients. 
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Table 6.2aii. Ordered probit of self-confidence in finance – Part 2 
Independent variables 2004 2008 
Applied (base category: Successful)   
- Bank finance rejection -0.0650(0.1504) -0.4237(0.2468)*** 
Gender (base category: Female)   
- Male 0.0527(0.1219) 0.0691(0.2360) 
Business type (base category: Start-up)   
- Non start-up 0.1392(0.2119) 0.3263(0.3057) 
Academic education (base category: no academic qualification)   
- Degree qualified 0.0583(0.1234) -0.3689(0.2430) 
Financial education (base category: no financial qualification)   
- Financially qualified 0.3408(0.1216)* 0.6259(0.2767)* 
Firm size (base category: medium sized firms)   
- Micro firm -0.2510(0.2096) -0.0063(0.4782) 
- Small firm -0.0489(0.2053) -0.5213(0.4825) 
VAT registration (base category: no VAT registered)   
- VAT registered firm -0.2061(0.1223)*** 0.4084(0.2458)*** 
Ethnicity (base category: non-white British)   
- White British 0.0300(0.1490) 0.0864(0.3182) 
Firm net worth (base category: net worth above £999,999)   
- Net worth £1 to £99,999 -0.2624(0.1502)*** -0.4040(0.2860) 
- Net worth £100,000 to £499,999 -0.0714(0.1215) 0.0070(0.2517) 
- Net worth £500,000 to £999,999 0.0492(0.1550) 0.2556(0.3596) 
Industry (base category: other community activities)   
- Agriculture, hunting & forestry 0.0603(0.2120) 0.1381(0.4553) 
- Manufacturing 0.0450(0.2412) -0.3507(0.6122) 
- Construction 0.3094(0.1990) -0.7312(0.4129)*** 
-Wholesale/Retail 0.0459(0.1917) -0.4642(0.3974) 
-Hotels & Restaurants 0.2800(0.2157) 0.1619(0.4277) 
-Transport, storage & communications 0.2697(0.2123) 0.0730(0.5166) 
-Real estate, renting & activities 0.0823(0.1822) 0.0496(0.4046) 
-Health & social work -0.3056(0.2185) 0.4444(0.4211) 
Log likelihood -969.4657 -228.2586 
LR Chi2(20) 34.49 31.97 
Prob> Chi2 0.0230 0.0436 
Observation 546 133 
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Significance: *p≤0.01 **p≤0.05 ***p≤0.10. Estimates are shown in coefficients. 
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Table 6.2b. Ordered probit of self-confidence in finance for overdraft users 
Independent variables 2004   2008 
Applied (base category: successful)     
   - Overdraft rejection -0.0899(0.1648)  -0.4345(0.2627)***  
   - Partial overdraft rejection  0.2534(0.1997)  -0.2793(0.3475) 
   - Outright overdraft rejection  -0.4113(0.2479)***  -0.1705(0.3469) 
Gender (base category: female)     
   - Male 0.0654(0.1261) 0.0455(0.1266) 0.1168(0.2286) 0.1188(0.2343) 
Business type (base cat.: Start-up)     
   - Non start-up 0.4925(0.2665)*** 0.4967(0.2671)*** -0.0858(0.3101) -0.1613(0.3128) 
Academic education (base cat.: no academic qualification)     
   - Degree qualified 0.0230(0.1215) 0.0248(0.1215) -0.2533(0.2383) -0.2272(0.2408) 
Financial education (base cat.: no financial qualification)     
   - Financially qualified 0.3361(0.1231)* 0.3294(0.1232)* 0.9849(0.2996)* 0.9877(0.2994)* 
Firm size (base cat.: medium sized firms)     
   - Micro firm -0.1586(0.2064) -0.1697(0.2064) 0.1748(0.4743) 0.2050(0.4738) 
   - Small firm -0.0196(0.2034) -0.0126(0.2035) -0.2328(0.4662) -0.2070(0.4668) 
VAT registration (base cat.: no VAT registered)     
   - VAT registered -0.1157(0.1146) -0.1282(0.1148) 0.2063(0.2235) 0.2263(0.2273) 
Ethnicity (base cat.: non-white British)     
   - White British -0.0080(0.1552) -0.0047(0.1552) 0.1463(0.3371) 0.1147(0.3365) 
Firm net worth (base cat.: net worth above £999,999)     
   - Net worth £1 to £99,999 -0.2649(0.1570)*** -0.2504(0.1575)*** -0.3945(0.2884) -0.4028(0.2910) 
   - Net worth £100,000 to £499,999 -0.1197(0.1269) -0.1321(0.1271) 0.1794(0.2688) 0.1670(0.2690) 
   - Net worth £500,000 to £999,999 0.0103(0.1606) 0.0033(0.1606) 0.5508(0.3757) 0.5378(0.3755) 
Log likelihood -872.5648 -870.8571 -207.4618 -208.1458 
LR Chi2(12)(13) 23.85 27.26 26.88 25.51 
Prob> Chi2 0.0213 0.0114 0.0080 0.0198 
Observation 492 492 119 119 
Note: Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. Significance: *p<0.01 **p<0.05 ***p<0.10. Estimates are shown in coefficients. 
 
  
167 
 
 
Table 6.2c. Ordered probit of self-confidence in finance for loan users 
Independent variables 2004  2008  
Applied (base category: successful)     
   - Loan rejection 0.0971(0.2724)  -0.6412(0.5102)  
   - Partial loan rejection  0.6531(0.3607)***  -0.3525(0.5688) 
   - Outright loan rejection  -0.4257(0.3714)  -0.2539(0.6219) 
Gender (base category: female)     
   - Male 0.3199(0.1729)*** 0.3238(0.1733)*** 0.3082(0.3723) 0.2996(0.3791) 
Business type (base cat.: start-up)     
   - Non start-up 0.0336(0.2614) -0.0361(0.2636) 0.2845(0.4537) 0.2221(0.4508) 
Academic education (base cat.: no academic qualification)     
   - Degree qualified -0.0485(0.1625) -0.0436(0.1626) -0.4208(0.3947) -0.4047(0.3956) 
Financial education (base cat.: no financial qualification)     
   - Financially qualified 0.3196(0.1546)** 0.3221(0.1547)** 0.1503(0.5708) 0.1854(0.5695) 
Firm size (base cat.: medium sized firms)     
   - Micro firm -0.2398(0.2376) -0.2272(0.2377) -0.8291(0.7408) -0.8067(0.7420) 
   - Small firm -0.0374(0.2315) -0.0444(0.2316) -0.7110(0.7172) -0.7419(0.7176) 
VAT registration (base cat.: no VAT registered)     
   - VAT registered 0.0097(0.1502) 0.0173(0.1503) 0.2627(0.3032) 0.2719(0.3048) 
Ethnicity (base cat.: non-white British)     
   - White British 0.0899(0.1828) 0.1079(0.1840) 0.0187(0.5690) -0.0530(0.5693) 
Firm net worth (base cat.: net worth above £999,999)     
   - Net worth £1 to £99,999 -0.0365(0.2082) -0.03580.2083) -0.1183(0.4898) -0.1617(0.5099) 
   - Net worth £100,000 to £499,999 -0.1113(0.1585) -0.1141(0.1589) -0.6154(0.3889) -0.5856(0.3929) 
   - Net worth £500,000 to £999,999 -0.0345(0.1903) -0.0427(0.1905) -0.3820(0.5036) -0.4863(0.4969) 
Log likelihood -527.5924 -525.7646 -101.9400 -102.3782 
LR Chi2(12)(13) 16.89 20.54 13.23 12.35 
Prob> Chi2 0.1539 0.0825 0.3526 0.4990 
Observation 301 301 59 59 
Note: Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. Significance: *p<0.01 **p<0.05 ***p<0.10. Estimates are shown in coefficients. 
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Table 6.3. Ordered probit of self-confidence in finance (male only estimate) 
Independent variables 2004  2008  
Applied (base category: Successful)     
- Bank finance rejection -0.0265(0.1689)  -0.5011(0.2938)***  
- Partial bank finance rejection  0.2260(0.1983)  -0.2422(0.3482) 
- Outright bank finance rejection  -0.2857(0.2673)  -0.2601(0.4128) 
Business type (base category: Start-up)     
- Non start-up 0.3216(0.2547) 0.3292(0.2548) 0.0422(0.3244) 0.0150(0.3247) 
Academic education (base category: no academic qualification)     
- Degree qualified -0.0315(0.1322) -0.0313(0.1323) -0.0650(0.2835) -0.0571(0.2875) 
Financial education (base category: no financial qualification)     
- Financially qualified 0.3154(0.1314)* 0.3151(0.1314)** 0.4077(0.3299) 0.4297(0.3308) 
Firm size (base category: medium sized firms)     
- Micro firm -0.1842(0.2097) -0.1852(0.2097) 0.1787(0.4862) 0.2048(0.4859) 
- Small firm 0.0490(0.2062) 0.0526(0.2063) -0.2375(0.4642) -0.2383(0.4645) 
VAT registration (base category: no VAT registered)     
- VAT registered firm -0.0321(0.1228) -0.0400(0.1230) 0.4329(0.2445)*** 0.4481(0.2492)*** 
Ethnicity (base category: non-white British)     
- White British 0.0009(0.1622) -0.0046(0.1627) 0.0207(0.3709) -0.0256(0.3705) 
Firm net worth (base category: net worth above £999,999)     
- Net worth £1 to £99,999 -0.2844(0.1653)*** -0.2931(0.1654)*** -0.6750(0.3355)** -0.6935(0.3360) 
- Net worth £100,000 to £499,999 -0.1358(0.1316) -0.1447(0.1318) -0.2424(0.2932) -0.2506(0.2934) 
- Net worth £500,000 to £999,999 -0.0501(0.1647) -0.0565(0.1648) -0.1304(0.4289) -0.1723(0.4294) 
Log likelihood -784.3674 -783.4448 -169.4311 -170.3959 
LR Chi2(11)(12) 22.42 24.27 19.36 17.43 
Prob> Chi2 0.0213 0.0187 0.0549 0.1341 
Observation 446 446 99 99 
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Significance: *p<0.01 **p<0.05 ***p<0.10. Estimates are shown in coefficients. 
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Table 6.4. Ordered probit of self-confidence in finance (female only estimate) 
Independent variables 2004  2008  
Applied (base category: Successful)     
- Bank finance rejection -0.0260(0.3458)  -0.1679(0.5325)  
- Partial bank finance rejection  1.1654(0.5456)**  -0.6099(1.0085) 
- Outright bank finance rejection  -0.8785(0.4569)***  0.2729(0.9065) 
Business type (base category: Start-up)     
- Non start-up -0.1838(0.3980) -0.4981(0.4140) -0.2912(0.6615) -0.2925(0.6615) 
Academic education (base category: no academic qualification)     
- Degree qualified 0.1656(0.2862) 0.2764(0.2898) -0.6887(0.4117)*** -0.6608(0.4147)*** 
Financial education (base category: no financial qualification)     
- Financially qualified 0.4993(0.2994)*** 0.3875(0.3034) 1.3527(0.5381)* 1.3966(0.5457)* 
Firm size (base category: medium sized firms)     
- Micro firm -0.2699(0.7955) -0.2546(0.7935) 0.2917(0.4210) 0.2564(0.4247) 
- Small firm -0.4769(0.8185) -0.4285(0.8167) ---4 ---4 
VAT registration (base category: no VAT registered)     
- VAT registered firm -0.2551(0.2248) -0.2242(0.2257) -0.3716(0.4255) -0.3052(0.4404) 
Ethnicity (base category: non-white British)     
- White British 0.3100(0.3757) 0.7044(0.4026)*** 0.2316(0.6974) 0.2171(0.6979) 
Firm net worth (base category: net worth above £999,999)     
- Net worth £1 to £99,999 -0.0628(0.3531) 0.1778(0.3640) 0.7503(0.6085) 0.8771(0.6438) 
- Net worth £100,000 to £499,999 0.2049(0.2975) 0.1630(0.2981) 0.7642(0.5661) 0.8300(0.5770) 
- Net worth £500,000 to £999,999 0.3206(0.4339) 0.2617(0.4363) 1.2902(0.7239)*** 1.4484(0.7730)*** 
Log likelihood -180.7289 -176.5658 -54.6938 -54.5092 
LR Chi2(11)(12) 6.90 15.22 12.83 13.20 
Prob> Chi2 0.8073 0.2294 0.2331 0.2803 
Observation 100 100 34 34 
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Significance: *p<0.01 **p<0.05 ***p<0.10. 4Variable omitted because of collinearity. Estimates are shown in coefficients. 
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6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter examines empirically the link between self-confidence in finance, bank finance 
rejection rates, gender and financial education using the 2004 and 2008 SME finance surveys. 
The results show that outright rejection is negatively associated with financial self-confidence 
whereas partial bank credit rejection may boost self-confidence. Also, the results show that 
financial education has a strong and positive effect on self-confidence in finance providing 
support for increasing entrepreneurial and financial education in higher education.    
Further research is recommended to evaluate and assess the self-confidence in finance of 
owner managers in limited companies, social enterprise and charities to determine their credit 
rejection rate and their gender aspect. This knowledge will allow owner managers to resolve 
their deficiency in financial education as a way to increase their self-confidence in finance 
and determine their readiness for entrepreneurship. Financial education could be one suitable 
way to increase self-confidence in finance and improve entrepreneurship. Hence, different 
types of firms have the potential to benefit from the financial self-confidence of the owner or 
leader. 
In summary, the results show that financial education can boost financial self-confidence. 
Outright bank credit rejection reduces self-confidence in finance while partial bank credit 
rejection may boost self-confidence especially during the financial crisis. 
The findings have implication for policy. Firstly, the financial self-confidence of owner 
managers can support their entrepreneurial capability in starting and operating one or more 
businesses such as serial entrepreneurs. As entrepreneurs successfully start and operate their 
own businesses, they are contributing to economic development through job creation, 
employment and tax contribution. Therefore, the government could provide policy support to 
enable financial education for potential entrepreneurs towards boosting their financial self-
confidence and improve their zeal for entrepreneurship. Secondly, entrepreneurs and potential 
entrepreneurs who have a need of financial education in their business may seek financial 
advice and training as a self-motivated exercise to boost their business venture. Seeking 
financial advice or financial counselling externally may serve as an alternative to owner 
manager pursuing financial education but this is subject to a strategic decision of the firm as 
there may be cost implications. Thirdly, the financial self-confidence of business owners has 
the potential to reduce the risk of bank credit rejection for their business venture. In this way, 
financial self-confidence of business owners reduces risk exposure and encourages banks in 
their lending engagement. 
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This research also has limitations. First, the SME finance data for 2004 and 2008 is based 
on UK firms. The firms that participated in the 2004 survey were not exactly the same as 
those of 2008. Therefore, as much as the results may be generalizable in the context of SMEs 
in the UK and, to some extent, other similarly developed countries, there must be caution in 
determining the applicability in worldwide context. Second, the research is based on cross-
sectional data for 2004 and 2008. Although both year periods provided opportunity for 
comparative analysis in this research, it does not replace the capability of longitudinal panel 
data. Thus, panel data could have supported greater analytical depth and detail of the 
differences in reported financial self-confidence and variations in bank credit rejection rates. 
Third, the SME finance survey captured financial self-confidence data for sole proprietor and 
partnership businesses only. Therefore, it was not possible to empirically examine other legal 
forms of firms such as limited liability companies, social enterprise and charitable 
organisations. Fourth, although ethnicity is explored for White British in this research, there 
was no detail of other ethnic groups. Exploring various minority ethnic groups will support 
further research and increase robustness. Fifth, this investigation did not cover types of 
financial education. A more robust approach will identify the types and level of financial 
education. Sixth, apart from degree qualification, different academic qualifications were not 
explored in this research. To improve robustness, it is suggested that different types of 
academic qualification is explored in future research. Seventh, the experience of the owner is 
another variable that can improve robustness. 
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6.8 Appendix 
 
Table 6.A1. Summary list of dependent and explanatory variables for 2004 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min1 Max2 
Self-confidence in finance (non-binary) 7.9474 1.9041 1 10 
Business start-up 0.0671 0.2504 0 1 
Degree qualified 0.1842 0.3879 0 1 
Financially qualified 0.2000 0.4003 0 1 
Gender 0.7908 0.4070 0 1 
Outright overdraft reject 0.0506 0.2194 0 1 
Partial overdraft reject 0.0720 0.2587 0 1 
Outright loan reject 0.0313 0.1745 0 1 
Partial loan reject 0.0345 0.1828 0 1 
VAT registered 0.6618 0.4734 0 1 
Ethnicity – White British 0.9026 0.2967 0 1 
Net worth – 1 to 99999 0.1931 0.3950 0 1 
Net worth – 100000 to 499999 0.4317 0.4957 0 1 
Net worth – 500000 to 999999 0.1338 0.3407 0 1 
Micro business 0.6921 0.4619 0 1 
Small business 0.2553 0.4363 0 1 
Industry – Agric., hunting & forestry 
0.1092 0.3121 0 1 
Industry – Manufacturing 
0.0618 0.2410 0 1 
Industry – Construction 
0.1263 0.3324 0 1 
Industry – Wholesale/Retail 
0.1382 0.3453 0 1 
Industry – Hotels & Restaurants 
0.0961 0.2949 0 1 
Industry – Transport, storage & comm. 
0.0816 0.2739 0 1 
Industry – Real estate, renting & activities 
0.1908 0.3932 0 1 
Industry – Health & social work 
0.0882 0.2837 0 1 
Note: 
1Min value of 0 denotes ‘No’. 2Max value of 1 denotes ‘Yes’. Self-confidence in finance is the dependent 
variable taking the values from 1 (no confidence) to 10 (complete confidence) as in the likert scale. 
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Table 6.A2. Summary list of dependent and explanatory variables for 2008 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min1 Max2 
Self-confidence in finance (non-binary) 7.8472 1.8455 1 10 
Business start-up 0.1872 0.3909 0 1 
Degree qualified 0.2689 0.4438 0 1 
Financially qualified 0.2143 0.4107 0 1 
Gender 0.7956 0.4036 0 1 
Outright overdraft reject 0.1019 0.3030 0 1 
Partial overdraft reject 0.0860 0.2808 0 1 
Outright loan reject 0.0539 0.2265 0 1 
Partial loan reject 0.0599 0.2380 0 1 
VAT registered 0.5977 0.4908 0 1 
Ethnicity – White British 0.8182 0.3861 0 1 
Net worth – 1 to 99999 0.1970 0.3982 0 1 
Net worth – 100000 to 499999 0.3771 0.4852 0 1 
Net worth – 500000 to 999999 0.1186 0.3237 0 1 
Micro business 0.7326 0.4431 0 1 
Small business 0.2267 0.4191 0 1 
Industry – Agric., hunting & forestry 
0.0832 0.2764 0 1 
Industry – Manufacturing 
0.0735 0.2612 0 1 
Industry – Construction 
0.1064 0.3086 0 1 
Industry – Wholesale/Retail 
0.1779 0.3828 0 1 
Industry – Hotels & Restaurants 
0.1025 0.3036 0 1 
Industry – Transport, storage & comm. 
0.0619 0.2412 0 1 
Industry – Real estate, renting & activities 
0.1799 0.3845 0 1 
Industry – Health & social work 
0.1044 0.3061 0 1 
Note: 
1Min value of 0 denotes ‘No’. 2Max value of 1 denotes ‘Yes’. Self-confidence in finance is the dependent 
variable taking the values from 1 (no confidence) to 10 (complete confidence) as in the likert scale.  
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Chapter 7 Access to Finance for SMEs in Post-Socialist countries: the 
Baltic States and the South Caucasus compared 
7.1 Introduction 
Finance is a key resource in the formation of businesses anywhere in the world. As the role of 
entrepreneurship and SMEs in economic development is increasingly recognised (World 
Bank, 2015; GEM, 2012), the importance of access to finance has been widely researched 
(Saridakis et al., 2013, 2014; Popov and Udell, 2012; Smallbone et al., 2012; Ivashina and 
Scharfstein, 2010; Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006). These researchers found that although 
businesses need finance for their formation and existence, many of them are financially 
constrained which typically reflects under capitalisation at start-up. As well as investigating 
access to finance for entrepreneurs in these post socialist countries, this chapter also examines 
the effectiveness of the court system which, it is suggested, can be a major constraint if there 
are significant institutional deficiencies. Institutional theory is a suitable framework for this 
research because access to finance obstacles show institutional characteristics and 
deficiencies. Institutional theory also provides an avenue to explore formal and informal 
analysis of institutional influences including cultural norms, values and beliefs (Aidis et al., 
2007). To this end, institutional theory has been seen to provide a wide opportunity for 
various academic debate accommodating different scholars including corporate social 
responsibility, organisational change and business continuity planning (Campbell, 2007; 
Zsidisin et al., 2005; Dacin et al., 2002).  
 The collapse of the Soviet Union into independent countries in 1991 was a major 
milestone for the countries involved, including Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. Among the fifteen countries of the former Soviet 
Union, the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) and South Caucasus (Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia) were chosen for this research. The rationale for this choice was the 
contrasting development paths of the countries involved. In the Baltic States the process of 
preparing for EU membership was a major driver of institutional change. One aspect of this is 
a key focus of this chapter, namely the operation of the courts in dealing with the regulation 
of business. There are also differences related to their respective locations, while the Baltic 
States have a geographical boundary with other EU countries to the West, the South 
Causcasus countries have a boundary with south Asia. The differences in the pace of 
institutional change lead us to expect some differences in access to finance because of the 
181 
 
effects of a fair and stable court system for business on the willingness of lenders to advance 
funds. Although the EU member states such as the Baltic States are known to exploit 
institutional and democratic reforms as part of their preparation for European Union 
membership, other post-Soviet Union countries are still proceeding with central planning 
(Aidis et al., 2007). The introduction of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2003 
is a way the EU intends to bring institutional change, openness and development to its 
neighbours (Chilosi, 2007). 
Researchers confirmed that adverse economic conditions, like the financial crisis of 
2007-2008, constrains the availability of business funding and introduce greater complexity 
to the process of accessing fund (Saridakis et al., 2013; Popov and Udell, 2012; Smallbone et 
al., 2012; Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010). Prior to the financial crisis of 2007-2008, Estonia 
experienced boom in cash inflows through real estate and credit but the global financial crisis 
introduced a high intensity burst resulting in economic slowdown in the country (Brixiova, 
Vartia, and Wörgötter, 2010). The housing market in Latvia became seriously overheated as 
local income levels began to level with other Western Europe countries (Klyviene and 
Rasmussen, 2010). While Georgia experienced the twin effect of war and financial crisis, 
Azerbaijan, Armenia, Lithuania and Latvia experienced their own share of woes while the 
crisis persisted (Wrobel, 2015; Otarashvili, 2013; Phillips et al., 2012; Klyviene and 
Rasmussen, 2010; Giuli, 2009). 
In most countries of the world, access to finance is the most commonly reported 
constraint on SME development by business owners and managers. This applies in mature 
market economies but most particularly in emerging market economies. This research aims to 
improve knowledge and understanding of access to finance and legal regulatory progress in 
the Baltic States and South Caucasus region in light of their membership of the former Soviet 
Union. We use the cross-sectional dataset from the Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Survey (BEEPS) for 2009 to empirically examine access to finance for SMEs 
together with the efficiency of the court system in the Baltic States and South Caucasus 
region. This research will empirically examine the economic progress in both the Baltic 
States and South Caucasus region in terms of access to finance for business and the support 
of the court system in financial contracts between business borrowers and lending 
institutions. We make a comparison between these countries on the basis of the self-reported 
survey responses received to determine their capacity for entrepreneurship through access to 
finance and the effect of the legal regulatory system. This research is the first to empirically 
explore access to finance and the legal regulatory system in the Baltic States and South 
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Caucasus region. Apart from the BEEPS data, secondary research information from the 
World Bank (WBDB, 2015; World Bank, 2015), Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM, 
2012, 2015) and World Justice Project (WJP, 2014) provided support to enhance discussion 
in this research. The questions to be investigated in this chapter include: (a) To what extent is 
access to finance a constraint on business development? (b) Are there differences between the 
Baltic States and South Caucasus region in access to finance for businesses? (c) Is there a 
gender dimension to the Baltic States and South Caucasus differences in access to finance for 
businesses? (d) To what extent does a good court system improve access to finance for 
businesses? 
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the background and literature 
review. Section 3 looked at the hypothesis definition. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 
defines the empirical methodology. Section 6 presents the empirical analysis and findings. 
Section 7 is a discussion of the findings. Section 8 provides the conclusion and suggestions 
for further research. 
7.2 Background and literature review 
Since the collapse of the former Soviet Union in 1991, there have been various constraints 
affecting economic growth in each of the former Soviet Republics. In pursuing a growth 
agenda, the Baltic States embraced European Union membership in 2004 causing a positive 
effect on the development of institutions and economic growth but less so in the South 
Caucasus region. According to Simão (2012), the protracted conflict in the South Caucasus 
region has put a limit to the promotion of European Union style democracy. Sammut (2013) 
believes that although modern buildings abound in the South Caucasus region, the old Soviet 
style practices persist. Although the countries in the South Caucasus are naturally neighbours 
in sharing the same boundary, they are not strategically linked as they pursue policies of 
isolation (Sammut, 2013). In the conflict between Russia and Georgia in 2008, sections of 
Georgian territory became isolated with recognition from Russia (Kakachia, 2011). This has 
caused a negative economic effect to the energy trade route with the EU as Georgia occupies 
a strategic geopolitical position. However, the unrest in the Georgian territory brought 
confusion to the South Caucasus region; hence, increased the constraints affecting economic 
growth. 
The South Caucasus region is seen as a hegemony of powers made up of mostly 
influences from Russia, USA and European Union (Suny, 2010). While Russia seeks to 
secure its former Soviet authority in the South Caucasus region to keep off other interests, the 
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European Union and USA aims to seek economic progress for the region as independent 
states with unhindered free market autonomy. The senior financial executives in the business 
community aspire to see the Eastern Europe region as part of the European Union because 
investors are more inclined towards free market with EU membership to promote fairness, 
rights and justice (Welch and Ciner, 2004). Indeed, the European Union membership 
provides better investor protection than the relics of the former Soviet Union. 
During the financial crisis of 2007-2008, the level of financial constraint was higher 
for smaller firms and this suggest that larger and older firms were more successful in 
accessing finance than small firms (Cowling et al., 2012). The financial constraint associated 
with the financial crisis show that adverse economic conditions can have detrimental effect 
on businesses and limit their access to finance (Saridakis et al., 2013; Smallbone et al., 2012; 
Cornett et al., 2011). The increase in foreign banks in Eastern Europe exposed the banking 
system to a form of imported adverse economic conditions with consequent adverse effects 
on local SMEs during the financial crisis (Popov and Udell, 2012). Therefore, while the 
parent banks in the developed countries experienced recessionary pressures, their local but 
foreign counterparts in Central and Eastern Europe had a localised version of uncertainty 
following reduced lending for SMEs. In crisis times, domestic banks contracted their credit 
base while foreign banks did not but rather relied on the health of their parent bank (de Haas 
and van Lelyveld, 2006). At the same time, there were differences between Central and East 
European countries in the impact of the financial crisis that was associated with the 
ownership of banks (Popov and Udell, 2012; Brixiova et al., 2010). In the Baltic States for 
example, following their bankruptcy in the early 1990s, the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian 
banks, were mainly foreign owned (Aidis et al., 2007). 
The credit and real estate markets of Estonia were affected by the global financial 
crisis of 2007-2008 causing slow economic growth (Brixiova et al., 2010). According to 
Pissarides (1999), the inadequate availability of credit during the crisis created limitation on 
the growth of SMEs in Central and Eastern Europe. Where there is inadequate credit for 
businesses, there is bound to be an increase in competition for the limited available business 
funding among SMEs. However, Aidis et al. (2007) disclosed that the availability of credit 
from the informal sector in Eastern Europe provided an opportunity for financing for some 
start-ups and small firms but the amount of money involved was typically not sufficient to 
support significant SME growth. The most devastating consequence of the financial crisis of 
2007-2008 in Eastern Europe was the sharp fall in consumer demand for goods and services 
(Nguyen and Qian, 2014). According to them, there were also increased debt levels and a 
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decline in access to finance among SMEs. The most financially distressed firms suffered the 
greatest adverse effect of the credit crunch (Mac an Bhaird, 2013). Georgia experienced twin 
crisis during 2007-2008, the financial crisis and the South Ossetia War, causing a negative 
impact on confidence in Georgian government and institutions (Otarashvili, 2013; Phillips et 
al., 2012; Giuli, 2009). Research show that the reduction in capital flows across countries 
during the global financial crisis depended on their financial integration, nature of the effect, 
macroeconomic conditions and the level of their interconnections to international trade flows 
(Klyviene and Rasmussen, 2010; Milesi-Ferretti and Tille, 2010). 
Although the Baltic States experienced the financial crisis of 2007-2008, they have 
progressed economically and are now following an independent path to achieving further 
greatness with fewer pitfalls (Wrobel, 2015; IMF Survey, 2014). However, the South 
Caucasus countries are still experiencing the effect of the financial crisis with Azerbaijan 
suffering high unemployment, lay off of workers, falling oil price and national currency 
depreciation (IMF Survey, 2015a; IMF Survey, 2015b; Mammadov, 2015). IMF Survey 
research shows that while oil exporting countries feel the adverse shock in lowering prices, 
oil importing countries are enjoying a long period of low oil prices with positive effect on 
economic outlook. 
7.3 Hypothesis development 
Beck et al. (2006) suggests that institution development is a key factor in cross-country 
comparison of SME financing. Further research indicates that a weak financial system is one 
consequence of a weak legal system (Beck et al., 2008). They argued that SMEs are 
characterised by weak financial systems are unable to access adequate external financing to 
support rapid growth. This suggests that SMEs in weak financial systems are more likely to 
be financially constrained and exhibit the characteristics of stunted growth and premature 
closure. According to Laeven and Majnoni (2005), the efficiency of the judiciary supports 
business access to credit as the cost of financial intermediation are reduced. Therefore, the 
increase in judicial efficiency lowers the cost of credit for SMEs. 
GEM (2012) disclosed that entrepreneurial activity and a well-supported business 
environment are the prerequisites for significant economic development. Thus, a government 
that rewards creativity and innovation encourages entrepreneurial ventures and new business 
creation. Economic stability and improved market economies have improved in Eastern 
Europe since more than a decade (Welch and Ciner, 2004). According to Beck and 
Demirguc-Kunt (2006), good financial and institution development supports SMEs in 
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reducing the limitations to their growth. Aggarwal and Goodell (2014) also reiterate the 
usefulness of an efficient financial sector development in improving access to finance for 
SMEs. Therefore, it is imperative that governments provide adequate support to SMEs 
through direct and indirect actions to improve the development of the business environment 
and thereby create a framework for the conditions for productive small business 
development. 
According to Aggarwal and Goodell (2014), there is a better access to finance 
associated with higher level of national wealth and adequate protection for investors. In 
transitional economies, it was found that the legal system was not adequately developed to 
protect investors and investees (Pistor et al, 2000). Labour regulation has the capacity to 
depress the measures of entrepreneurship aimed at supporting nascent and new entrepreneurs 
(Thurik, van Stel and Storey, 2007). An effective legal regulatory environment is determined 
by the effectiveness of the applicable laws rather than a mere existence of the legal system 
(Yao and Yueh, 2009). The efficiency of the legal and regulatory systems depends on the 
quality of the national court system in mediating contractual disputes (Laeven and Majnoni, 
2005; La Porta et al., 1998). According to La Porta et al. (1998), an effective legal regulatory 
system can support financial contracts. If the judiciary is efficient with judicial enforcement 
of financial contract, there will be lower cost of SMEs accessing finance (Laeven and 
Majnoni, 2005). To this end, an effective legal regulatory system can act as a symbol of an 
efficient financial sector and institution development because it provides protection for the 
financial market participants. 
Indeed, access to finance providers are desirous of an effective legal framework to 
protect them in contractual engagements with SMEs. Higher levels of protection of property 
rights lead to better outcomes for investors and businesses (Hur et al., 2006). Firm 
performance and property right protection are positively linked (Yasar et al., 2011). It follows 
that the protection of property rights requires an efficient legal framework and leads to 
improved access to finance and better firm performance. Amongst other criteria, the 
European Union expects all potential member states to comply with and apply the rule of law 
to promote stability, rights and improve market economy (EC, 2014a, 2014b; Copenhagen 
Criteria, 1993). The rule of law means that governments, agents, individuals and private 
entities are accountable under the law (WJP, 2014). 
Financial executives in the USA are positively inclined to invest in Eastern European 
countries as a result of the membership of the European Union with financial market 
improvement (Welch and Ciner, 2004). However, the rule of law is multidimensional and has 
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an impact on the business environment and national economy with major ‘law and order’ 
challenges in developing countries (Haggard and Tiede, 2011). They argue that if the general 
court system fails to resolve disputes and apply the principle of fairness and equality between 
parties, it may become irrelevant and cease to be trusted. Therefore, weak legal regulatory 
systems, weak institution development, inadequate protection for investors and adverse 
economic environment can reduce the ease of access to finance for SMEs. We therefore 
propose the following hypotheses: 
 
H1: Fairness in the court system reduces the obstacle to SMEs accessing finance. 
 
H2: Decision enforcement in the court system reduces the obstacle to SMEs accessing finance. 
 
 
Female entrepreneurs face tighter credit availability in their search for business loan 
but the conditions are relaxed with established banking relationship signifying that gender is 
relevant in access to banking finance (Bellucci et al., 2010). In a similar study, females were 
unable to determine their entrepreneurial career outlook as they do not trust their financial 
competence (Bowen and Hisrich, 1986). Female entrepreneurship in transitional economies 
like Ukraine and Lithuania does not follow conventional practice as in the developed world 
(Aidis et al., 2007). According to Aidis et al. (2007), female entrepreneurship is the key to 
societal development but there are informal institutional influences affecting them. According 
to Wijewardena et al. (2008), the mentality of the business owner or manager can have an 
impact on the financial performance of the organisation. Indeed, as money is a necessity in 
any business operation, any reduction in essential financial resources can be damaging to the 
business. Therefore, the mentality of females in their entrepreneurial capability can reduce 
self-confidence and negatively impact their business operations and performance. 
The population of female entrepreneurs in each of the Eastern European economies is 
less than 30% (GEM, 2012). The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor shows that there are 
cultural dimensions to the access to finance phenomenon (GEM, 2012). Aggarwal and 
Goodell (2014) reiterate the cultural dimension of access to finance and the aspect of national 
culture that impacts access to finance for businesses. They assert that national culture 
determines a dimension of cultural norms associated with different types of people and 
nationalities. Gupta et al. (2009, p. 398) argued that the socially formed, societal norm and 
knowledge about gender and entrepreneurship put constraint on the ability of females ‘to 
accrue social, cultural, human, and financial capital’. The socially formed norm and practices 
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put limits on the ability of females in their entrepreneurial ventures as they are unable to 
provide credit history to compensate for inadequate or lack of collateral (Gupta et al., 2009).  
According to GEM (2012), the culture of an entrepreneur has a constraining effect on 
their entrepreneurial venture participation. Also, Gupta et al. (2009) stated that there is a 
gender stereotype against female owner-managers. Moreover, socially formed, societal norms 
and knowledge about gender characteristics and entrepreneurship differs from one country to 
another and this has existed over many centuries (Gupta et al., 2009). Thus, societal norm 
and the social framework emanate from nature and human civilization, and it will take time 
for relevant social and societal changes to propagate towards a social and societal 
equilibrium.  Gupta et al. (2009) concluded that their research may only be relevant to the 
countries selected for the investigation (USA, Turkey and India) and may not be relevant in 
other countries such as the Scandinavian countries where there are social and demographic 
contexts which explain certain societal norm and changes. Although Gupta et al. (2009) 
associated their research to the USA, Turkey and India, GEM (2012) and Aggarwal and 
Goodell (2014) show that cultural differences exist from one country to another with impact 
on gender entrepreneurship. Aidis et al. (2007) also identified the influence of cultural norms 
and values in creating an informal institutional frame constraining female entrepreneurship. 
Therefore, it is an opportunity to further explore the gender and cultural dimension for access 
to finance in this research context. We therefore propose the following hypotheses: 
 
H3: Businesses with at least one female owner reduces the obstacle to SMEs accessing finance. 
 
H4: Businesses with a female top manager increases the obstacle to SMEs accessing finance. 
 
 
7.4 Data 
The 11998 SME sample for our analysis originated from the Business Environment and 
Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) for 2009. The survey captured the self-reported 
information of business owners. It was administered jointly by the World Bank and the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The 2009 survey was conducted among 
30 countries in Central and Eastern Europe made up of Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, FYR 
Macedonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. Although there were thirty countries 
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represented in the survey, this research focusses on six former Soviet Union countries in the 
Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) and South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and 
Georgia) regions. While the Baltic States are now within the EU, South Caucasus countries 
are outside it with the opportunity to benefit from ENP (EC, 2014a, 2014b; Chilosi, 2007; 
Copenhagen Criteria, 1993). 
 For the purpose of assessing access to finance and the efficiency of the court system 
from one country to another, we focus on information about access to finance and the court 
system in each of the Baltic States and South Caucasus countries. We also explored the 
gender of top managers and business owners as a way to determine their gender 
characteristics. We explored other relevant information in Table 7.2b including quality 
certification, competition from informal sector, management experience, government 
subsidies, possess overdraft facility, possess credit/loan facility, whether applied for new 
credit/loan and the total sales. The selected questions for this survey include:  
 How much of an obstacle is access to finance [No obstacle, a Minor obstacle, a Moderate 
obstacle, a Major obstacle, or a Very severe obstacle]?  
 What is the most serious obstacle affecting the operation of this establishment? 
 The court system is fair, impartial and uncorrupted [Strongly disagree, Tend to disagree, 
Tend to agree, or Strongly agree]?  
 The court system is quick [Strongly disagree, Tend to disagree, Tend to agree, or Strongly 
agree]?  
 The court system is able to enforce its decisions [Strongly disagree, Tend to disagree, 
Tend to agree, or Strongly agree]?  
 Is the top manager female [Yes/No]?  
 Are any of the owners female [Yes/No]? 
 Does this establishment have an internationally-recognized quality certification 
[Yes/No]? 
 Does this establishment compete against unregistered or informal firms [Yes/No]? 
 Over the last 3 years, has this establishment received any government subsidies 
[Yes/No]? 
 At this time, does this establishment have an overdraft facility [Yes/No]? 
 Does this establishment have a line of credit or loan from a financial institution [Yes/No]? 
 In last fiscal year, did establishment apply for new loans/lines of credit [Yes/No]? 
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 What were the establishment's total annual sales three fiscal years ago (exclude those not 
in business 3 years ago)? 
 
The responses to these questions were used to measure the level of effectiveness of the court 
system in supporting access to finance contracts in the Baltic States and South Caucasus 
countries. Although the Baltic States and South Caucasus countries in the survey are 
comparable on the basis of the responses received, it will be difficult to relate the responses 
to other countries that were not surveyed. All the ‘don’t know’ or ‘does not apply’ responses 
were excluded from our sample to improve validity and robustness. 
 Figure 7.1 presents a conceptual framework of access to finance obstacles, classified 
as legal, financial and socio-economic. The legal aspects deal with the court system 
characteristics including fairness, decision enforcement and quick justice. The financial 
aspects include government subsidies, possess overdraft, possess credit, application for new 
credit and total sales. The socio-economic aspects deal with the management experience of 
the owner, quality certification, owner gender and top manager gender. This conceptual 
framework adopts institutional theory principles in its analysis because the categorisation of 
access to finance obstacles into legal, financial and socio-economic depicts institutional 
characteristics, environment and deficiencies. 
 
Figure 7.1. Conceptual framework of access to finance obstacles 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Access to finance obstacle 
 
Legal Socio-Economic Financial 
Fairness Decision 
Enforcement 
Quick 
Justice 
Subsidies Possess 
Overdraft 
Possess 
Credit 
Sales 
Mgt. 
Experience 
Owner 
Gender 
Quality 
certified 
Top Manager 
Gender 
New 
Credit 
190 
 
7.4.1 Sample Analysis 
Table 7.1 provides the summary statistics containing the dependent and independent variables 
for this investigation. Access to finance obstacle is a dependent variable and interprets the 
level of access to finance obstacle to business operations where 0 is no obstacle and 4 is a 
very severe obstacle. Fairness is defined as the component of the court system made up of the 
feature of fair, impartial and uncorrupted. Quick justice defines a court system featuring a 
quick or speedy court process. Decision enforcement describes a court system that is able to 
enforce its decisions. Female owner defines a business with at least one female owner. Top 
manager female describes a business with the gender of the top manager as female. 
 
Table 7.1. Summary statistics for the Baltic States and South Caucasus Region 
Variables Type N Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
Access to finance obstacle1 Dependent 757 1.5218 1.3613 0 4 
Fairness Independent 757 0.4320 0.4957 0 1 
Quick justice Independent 757 0.2748 0.4467 0 1 
Decision enforcement Independent 757 0.6460 0.4785 0 1 
Female owner (≥1) Independent 757 0.3844 0.4868 0 1 
Top manager female Independent 757 0.1770 0.3819 0 1 
Public limited company Independent 757 0.1308 0.3374 0 1 
Private limited company Independent 757 0.7398 0.4391 0 1 
Sole proprietor Independent 757 0.1030 0.3042 0 1 
Partnership Independent 757 0.0172 0.1300 0 1 
Other types of firms Independent 757 0.0092 0.0958 0 1 
Formally registered Independent 757 0.9590 0.1983 0 1 
Management experience2 Independent 757 3.5852 0.6604 1 4 
---0 to 1 year mgt. experience Independent 757 0.0119 0.1085 0 1 
---2 to 4 years mgt. experience Independent 757 0.0608 0.2391 0 1 
---5 to 10 years mgt. experience Independent 757 0.2576 0.4376 0 1 
---11+ years mgt. experience Independent 757 0.6697 0.4706 0 1 
Quality certification Independent 757 0.2417 0.4284 0 1 
Competition-unregistered/informal Independent 757 0.4161 0.4932 0 1 
Government subsidies Independent 757 0.1070 0.3093 0 1 
Possess overdraft facility Independent 757 0.3527 0.4781 0 1 
Possess line of credit or loan Independent 757 0.5297 0.4994 0 1 
Applied for new loans/lines of credit Independent 757 0.4346 0.4960 0 1 
Total sales 0 to 100,000 Independent 757 0.1546 0.3617 0 1 
Total sales 100,001 to 500,000 Independent 757 0.1810 0.3853 0 1 
Total sales 500,001 to 1,000,000 Independent 757 0.0938 0.2917 0 1 
Total sales 1,000,001+ Independent 757 0.5707 0.4953 0 1 
Main market - Local Independent 222 0.2523 0.4353 0 1 
Main market - National Independent 222 0.4730 0.5004 0 1 
Main market - International Independent 222 0.2748 0.4474 0 1 
Note: 
1
Access to finance obstacle is categorised from 0 to 4 where 0 is No obstacle, 1 is a Minor obstacle, 2 is a 
Moderate obstacle, 3 is a Major obstacle, and 4 is a Very severe obstacle.  
2
Management experience is 
combined and also categorised from 1 to 4 where 1 is 0 to 1 year, 2 is 2 to 4 years, 3 is 5 to 10 years and 4 is 
11+ years. This is a combined summary statistics for the Baltic States and South Caucasus region 
 
It can be construed from the analysis in Table 7.2a that access to finance is an 
important factor for business operation in the surveyed countries. Although the analysis is 
based on self-reported data, it shows that the significance of access to finance in comparison 
with other reported barriers (e.g. electricity, political instability, tax rates, corruption, etc.) to 
business operation vary from one country to another. Table 7.2a confirm the research by 
Pissarides (1999) that access to finance alone is not the cause of low business growth in 
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Central and Eastern Europe. The BEEPS survey of Central and Eastern Europe covers the 
Baltic States and South Caucasus countries among others and shows that access to finance is 
not the biggest obstacle to business operations in all of the countries surveyed. However, 
access to finance is the biggest obstacle to business operations in Azerbaijan. Access to 
finance is the fourth biggest obstacle in Armenia, fifth in Estonia, third in Lithuania, third in 
Georgia and fifth in Latvia. 
Apart from access to finance, other reported barriers to business operations include, 
inadequately educated workforce (e.g. Estonia), practices of competitors in the informal 
sector (e.g. Armenia) and tax rates (e.g. Latvia and Lithuania). This data analysis shows that 
access to finance for SMEs is different in each of the Baltic States and South Caucasus 
countries indicating a varying level of obstacles to business operations. This investigation 
focusses on access to finance for SMEs because it is a way to understand the strength of 
entrepreneurship in the countries surveyed. Thus, access to finance obstacle can have 
negative effect on the strength of entrepreneurship in particular and economic growth in 
general. 
Table 7.2b provides the proportion and summary statistics of independent variables by 
country. The highest proportion of fairness is recorded for Estonia followed by Azerbaijan 
and Georgia, then Latvia, Lithuania and Armenia. The highest proportion of quick justice is 
recorded for Armenia followed by Azerbaijan then Georgia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. 
The highest proportion of decision enforcement was recorded for Armenia followed by 
Estonia then Lithuania, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Latvia. 
As shown in Table 7.2b, the proportion of firms with at least one female owner is 
highest in Latvia followed by Estonia then Georgia, Lithuania, Armenia and Azerbaijan. 
Latvia also has the highest proportion of firms with female top manager followed by Estonia 
then Georgia, Lithuania, Armenia and Azerbaijan. 
In Table 7.2b, competition from firms in the informal sector is highest in Georgia 
followed by Azerbaijan then Lithuania, Armenia, Latvia and Estonia. The competition from 
the informal sector is highest in the South Caucasus region than the Baltic States. This 
confirms Aidis et al. (2007) that the activities of firms in the informal sector could not be 
ignored. Government subsidies are highest among firms in the three Baltic States than the 
South Caucasus countries by high proportions. Our analysis shows that Armenia did not 
provide government subsidies for businesses in 2009. All the firms in the Baltic States and 
South Caucasus region possess both overdraft facility and credit/loan facility. They also 
applied for new line of credit/loan. Lithuania has the highest proportion of firms which 
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applied for new line of credit/loan followed by Georgia then Estonia, Armenia, Latvia and 
Azerbaijan. As there are high proportions of firms making credit/loan applications, there is 
need for protection for lenders and borrowers alike to create a fair and equitable business 
domain for all. 
Table 7.A1 in the Appendix shows the Strength of Legal Rights index (SLRi). The 
SLRi was developed by the World Bank to provide comparison between countries in terms of 
protection for borrowers and lenders (WBDB, 2015; World Bank, 2015). Table 7.A1 
provides a comparison between the Baltic States and South Caucasus countries in terms of 
law and justice indicating the level of the protection for borrowers and lenders. Apart from 
the Baltic States and South Caucasus countries, three countries (Germany, UK and USA) 
were provided as benchmark to support comparison. 
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Table 7.2a. Proportion of the biggest obstacles to business operations by country 
Obstacles to business operations Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
Access to finance 14.29 (31.67) 14.10 7.59 11.56 10.45 
Access to land 0.00 1.67 3.85 1.38 1.36 0.75 
Business licensing and permits 0.75 4.17 2.56 1.38 0.68 4.48 
Corruption 2.26 18.33 8.97 2.07 3.40 2.99 
Courts 1.50 0.00 2.56 0.69 0.68 0.75 
Crime, theft and disorder 0.00 0.00 1.28 3.45 0.68 5.22 
Customs and trade regulations 6.02 2.50 3.85 0.69 0.00 0.00 
Electricity 2.26 1.67 3.85 2.76 0.68 2.99 
Inadequately educated workforce 0.75 2.50 2.56 (30.34) 13.61 7.46 
Labor regulations 0.75 1.67 0.00 12.41 3.40 5.22 
Political instability 15.04 1.67 (20.51) 20.69 14.97 11.94 
Practices of competitors in the informal sector (23.31) 7.50 15.38 8.97 10.88 9.70 
Tax administration 9.02 3.33 6.41 0.69 14.29 4.48 
Tax rates 20.30 23.33 10.26 5.52 (19.05) (33.58) 
Transport 3.76 0.00 3.85 1.38 4.76 0.00 
% 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
N 133 120 78 145 147 134 
Note: The biggest obstacle to business operations per country is shown in parenthesis. 
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Table 7.2b. Proportion and summary statistics by country 
 Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
Independent variables % % % % % % 
Fairness 26.32 50.00 50.00 68.97 36.73 29.10 
Quick justice 49.62 47.50 37.18 15.86 12.93 10.45 
Decision enforcement 70.68 65.00 64.10 69.66 51.02 67.91 
Female owner (≥1) 37.59 15.83 41.03 41.38 51.70 40.30 
Female top manager 12.03 3.33 19.23 23.45 31.97 13.43 
Quality certification 27.82 23.33 16.67 27.59 27.21 18.66 
Competition – informal 40.60 45.00 70.51 23.45 40.14 44.03 
Management experience:       
---0 to 1 year mgt. experience 1.50 0.00 0.00 2.07 1.36 1.49 
---2 to 4 year mgt. experience 9.02 6.67 3.85 6.21 4.08 5.97 
---5 to 10 year mgt. experience 33.83 28.33 23.08 22.76 21.77 24.63 
---11+ year mgt. experience 55.64 65.00 73.08 68.97 72.79 67.91 
Government subsidies 0.00 3.33 2.56 17.93 17.69 17.16 
Possess overdraft facility 46.62 17.50 38.46 55.86 27.89 23.88 
Possess credit/loan facility 46.62 20.00 47.44 62.76 65.31 67.91 
Applied for new credit/loan 43.61 15.00 53.85 49.66 42.18 57.46 
Total sales:       
--- 0-100,000 0.75 42.50 37.18 0.00 17.01 8.21 
--- 100,001-500,000 1.50 31.67 28.21 1.38 31.29 20.15 
--- 500,001-1,000,000 2.26 11.67 14.10 4.14 15.65 10.45 
--- 1,000,001+ 95.49 14.17 20.51 94.48 36.05 61.19 
       
Observations 133 120 78 145 147 134 
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7.5 Empirical methodology 
We used ordered probit estimation technique (see Wooldridge, 2002) to model access to 
finance and the court system in the Baltic States and South Caucasus countries. We examine 
the association between access to finance obstacle with fairness (FN), speedy justice (SJ), 
enforcing judgment decision (JD), owner gender (OG) and the gender of top manager (GM) 
controlling for owner and firm characteristics (X). Respondents answered the following 
question: How much of an obstacle is access to finance [No obstacle, a Minor obstacle, a 
Moderate obstacle, a Major obstacle, or a Very severe obstacle]? On the basis of the 
responses received, we construct a variable that captures access to finance obstacle taking the 
values from 0 (no obstacle) to 4 (very severe obstacle), assigning the numeric values {0… 4}. 
The responses follow a logical order as found in ordered probit tradition. Therefore, the 
following ordered probit equation is relevant
13
: 
 
 𝐴𝐹𝑖
∗ = 𝑎1𝐹𝑁𝑖 + 𝑎2𝑆𝐽𝑖 + 𝑎3𝐽𝐷𝑖 + 𝑎4𝑂𝐺𝑖 + 𝑎5𝐺𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖                     (1) 
 
Where  𝐴𝐹𝑖
∗ represent the latent variable denoting the unobserved likelihood of a firm i to face 
access to finance obstacle and αi (where i=1,…,N). Although  𝐴𝐹𝑖
∗ is unobserved, we observe 
 𝐴𝐹𝑖  such that: 
 
 𝐴𝐹𝑖 = 𝑗 𝑖𝑓 𝛾𝑗−1 <  𝐴𝐹𝑖
∗ ≤ 𝛾𝑗 (where j=0,..,4)        (2) 
 
The 𝛾 in (2) are threshold parameters to be estimated while 𝑋𝑖 in (1) is a row vector of owner 
and firm characteristics (see Table 7.2b)
14
.  
Simply, this study uses a dependent variable that is “access to finance obstacle” taking 
the values from 0 to 4. The study also uses a number of key explanatory variables to explain 
the dependent variable. Specifically, we use the legal or court system (fairness, quick justice, 
decision enforcement), financial (government subsidies, possess overdraft, possess 
credit/loan, applied for new credit/loan and total sales) and socio-economic (at least one 
female owner, female top manager, quality certification, competition with 
informal/unregistered firms and management experience) variables using the ordered probit 
estimation technique described above.  
                                                          
13
 We use probit estimation technique for robustness check. In this regard, we construct a variable capturing 
access to finance obstacle that takes the value of 1 for no obstacle and 0 otherwise. We find that the results are 
similar to those reported from the ordered probit regression. 
14
 Using ivregress 2SLS and ivprobit commands in Stata, we report no endogenous regressors. The test of 
endogeneity shows that under the null hypothesis, the modelled variables are exogenous. 
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In the gender and other similar type questions, we made conversions into binary 
response. In our binary conversion, dichotomous variable was generated where ‘Yes’ 
response became 1 while ‘No’ response became 0. The ‘don’t know’ response was discarded. 
In the legal or court system variables, we generated dichotomous variable as we converted 
‘Strongly disagree’ and ‘Tend to disagree’ into ‘disagree’ while ‘Strongly agree’ and ‘Tend 
to agree’ became ‘agree’. We then interpret ‘agree’ as 1 and ‘disagree’ as 0 to produce binary 
outcomes. Further discussion on technical aspects of the method used in this chapter can be 
found in Gujarati and Porter (2009), Borooah (2002) and McKelvey and Zavoina (1975). 
 As a way to check ‘multicollinearity’, we employ variance inflation factor (VIF) and 
tolerance (1/VIF) on the model variables (Pevalin and Robson, 2012, p. 302; Gujarati and 
Porter, 2009, p. 340). Our multicollinearity check for the BEEPS data for all the six countries 
selected for this research show a Mean VIF of 1.20 and each of the VIF values are between 
1.02 and 1.53. Also, the tolerance values for the BEEPS data for all the six countries are 
between 0.9781 and 0.6545. Therefore, as the VIF < 10 and tolerance > 0.1, we suggest that 
multicollinearity is not a problem here. 
7.6 Empirical analysis and findings 
The empirical results in Table 7.3a and Table 7.3b show remarkable differences in access to 
finance and court systems in the Baltic States and South Caucasus countries. Although there 
are differences identified from one Baltic States and South Caucasus country to another, there 
are similarities too. The empirical analysis is divided into two sub-sections made up of 
country and region. 
7.6.1 Country by country analysis 
In Estonia, firms with at least one female owner reduce the constraint in access to finance, 
and the coefficient is found to be statistically significant. The study finds that businesses 
owned by at least one female are less likely to experience access to finance obstacle. 
Therefore, this supports hypothesis H3 (Businesses with at least one female owner reduces 
the obstacle to SMEs accessing finance). This supports existing research as GEM (2012) and 
Aggarwal and Goodell (2014) show that cultural differences exist from one country to 
another with impact on gender entrepreneurship. Moreover, there is increased obstacle in 
access to finance for firms which have applied for new credit/loan facility with statistical 
significance. This could be as a result of the effect of the financial crisis of 2007-2008 as 
reported in research (Mac an Bhaird, 2013; Saridakis et al., 2013; Smallbone et al., 2012). 
Hypotheses H1 and H2 are rejected for Estonia because although fairness, quick justice and 
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decision enforcement reduce access to finance obstacle, the coefficients are found to be 
statistically insignificant. Hypothesis H4 is also rejected for Estonia because the female top 
manager coefficient is also found to be statistically insignificant.  
Latvia is a country with high level of competition from companies in the informal 
sector and this is increasing the access to finance obstacle with statistical significance. 
Moreover, government subsidies reduce the obstacle to access finance with the coefficient 
being statistically significant. Additionally, and there is increased obstacle in access to 
finance for firms which applied for new credit/loan facility with the estimated coefficient 
being statistical significant. Hence, the government may have engaged in subsidies to reduce 
the negative effect of the financial crisis on SMEs during 2007-2008. Prior research shows 
that the period of the financial crisis is characterised by uncertainties and reduced credit in 
the business environment as access to finance for SMEs is constrained (Cowling et al., 2012; 
Cornett et al., 2011; Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010; Klyviene and Rasmussen, 2010). This 
study finds that firms with high sales value have reduced access to finance obstacle but the 
association is found to be weak. High sales value increases asset value and increases the 
chance of access to finance, including at times of economic uncertainty (Cowling et al., 
2012). Overall, hypotheses H1, H2, H3 and H4 are rejected for Latvia because they are 
unsupported. 
For Lithuania we find that having a female top manager increases the obstacle to 
access finance and the coefficient is found to be statistically significant. Therefore, this 
supports hypothesis H4 (Businesses with a female top manager increases the obstacle to 
SMEs accessing finance). There is increased obstacle in access to finance for firms which 
applied for new credit/loan facility with the coefficient being statistically significant 
confirming the negative effect of the financial crisis on access to finance (Wrobel, 2015; 
Otarashvili, 2013; Phillips et al., 2012; Giuli, 2009). Hypotheses H1, H2 and H3 are rejected 
for Lithuania because they are empirically unsupported. 
Armenian firms experiencing fairness are more likely to report a fair, impartial and 
uncorrupted court system with the reported coefficient to be statistically significant. The 
result for Armenia shows that fairness reduces access to finance obstacle. Therefore, this 
supports hypothesis H1 (Fairness in the court system reduces the obstacle to SMEs accessing 
finance). Moreover, the analysis for Armenia shows with that the court system exhibit the 
feature of quick justice. It follows that hypothesis H1 confirms existing research, that an 
effective judicial system and financial sector development plays an important role in ensuring 
a positive access to finance for businesses and hence stronger entrepreneurship potential 
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(Aggarwal and Goodell, 2014; Beck et al., 2008; Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006; Laeven 
and Majnoni, 2005). As discussed in GEM (2015), one of the entrepreneurship framework 
conditions for successful business creation is a national policy on regulation and access to 
finance. On the basis of hypothesis H1, a reliable court system can improve national policy 
on regulation and access to finance. Therefore, GEM (2015) find that developed countries did 
better than developing countries in formulating a national policy on regulation and access to 
finance and this will positively impact entrepreneurship. The compliance with the ENP 
(Chiosi, 2007) or EU membership will go a long way to support a viable national policy on 
regulation and better access to finance. Management experience increases access to finance 
obstacle with statistical significance. This confirms the negative effect of the financial crisis 
as management experience increased the access to finance obstacle. High total sales 
contribute to reduced access to finance obstacle with statistical significance. Therefore, firms 
with high sales value would increase their asset base to provide high collateral to support 
credit (Cowling et al., 2012). In contrast, hypotheses H2, H3 and H4 are rejected for Armenia 
because their associated coefficients are found to be statistically insignificant. 
Azerbaijan has fairness and decision enforcement in its court system but the 
coefficient is found to be statistically insignificant hence hypotheses H1 and H2 are rejected. 
Moreover, we find that Azerbaijani firms which possess credit/loan facility increases access 
to finance obstacle with the estimated coefficient to be statistically significant. Finally, 
hypotheses H3 and H4 are rejected for Azerbaijan because they are empirically unsupported. 
Fairness and decision enforcement in the court system contributes to reduced obstacle in 
access to finance but with weak association. There is increased obstacle in access to finance 
for female owned and/or female managed firms with weak statistical association. Quality 
certification, informal sector competition and/or possessing over draft facility reduce the 
likelihood of obstacle in access to finance but again with weak statistical association. We also 
find that firms which has high value sales have reduced constraint on access to finance. 
However, we find that firms possessing credit/loan facility have increased obstacle on access 
to finance. The financial crisis may have reduced credit accessibility and availability 
(Cowling et al., 2012; Milesi-Ferretti and Tille, 2010). 
Georgia has a court system characterised by quick justice with statistical significance 
but weak statistical association in fairness in the court system. The analysis for Georgia 
shows that quick justice reduces access to finance obstacle. However, the analysis show that 
competition from informal sector increases access to finance obstacle with statistical 
significance confirming the research of Aidis et al. (2007) that the activities of firms in the 
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informal sector could not be ignored as they have negative effect on access to finance for 
firms. The activities of firms in the informal sector introduce constraint in access to finance 
for firms. Management experience increases access to finance obstacle with statistical 
significance and this shows the constraining effect of the financial crisis as reported in 
research (Saridakis et al., 2013; Smallbone et al., 2012; Cornett et al., 2011; Ivashina and 
Scharfstein, 2010). High sales increases access to finance obstacle with the coefficient being 
statistically significant. The analysis for Georgia shows that informal sector competition, 
management experience and high sales value did not yield positive result in access to finance. 
This can be attributed to the twin crisis of 2007-2008 as there was war (Otarashvili, 2013; 
Phillips et al., 2012; Giuli, 2009) and financial crisis (Mac an Bhaird, 2013; Milesi-Ferretti 
and Tille, 2010). Following the above and analysis, hypotheses H1, H2, H3 and H4 are 
rejected for Georgia because they are statistically unsupported. 
7.6.2 Region by region analysis 
In both the Baltic States and South Caucasus region, fairness in the court systems contributes 
to a reduction in access to finance being reported as a barrier. The region by region analysis 
shows that fairness reduces the access to finance obstacle with statistical significance. Firms 
experiencing fairness are more likely to report a fair, impartial and uncorrupted court system 
with strong association. Therefore, in both the Baltic States and South Caucasus region, this 
supports hypothesis H1 (Fairness in the court system reduces the obstacle to SMEs accessing 
finance). 
In the Baltic States, the analysis shows with statistical significance that at least one 
female owner reduce the obstacle to access finance. This indicates that businesses owned by 
at least one female are less likely to experience access to finance obstacle. Therefore, this 
supports hypothesis H3 (Businesses with at least one female owner reduces the obstacle to 
SMEs accessing finance). Moreover, female top manager increases the obstacle to access 
finance for SMEs with the coefficient being statistical significant. Hence we find support of 
hypothesis H4 (Businesses with a female top manager increases the obstacle to SMEs 
accessing finance). It follows that businesses demonstrating constraints in relation to 
accessing finance are more likely to have a female top manager. Firms owned by at least one 
female are less likely to experience access to finance obstacle. Therefore, hypotheses H3 and 
H4 are synonymous with research evidence in various ways. First, there is a tighter bank 
credit among female entrepreneurs but relaxed with established banking relationship 
(Bellucci et al., 2010). Second, female entrepreneurs have low confidence in their financial 
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competency (Bowen and Hisrich, 1986). Third, female entrepreneurs are affected by their 
cultural background with knock-on effect on their entrepreneurial capability (Aggarwal and 
Goodell, 2014; GEM, 2012). Fourth, the mentality of the business owner or manager can 
impact on the organisational performance (Wijewardena et al., 2008). Indeed, as the female 
gender have self-reported low self-confidence and entrepreneurial capability, access to 
finance for their firms can become constrained. The informal sector competition increases 
access to finance obstacle with statistical significance. This confirms previous research, 
Distinguin et al. (2016), that informal firms can represent a danger to registered firms in 
access to credit. Firms that possess overdraft facility are significantly less likely to report 
access to finance as a barrier. Firms that possess credit/loan facility have increased access to 
finance obstacle with statistical significance. This could be attributed to the liquidity risk 
management associated with banking institutions during the financial crisis (Cornett et al., 
2011). Therefore, banks may want to eliminate over-exposure to credit risk among SME 
borrowers with the consequence of default. Firms that applied for new credit/loan have 
increased obstacle to access finance with the coefficient being statistically significant. The 
period of the financial crisis was characterised by credit constraints among both old and new 
firms. However, there was greater access to finance constraints on new firms (Cowling et al., 
2012). Firms that possess low total sales values increases the obstacle to access finance with 
statistical significance. There is no support for hypothesis H2 in the Baltic States because 
there is no statistical significance for decision enforcement in the court system. 
The South Caucasus region has firms possessing management experience with 
statistical significance which increase access to finance obstacle. The strong management 
experience of the firms did not provide opportunity for good access to finance, instead, there 
was an obstacle. This shows the negative effect of the financial crisis (Mac an Bhaird, 2013; 
Milesi-Ferretti and Tille, 2010) and war (Otarashvili, 2013; Phillips et al., 2012; Giuli, 2009) 
in the region as reported in research. Firms that possess overdraft facility in this region have 
reduced access to finance obstacle with statistical significance. Firms that possess credit/loan 
facility have increased access to finance obstacle with statistical significance hence 
supporting the liquidity risk management research by Cornett et al. (2011). Apart from the 
support for hypothesis H1 as earlier discussed, hypotheses H2, H3 and H4 are empirically 
unsupported for this region of South Caucasus. 
Finally, when the model is estimated for all countries, we find strong support of 
hypothesis H1 and hypothesis H3. However, country and regional level analysis provide 
more informative analysis especially from policy perspective. 
201 
 
7.7 Discussion 
It is clear in the analysis that the Baltic States and South Caucasus countries are each unique 
in their own way, however, there are some similarities in their character. The crisis recorded 
in 2007-2008 contributed to the obstacle in access to finance across the Baltic States and 
South Caucasus countries. These countries were affected by the global financial crisis in 
different severity depending on the level of macro-economic development and financial 
integration with other countries (Milesi-Ferretti and Tille, 2010). Research shows that in the 
presence of constraints like the credit crunch, access to finance can seem unreachable for 
entrepreneurial ventures (Popov and Udell, 2012). The Georgian war of 2008 contributed to 
its economic woes and access to finance challenges with negative impact on the South 
Caucasus region (Simão, 2012; Kakachia, 2011). Following the effect of the financial crisis 
in 2007-2008, local financial institutions had reduced credit but foreign-owned financial 
institutions based in CEE countries relied on their parents based abroad to boost their credit 
availability (Popov and Udell, 2012; Brixiova et al., 2010). According to Aidis et al. (2007), 
female entrepreneurs in Eastern Europe reported financial constraints from formal sources 
than their male counterparts. They also confirmed that formal sources of finance were not 
well developed; hence reliance on informal sources. Dietz et al. (2012) also revealed the 
liquidity constraints during the financial crisis and the opportunity for improvement going 
forward. There is an increasing number of foreign bank ownership in Eastern Europe 
countries (Popov and Udell, 2012). Although the domestic banks suffered contracted credit 
availability in crisis times, the parent of foreign banks provided liquidity to the regions (de 
Haas and van Lelyveld, 2006). 
There is need to look at the informal institutional environment identified in Aidis et 
al. (2007) which has brought the informal institutions in transitional economies to the notice 
of the research community. This research finds that the competition of the informal sector 
increased the likelihood of access to finance obstacle in all the Baltic States and South 
Caucasus region except Azerbaijan. Although the level of informal sector competition exists 
in all the Baltic States and South Caucasus countries, it is highest in Georgia and lowest in 
Estonia. Distinguin et al. (2016) confirm that firms in the informal sector hurts registered 
firms in access to finance and the effect is higher for countries with weak rule of law. 
The gender aspect in this research could slant unfavourably against female 
entrepreneurs but the cultural disparity across the Baltic States and South Caucasus region 
show that gender characterisation in the regions is varied and complex. This is partly because 
the availability of formal and informal access to finance can pose different level of obstacle. 
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Therefore, gender entrepreneurship in the regions may not be explained by access to finance 
obstacle alone. The Baltic States shows that businesses demonstrating access to finance 
constraints are more likely to have female top manager. Firms owned by at least one female 
are less likely to encounter access to finance obstacle. These will hold true for formal 
business environment characterised by healthy and unhindered competition synonymous with 
a fully free market economy. However, as our analysis in Table 7.2b show a high level of 
informal sector competition and activities, it becomes very difficult to determine gender 
characterisation in entrepreneurship in the Baltic States and South Caucasus region. 
This research shows that fairness holds in the court system in both the Baltic States 
and South Caucasus region. This suggests that strong entrepreneurship is encouraged in the 
regions. At country level, Armenia has a strong effect of fairness in the court system and 
hence, possesses the potential for better access to finance and entrepreneurship than the other 
countries in the regions. 
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Table 7.3a. Ordered Probit estimations of businesses with access to finance obstacle (country by country) 
 Baltic States South Caucasus Countries 
Independent variables Estonia Latvia Lithuania Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia 
Fairness (base category: No)       
---Fairness -0.2906(0.2357) -0.2223(0.2070) -0.0381(0.2220) -0.6801(0.2510)* -0.3051(0.3710) 0.0689(0.3056) 
Quick justice (base category: No)       
---Quick justice -0.5397(0.3418) 0.3594(0.2849) 0.0640(0.3218) -0.5656(0.2362)* 0.1620(0.3578) -0.8191(0.3362)** 
Decision enforcement (base category: No)       
---Decision enforcement -0.0689(0.2367) -0.0789(0.1989) -0.1804(0.2068) 0.0958(0.2431) -0.0474(0.2666) -0.0118(0.2826) 
Female owner (base category: No)       
---Female owner (≥1) -0.3986(0.2361)*** -0.3292(0.2095) -0.1896(0.2037) -0.2121(0.2288) 0.3372(0.2893) 0.0672(0.3150) 
Female top manager (base category: No)       
---Female top manager 0.3984(0.2811) 0.2503(0.2243) 0.5673(0.3141)*** -0.3363(0.3726) 0.8636(0.5917) -0.0640(0.4067) 
Quality certification (base category: No)       
---Quality certification -0.2385(0.2695) 0.2461(0.2205) 0.2319(0.2803) -0.1186(0.2253) -0.2506(0.2853) 0.2419(0.3838) 
Competition – informal (base category: No)       
---Competition – informal 0.3758(0.2397) 0.3237(0.1995)*** 0.2228(0.1940) 0.1325(0.1952) -0.0804(0.2141) 0.6033(0.3001)** 
Management experience (base category: 1)       
---Management experience -0.0521(0.1548) 0.0199(0.1499) -0.1410(0.1482) 0.3219(0.1452)** 0.0743(0.1693) 0.6059(0.2781)** 
Government subsidies (base category: No)       
---Government subsidies 0.2988(0.2981) -0.5474(0.2799)** -0.1152(0.2644) --- 0.3804(0.5779) 0.5195(0.8336) 
Possess overdraft facility (base category: No)       
---Possess overdraft facility -0.2931(0.2403) 0.3221(0.2128) -0.1014(0.2352) 0.1090(0.2122) -0.3504(0.3010) -0.7880(0.3616)** 
Possess credit/loan facility (base category: No)       
---Possess credit/loan facility -0.0845(0.2722) 0.2743(0.2215) 0.1526(0.2602) 0.3896(0.2449) 0.7455(0.2886)* 0.9311(0.4490)** 
Applied for new credit/loan (base category: No)       
---Applied for new credit/loan 0.6181(0.2544)** 0.3865(0.2093)*** 0.3839(0.2298)*** 0.0703(0.2284) 0.0738(0.3184) -0.4963(0.4509) 
Total sales (base category: 0-100,000)       
---0-100,000 --- 0.0011(0.2847) 0.1371(0.3741) 1.0658(1.1281) 0.2746(0.3755) 0.1711(0.4464) 
---100,001-500,000 0.4485(0.8340) 0.0684(0.2565) -0.2879(0.2851) 1.1616(0.8188) -0.0941(0.3628) 0.6727(0.4447) 
---500,001-1,000,000 0.0401(0.5221) -0.1845(0.2956) -0.3421(0.3289) -1.3457(0.7393)*** -0.6131(0.4293) 1.0114(0.4832)** 
       
Log likelihood -144.2746 -209.3208 -198.1118 -184.1660 -171.5530 -104.1229 
LR Chi2(15) 22.64 26.99 16.58 40.89 23.31 27.10 
Prob>Chi2 0.0663 0.0288 0.3443 0.0002 0.0778 0.0279 
Pseudo R2 0.0728 0.0606 0.0402 0.0999 0.0636 0.1152 
Observation 145 147 134 133 120 78 
Note: Significance: *p<0.01 **p<0.05 ***p<0.10. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. --- signifies No data 
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Table 7.3b. Ordered Probit estimations of businesses with access to finance obstacle (general and regional) 
 
Independent variables Baltic States South Caucasus region All countries (general) 
Fairness (base category: No)    
---Fairness -0.2681(0.1165)** -0.3524(0.1520)** -0.3816(0.0885)* 
Quick justice (base category: No)    
---Quick justice 0.0248(0.1668) -0.2389(0.1508) 0.0501(0.0978) 
Decision enforcement (base category: No)    
---Decision enforcement -0.0737(0.1140) -0.0056(0.1405) -0.0630(0.0872) 
Female owner (base category: No)    
---Female owner (≥1) -0.2903(0.1196)** -0.0537(0.1470) -0.2411(0.0911)* 
Female top manager (base category: No)    
---Female top manager 0.2754(0.1426)*** -0.0917(0.2229) 0.0876(0.1169) 
Quality certification (base category: No)    
---Quality certification 0.0713(0.1348) -0.0813(0.1478) 0.0315(0.0981) 
Competition - informal (base category: No)    
---Competition - informal 0.3263(0.1143)* 0.1623(0.1215) 0.2619(0.0819)* 
Management experience (base category: 1)    
---Management experience -0.0317(0.0802) 0.3043(0.0961)* 0.0779(0.0603) 
Government subsidies (base category: No)    
---Government subsidies -0.1050(0.1522) 0.3753(0.4404) -0.1859(0.1369) 
Possess overdraft facility (base category: No)    
---Possess overdraft facility -0.1964(0.1207)*** -0.2343(0.1432)*** -0.1436(0.0901)*** 
Possess credit/loan facility (base category: No)    
---Possess credit/loan facility 0.3184(0.1350)** 0.5320(0.1574)* 0.2510(0.0973)* 
Applied for new credit/loan (base category: No)    
---Applied for new credit/loan 0.4782(0.1254)* -0.0005(0.1549) 0.2993(0.0957)* 
Total sales (base category: 0-100,000)    
---0-100,000 0.4420(0.1983)** 0.1345(0.1695) 0.3697(0.1219)* 
---100,001-500,000 0.3213(0.1547)** 0.0703(0.1712) 0.2239(0.1126)** 
---500,001-1,000,000 0.0606(0.1866) -0.1787(0.2307) 0.0028(0.1416) 
    
Log likelihood -580.7697 -484.6149 -1088.6488 
LR Chi2(15) 63.39 46.83 87.10 
Prob>Chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.0517 0.0461 0.0385 
Observation 426 331 757 
Note: Significance: *p<0.01 **p<0.05 ***p<0.10. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis.  
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7.8 Conclusion 
This chapter empirically examines access to finance for SMEs and the court system among 
the Baltic States and South Caucasus countries using BEEPS data. This study finds that the 
court system is an effective legal regulatory system measured by their level of fairness, 
impartiality and without corruption. There are remarkable differences in access to finance and 
court systems between these countries but there are some similarities. In both the Baltic 
States and South Caucasus region, firms that report fairness, impartiality and uncorrupted 
court system have reduced likelihood of access to finance obstacle. However, we find a weak 
statistical association that the court is able to enforce its decision and there is evidence of 
slow court process. We suggest that an efficient court system can improve access to finance 
for business if parties in dispute are treated in a fair, impartial and uncorrupted way. 
The research results show that access to finance is reported by entrepreneurs to be the 
first obstacle to business operations in Azerbaijan; third in Georgia and Lithuania; fourth in 
Armenia; fifth in Estonia and Latvia. Therefore, although access to finance is identified by 
the business owners as an obstacle to business operations in all the Baltic States and South 
Caucasus countries, it is not the biggest obstacle in some of the countries. Apart from access 
to finance, there are other biggest obstacles to business operations. These include: practices 
of competitors in the informal sector in Armenia; inadequately educated workforce in 
Estonia; political instability in Georgia; tax rates in Latvia and Lithuania. 
In the Baltic States, businesses reporting access to finance as a barrier are more likely 
to have a female top manager. Firms owned by at least one female are less likely to encounter 
access to finance obstacle. On the other hand, the South Caucasus region has a weak 
statistical association. This shows the gender differences in access to finance; hence, there is 
a gender dimension to the Baltic States and South Caucasus national differences in access to 
finance for businesses. Although females appear to be disadvantaged in accessing finance for 
their business operations, research show that females are characterised by low self-confidence 
in finance and reduced entrepreneurial capability. The early stage development of many 
female businesses contributes to lower opportunity for access to finance as their businesses 
lack track record and collateral as a way to avoid credit rejection or credit rationing. 
Generally, early stage businesses seeking credit for start-up and innovation are characterised 
by information asymmetry and the ways to avoid credit rejection include banking relationship 
and providing collateral. Meanwhile, the competitive nature of the informal sectors in the 
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Baltic States and South Caucasus region has made gender differentiation complex as it also 
relates to their cultural values. 
This investigation suggest that if access to finance is no obstacle to business 
operations and the court system is fair, impartial and uncorrupted, it determines the likelihood 
of strength in entrepreneurship. This study identified with strong association the Baltic States 
and South Caucasus countries where access to finance and fairness are positively linked 
triggering potential advantage for businesses in Armenia. Although with weak statistical 
association, the study also identified the Baltic States and South Caucasus countries where 
access to finance and fairness are positively linked triggering potential entrepreneurial 
advantage for businesses in Azerbaijan, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. However, Georgia has 
no positive link between access to finance and fairness. 
In summary, we find variations between the Baltic States and South Caucasus 
countries in terms of the fairness, speed of justice and decision enforcement in their court 
system. According to business surveys, access to finance is the biggest obstacle to business 
operations in Azerbaijan, but not so in Armenia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia 
where access to finance was regarded as a lesser obstacle. This investigation find that the 
other biggest obstacles to business operations exist in the forms of tax rates in Lithuania and 
Latvia, inadequately educated workforce in Estonia and practices of competitors in the 
informal sector in Armenia. The result shows that perceived fairness in the court system 
reduces access to finance obstacle. Firms owned by at least one female are less likely to 
report constraints in terms of accessing finance. Firms that have female as their top manager 
are more likely to report constraints in terms of accessing finance. We suggest that if access 
to finance is no obstacle to business operations and the court system is perceived fair, it can 
determine the likelihood of strength in entrepreneurship. 
As this investigation is focused on the Baltic States and South Caucasus countries, it 
will be refreshing if other geographical locations in the former Soviet Union countries can be 
explored in future research. Also, this research explored the Baltic States and South Caucasus 
countries as a whole; it is possible to explore each of the Baltic States and South Caucasus 
countries in more detail to determine their access to finance for businesses and the 
effectiveness of the court system in a comparative study using any developed country as a 
benchmark. 
The findings in this research have implication for policy. Firstly, the fairness in the 
court system provides a solid ground for institution development, free market autonomy and 
rule of law. The general notion of fairness in the court system can attract foreign investors to 
207 
 
the regions and improve private sector participation. As institution development improves, 
economic growth increases. Secondly, the government can formulate policy to target and 
support any disadvantaged entrepreneurs to improve their entrepreneurial participation. 
Although there is no clear indication about the gender circumstances of entrepreneurs, the 
government can investigate localised and informal issues affecting access to finance. Thirdly, 
the activities of the informal sector can be out of control and invisible if allowed to continue 
unchecked. In this regard, the government can help the private sector to embrace openness by 
removing unnecessary regulatory burden on the existing and new businesses. Countries like 
Georgia which has the highest informal sector competition should encourage better 
entrepreneurship by removing bottlenecks in access to finance to improve business 
operations. Fourthly, the government should encourage SMEs in the informal sector with 
incentive to pursue formal business operations and practices to increase economic 
development and business growth. 
There are some limitations in this research. Firstly, the BEEPS 2009 data used for this 
research represents a cross-sectional aspect of the investigation for 2009. This investigation 
cannot replace panel and longitudinal data capability that is able to report over long periods 
of time.  Secondly, for the passage of time, it is possible that the Baltic States and South 
Caucasus countries have developed since 2009 beyond the period of war and financial crisis 
towards a more vibrant economy. Thirdly, the generalizability of this research must be treated 
with caution as different countries have their own make-up of law and regulatory 
environment. Therefore, generalizability could be limited to the Baltic States and South 
Caucasus countries.  
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7.10 Appendix 
 
 
Table 7.A1: Strength of Legal Rights index (SLRi) 
Regions Countries SLRi 
Baltic Estonia 7 
 Latvia 9 
 Lithuania 6 
South Caucasus Armenia 5 
 Azerbaijan 2 
 Georgia 9 
Benchmark Germany 6 
 UK 7 
 USA 11 
Note: Germany, UK and USA are used for benchmarking purpose. 
SLRi stand for ‘strength of legal rights index’ recorded from 0 (lowest) through 12 (highest). The World Bank 
introduced the strength of legal rights index to measure the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws can 
facilitate lending. The index provides a way to protect the rights of borrowers and lenders in financial 
contracts. 
Source: WBDB (2015), World Bank (2015) 
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Chapter 8 General Conclusion 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a general conclusion of this thesis. There are many sources of funding 
for SMEs including personal savings, family/friend support, debt finance, equity finance, 
venture capital finance, crowdfunding, invoice discounting, trade finance and business 
angels. This research explored debt finance in the form of overdraft and commercial loans as 
well as crowdfunding and venture capital finance. 
8.2 Importance of access to finance for SMEs 
8.2.1 Increased business start-up, growth and survival 
Access to finance provides SMEs the required fund for their start-up, innovation, growth, 
business development and survival. As businesses start-up, innovate, grow and survive, they 
create jobs and contribute to economic development. 
8.2.2 Improved entrepreneurship 
Access to finance helps new business creation. As new businesses are created, it improves 
entrepreneurship and more business opportunities for entrepreneurs. 
8.2.3 Increased employment 
Access to finance helps businesses to employ more workers and increase business 
development. Increased employment among adults in the society helps to increase tax 
revenue of the government. 
8.2.4 Reduced household poverty 
Access to finance for SMEs improves the income of families, households and community. 
This reduces the poverty level in households and increase financial inclusion. 
8.3 Research gaps identified 
 Limited knowledge base about venture capital finance 
 Limited knowledge base about crowdfunding 
 Limited conceptual understanding of access to finance for SMEs and extant theories 
 Limited research evidence about the determinants of access to finance for SMEs 
 Limited research evidence about the relevance of the court system in supporting 
access to bank finance 
 Limited research evidence about gender effect in access to finance for SMEs 
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 Limited research evidence about the effect of the financial crisis of 2007-2008 on 
SMEs and their access to finance 
8.4 Summary of research findings and their importance 
8.4.1 Provides a research knowledge base of SMEs and access to finance 
A common English adage suggests that ‘knowledge is power’. This research provides a 
knowledge base of access to finance for SMEs to support researchers, entrepreneurs and 
business practitioners. The knowledge base covers crowdfunding and venture capital finance 
as innovative methods of access to finance for firms. It also covers the key theories of access 
to finance and the explanation of relevant key themes. As the knowledge base is provided, it 
helps SMEs and their owners to make better financing decision towards growth and survival. 
8.4.2 Positive effect of financial education in boosting financial self-confidence 
Financial education has a strong and positive effect on self-confidence in finance providing 
support for increasing entrepreneurial and financial education in higher education. The 
financial self-confidence of owner managers can support their entrepreneurial capability in 
starting and operating one or more businesses such as serial entrepreneurs. As entrepreneurs 
successfully start and operate their own businesses, they are contributing to economic 
development through job creation, employment and tax contribution. 
8.4.3 Partial credit rejection boost financial self-confidence during financial crisis 
Outright credit rejection is negatively associated with financial self-confidence whereas 
partial bank credit rejection may boost self-confidence during the period of financial crisis. 
Although there were higher bank credit rejection rates in 2008, financially self-confident 
owner managers had better access to bank finance in comparison to their non-financially self-
confident counterparts. 
8.4.4 Start-up firms suffered greater credit rejections 
Start-up firms were more likely to be rejected from bank credit. This is a confirmation of 
previous research that older established firms are more successful in access to bank finance, 
including pre-and during financial crisis of 2007. Businesses with experienced owner 
managers were less likely to be rejected for bank finance in 2004. Therefore, we suggest that 
older firms are able to positively exploit their years of business experience in seeking bank 
finance. However, experience does not seem to significantly affect the bank finance outcomes 
in 2008. Hence, when operating in economic hardship, experience seems to play no role. 
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 Start-up firms face greater challenges in accessing finance. The government may 
provide direct support through start-up training and start-up finance in the form of micro 
credit. The government may also target financial support and counselling to the start-up 
entrepreneur on the basis of business potential and viability. 
8.4.5 Gender of the owner has no significant effect on credit rejection rates 
The gender dimension in this research shows that the gender of the owner manager has no 
significant effect on bank finance rejection rate. Therefore, although many research show 
greater financial constraints and risk aversion on the female entrepreneur, there is no gender 
effect in this study. One possibility for this observation is an uneven discouraged borrower 
effect between males and females; the latter showing less confidence in external finance 
seeking. 
8.5 Limitations of this research work 
8.5.1 SME finance data for 2004 and 2008 are based on UK firms 
The SME finance data for 2004 and 2008 are based on UK firms. The firms that participated 
in the 2004 survey were not the same as those of 2008. Therefore, as much as the results may 
be generalizable in the context of SMEs in the UK and, to some extent, other similarly 
developed countries, there must be caution in determining the applicability in worldwide 
context. 
8.5.2 SME finance data for 2004 and 2008 are cross-sectional 
This research is based on the SME finance cross-sectional data for 2004 and 2008. Although 
both year periods provided opportunity for comparative analysis in this research, it does not 
replace the capability of longitudinal panel data. Thus, panel data could have supported 
greater analytical depth and detail of the differences in reported financial self-confidence and 
variations in bank credit rejection rates. 
8.5.3 Financial self-confidence data was limited to sole proprietor and partnership 
The SME finance survey captured financial self-confidence data for sole proprietor and 
partnership businesses only. Therefore, it was not possible to empirically examine other legal 
forms of firms such as limited liability companies, social enterprise and charitable 
organisations. 
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8.6 Further research recommendation 
8.6.1 Explore the role of financial education and financial self-confidence 
The SME finance survey did not capture data beyond sole proprietors and partnership firms. 
Therefore, it is recommended that further research explores the role of financial education 
and financial self-confidence among owner managers in limited liability businesses, charities 
and social enterprises to support their strong growth. 
8.6.2 Explore the role of panel data 
The SME finance survey captured data for 2004 and 2008 resulting in a cross-sectional 
analysis. However, panel data analysis approach has the potential to observe firms over a 
period of time and leads to better analysis and clearer precision of result. Panel data analysis 
approach can capture changes in self-confidence and credit rejection rates with a more 
accurate precision. 
